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  i	  
Abstract	  This	  study	  analyses	  regionalism	  in	  Africa	  from	  a	  theoretical	  and	  an	  applied	  perspective.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  study	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  critical	  and	  reflectivist	  corpus	  of	  theories	  of	   regionalism.	   This	   field	   is	   dominated	   by	   rationalist	   theories	   that	   are	   largely	  preoccupied	   with	   formal	   inter-­‐state	   and	   market-­‐driven	   processes	   of	   regional	  integration.	   The	   rationalist	   theoretical	   hegemony	   in	   academia	   and	   politics	   serves	   to	  reinforce	   and	   reproduce	   neoliberal	   ideology	   informing	   global	   political	   economic	  practices.	   This	   study	   illustrates	   the	   limitations	   and	   normative	   assumptions	   of	   these	  orthodox	   frames	   and	   demonstrates	   the	   multidimensionality	   of	   regionalisation.	   The	  study	   applies	   a	   combination	   of	   three	   critical	   reflectivist	   theories:	   the	   World	   Order	  Approach,	  the	  New	  Regionalism	  Approach	  and	  the	  New	  Regionalisms	  Approach/Weave-­‐world	  in	  an	  analysis	  of	  an	  ongoing	  regional	  oil	  and	  infrastructure	  project	  in	  East	  Africa	  called	   the	   Lamu	   Port,	   South	   Sudan	   and	   Ethiopia	   (LAPSSET)	   Corridor.	   The	   study’s	  primary	  research	  question	  investigates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  oil	  production	  is	  driving	  the	  manifestation	   of	   (new)	   regionalism	   in	   East	   Africa,	   especially	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	  Corridor,	   with	   secondary	   questions	   identifying	   the	   actors	   involved	   in	   this	  regionalisation,	  and	  what	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  reveals	  about	  the	  regionalisation	  in	  East	  Africa.	  After	  a	  review	  of	  some	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  theoretical	  contributions	  to	  the	  study	   of	   regions	   a	   critical	   reflectivist	   approach	   is	   suggested	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	  conventional	  rationalist	  theories.	  A	  broad	  historical	  overview	  of	  the	  East	  African	  region	  is	   elaborated	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   Uganda	   and	   Kenya,	   highlighting	   the	   social,	   cultural,	  political	   and	   economic	   evolution	   of	   the	   region	   before	   reflection	   on	   how	   forces	   of	  production	  relate	  to	  regime	  type	  in	  East	  Africa.	  Subsequently,	  a	  case	  study	  establishes	  an	  assessment	   of	   the	   historical	   and	   social	   construction	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor.	   The	  objectives	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  and	  its	  implementation	  mechanisms	  are	  scrutinised	  and	  viewed	  in	  comparison	  with	  its	  potential	  for	  inclusiveness	  of	  local	  participation	  and	  sustainable	   socio-­‐economic	   development.	   Two	   important	   conclusions	   can	   be	   drawn	  from	  this	  study.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  oil	  production	  is	  critical	  in	  the	  current	  regionalisation	  in	  East	  Africa.	  However,	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  regionalisation	  flows	  contrary	  to	  other	  regional	  motives.	   The	   second	   conclusion	   is	   that	   the	   anti-­‐reductionist	   and	   critical	   reflectivist	  approach	   is	   indeed	   essential	   to	   fully	   understand	   the	   variety	   of	   multi-­‐level	   factors	   of	  structures	  and	  agency	  that	  influence	  regionalism	  and	  regionalisation	  in	  East	  Africa.	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1	  	   Introduction	  
1.1	  	   The	  history	  of	  regionalism	  Regions,	  understood	  as	  the	  connection	  between	  entities	  of	  political,	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  significance	  have	  existed	  for	  a	   long	  time	  in	  our	  history.	  However,	  political	  and	  academic	  debates	  about	  regional	   integration,	  cooperation	  and	  regionalism	  appeared	  in	  Europe	  only	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  In	  the	  last	  decades	  regionalism	  has	  become	  a	  persistent	   attribute	   of	   international	   affairs.	   Only	   one	   member	   of	   the	   World	   Trade	  Organisation	   (WTO)	   –	   Mongolia	   –	   does	   not	   belong	   to	   any	   regional	   arrangement.	  Regionalism	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  forces	  which	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  has	  been	  “challenging	  the	  traditional	   centrality	   of	   states	   in	   international	   relations”	   (Best	   &	   Christiansen	   2012:	  430).	  	  The	  relevance	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  regionalism/regionalisation	  has	  appeared	  and	  disappeared	   like	   ‘waves’	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Second	   World	   War,	   and	   has	   gained	  momentum	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  both	  theoretically	  and	  empirically.	  The	  contemporary	  academic	  debate	  on	  regionalism	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  ‘early’	  and	  the	  more	  ‘recent’	  debate	   on	   regionalism,	   which	   has	   widely	   gained	   acceptance.	   Simultaneously,	   the	   two	  categories	   correspond	   empirically	   with	   a	   first	   ‘old’	   and	   a	   second	   ‘new’	   wave,	  respectively,	  of	  regionalisms.	  Since	  the	  emergence	  of	  regionalism	  in	  the	  political	  and	  academic	  spheres	  there	  has	  been	   an	   evolution	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   theoretical	   perception	   on	   regionalism	   and	  integration	   theory.	   The	   so-­‐called	   mainstream	   theories	   (Neorealism,	   Functionalism,	  Institutionalism	  and	  Regional	  Economic	  Integration)	  have	  dominated	  the	  field	  and	  to	  a	  great	   extent	   influenced	   the	  political	   economic	   strategies	   and	  development	  of	   different	  regional	   projects.	   In	   contrast	   to	   rational,	  mainstream	   theories	   of	   regional	   integration,	  the	   reflectivist	   theoretical	   framework	   –	   New	   Regionalism	   Approach	   (NRA)	   –	   is	   more	  concerned	  about	  the	  historical	  context	  and	  agency	  of	  regionalisation,	  which	  “requires	  in-­‐depth	   knowledge	   of	   how	   actors	   think	   of	   themselves,	   their	  motivations,	   identities	   and	  strategies,	   as	   well	   as	   how	   they	   are	   influenced	   by	   other	   actors	   and	   their	   contextual	  surroundings”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  4).	  Another	  important	  contribution	  by	  Söderbaum	  to	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the	  new	  literature	  on	  regions	  is	  the	  emphasis	  granted	  the	  civil	  society	  as	  a	  dynamic	  force	  on	  the	  regional	  level	  (Söderbaum	  2007).	  	  	  
1.2	  	   Regionalism	  in	  Africa	  and	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  In	  contemporary	  Africa	   regionalism	  (re-­‐)emerged	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	   the	  struggle	  against	  colonialism.	  However,	  these	  regional	  arrangements	  were	  often	  a	  reconstruction	  of	  colonial	  and	  pre-­‐colonial	  regional	  constructs	  (Abir,	  1968;	  Söderbaum	  2004;	  Bakewell	  &	  de	  Haas	  2007).	  In	  the	  pre-­‐colonial	  era	  pastoral	  migration	  patterns	  and	  trade	  caravans	  established	   trade	   routes	   and	   ties	   between	   people	   generating	   proliferation	   of	  commodities,	  language,	  technologies	  and	  culture	  across	  regions	  in	  Africa	  and	  far	  beyond	  the	   continent.	   The	   arrival	   of	   the	   Europeans	   in	   Africa	  witnessed	   the	   reconstruction	   of	  these	  trade	  routes	  and	  regions.	  In	  East	  Africa,	  the	  British	  rulers	  constructed	  railways	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  dominance	  in	  the	  region	  and	  to	  enhance	  the	  potential	  wealth	  in	  the	  coffee,	  tea	   and	   cotton	   production	   in	   the	   region.	   Regional	   institutions	   were	   established	   and	  transnational	  co-­‐operation	  encouraged	  by	  the	  colonialists	   to	  maximise	   the	  potential	  of	  the	   countries.	   With	   independence	   in	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s	   the	   new	   independent	  governments	  sustained	   the	  regional	   institutions	  and	  co-­‐operation.	  The	  current	  greater	  continental	  adherence	   to	   sub-­‐regional	  arrangements	  derives	   from	   the	  approach	  of	   the	  African	   Union	   (AU)	   and	   the	   New	   Partnership	   for	   Africa’s	   Development	   (NEPAD)	   to	  enhance	  intra-­‐regional	  economic	  growth,	  development	  as	  well	  as	  conflict	  management.	  The	   various	   regional	   economic	   communities	   (RECs)	   in	   Africa	   have	   recently	   advanced	  with	  functional	  co-­‐operation.	  However,	  various	  institutional	  weaknesses	  are	  hampering	  national	  implementation	  and	  effective	  integration,	  which	  have	  been	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  assortment	  of	  overlapping	  regional	  arrangements	  on	  the	  continent.	  In	  addition,	  there	  is	  an	  elusiveness	   for	   the	   factors	   required	   for	  deepened	   integration.	  While	   the	  economies	  have	  been	  lacking	  sufficient	  complementarity,	  integration	  has	  also	  been	  hindered	  by	  the	  absence	   of	   strong	   regional	   focal	   points.	   Narrow	   domestic	   constituency	   in	   terms	   of	  pressure	   from	   civil	   society	   and	   business	   interests	   and	   the	   unwillingness	   to	   pool	  sovereignty	   have	   been	   impediments	   to	   real	   integration	   (Economic	   Commission	   for	  Africa	  &	  African	  Union	  2006).	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  East	  African	  region	  is	  not	  a	  novel	  phenomenon,	  and	  the	  East	  African	  Community	  is	  the	  second	  attempt	  in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  era	  to	  established	  a	  formal	  institutionalised	  regional	  community	  in	  East	  Africa.	  Even	  though	  the	  region	  is	  one	  of	  the	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most	   successful	   arrangements	   in	   functional	   regional	   integration	   on	   the	   continent,	   the	  EAC	   faces	  many	  of	   the	   same	  challenges	  as	  other	  RECs	   in	  Africa.	  Poor	   infrastructure	   is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  factors	  behind	  the	  slow	  pace	  of	  regionalisation	  and	  integration	  as	  well	  as	   the	   low	   level	   of	   cross-­‐border,	   intra-­‐regional	   and	   intra-­‐continental	   trade	   in	   Africa.	  Poor	   infrastructure	   is	   also	   the	   reason	   why	   the	   countries’	   peripheral	   micro-­‐regions	  remain	  very	  unproductive.	  A	  report	  by	  the	  African	  Development	  Bank	  (AfDB)	  (2013)	  on	  the	   state	   of	   infrastructure	   in	   East	   Africa	   says	   that	   “[s]urface	   transportation	   costs	  associated	  with	  logistics	  in	  East	  Africa	  are	  higher	  than	  in	  any	  other	  region	  in	  the	  world”	  (AfDB	  2013:	  4).	  	  The	  most	  deprived	  infrastructure	  sector	  in	  East	  Africa	  is	  energy	  production.	  The	  sub-­‐region	  of	  East	  Africa	  “has	  the	  lowest	  generation	  capacity	  after	  Central	  Africa	  […]	  and	  the	  smallest	  per	  capita	  generation	  in	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  continent”	  (AfDB	  2013:	  4).	  The	  AfDB	  (2013:	  4)	  recommends	  enhanced	  regional	  integration	  and	  intra-­‐regional	  trade	  in	  energy	  to	  “reduce	  costs,	  and	  ensure	  greater	  reliability	  of	  supply”.	  The	  recent	  discoveries	  of	  oil	  and	   natural	   gas	   could	   therefore	   present	   several	   factors	   which	   can	   encourage	   and	  facilitate	   regionalisation.	   First,	   and	   because	   of	   the	   geographical	   circumstances	   of	   the	  region,	   the	   countries	   must	   improve	   the	   regional	   infrastructure	   (pipelines,	   roads,	  railways,	  refineries	  and	  ports)	  which	  will	   in	  turn	  allow	  for	  a	  better	  integrated	  regional	  market.	   Second,	   the	   oil	   and	   natural	   gas	   sector	   could	   have	   a	   ripple	   effect	   creating	   job	  opportunities,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  oil	  sector,	  but	  in	  the	  construction	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  infrastructure	  necessary	   to	   support	   the	  oil	  production	   in	   the	   region.	  Third,	   the	  micro-­‐regions	  where	   the	   pipeline	   is	   intended	   to	   go,	  where	   the	   port	   under	   construction	   and	  where	  the	  oil	  extraction	  will	  take	  place	  are	  all	  traditionally	  neglected	  provinces	  of	  East	  Africa.	  As	  reports	  note	  (AfDB	  2013)	  the	  exclusion	  of	  these	  regions	  is	  a	  loss	  of	  potential	  productivity	  and	  increased	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP).	  Fourth,	  the	  introduction	  of	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  to	  the	  regional	  economy	  will	  to	  some	  extent	  help	  diversify	  the	  regional	  economy.	   Fifth,	   the	   political	   elites	   are	   all	   showing	   great	   interest	   in	   developing	   the	  regional	  oil	  production	  and	  infrastructure.	  This	  might	  constitute	  the	  regional	  focal	  point	  the	  region	  has	  been	  missing	  so	  far.	  Sixth,	  while	  oil	  production	  has	  not	  always	  proven	  to	  be	   a	   source	   of	   sustainable	   socioeconomic	   development,	   the	   sector	   seems	   to	   have	  changed	   since	   production	   started	   in,	   for	   example,	   Nigeria.	   Global	   governance	  organisations	   like	   the	   international	   standard	   Extractive	   Industries	   Transparency	  Initiative	   (EITI)	   and	   increased	   pressure	   from	   civil	   society	   organisations	   (CSOs)	  might	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have	   the	   leverage	   to	   secure	   a	  more	   transparent	   and	   inclusive	   industry	   in	   East	   Africa.	  Tanzania	  is	  the	  only	  EAC	  member	  state	  with	  membership	  status	  to	  the	  EITI.	  Uganda	  and	  Kenya	  have	  both	  restated	  their	  intention	  to	  join	  the	  initiative,	  and	  oil	  corporations,	  such	  as	   Tullow	   Oil	   and	   Total,	   with	   extraction	   contracts	   in	   Uganda	   and	   Kenya	   are	   EITI	  stakeholders.	  The	   process	   of	   constructing	   the	   Lamu	   Port,	   South	   Sudan,	   Ethiopia	   (LAPSSET)	  Corridor,	   a	   development	   corridor	   including	   oil	   and	   transportation	   infrastructure	  connecting	  Ethiopia,	  Kenya,	  South	  Sudan	  and	  Uganda,	  is	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  an	  endeavour	  to	  reconstruct	  an	  intra-­‐regional	  liaison	  that	  dates	  back	  at	  least	  to	  the	  18th	  century,	  and	  which	   includes	   the	   area	   today	   consisting	   of	   Northern	   Tanzania,	   Kenya,	   Burundi,	  Rwanda,	   Uganda,	   Southern	   Ethiopia	   and	   South	   Sudan.	   The	   region	   is	   interlinked	   by	  cultural,	   social,	   political,	   economic	   and	   other	   strategic	   factors	   as	   well	   as	   shared	  languages	  and	  long	  historical	  linkages	  (Obala	  2012:	  1).	  The	  caravan	  trade	  routes	  of	  the	  Zanzibari	   merchants	   witnessed	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   trade	   network	   covering	   more	  than	  only	   the	   current	  EAC	   territory,	   and	   includes	  South	  Sudan	  and	  Southern	  Ethiopia.	  These	   trade	   routes	  had	   significant	   impact	  on	   the	   region	  and	   saw	   the	  establishment	  of	  merchant	   villages,	   spreading	   of	   ideas	   and	   culture,	   technology	   and	   language,	   such	   as	  Swahili.	  Several	  of	  the	  countries	  also	  share	  a	  common	  colonial	  history	  under	  the	  British,	  who	  set	  up	  regional	  institutions	  in	  efforts	  to	  integrate	  the	  region.	  At	  present,	  the	  EAC	  is	  constituted	   by	   the	   five	   countries	   of	   Burundi,	   Kenya,	   Rwanda,	   Tanzania	   and	   Uganda.	  South	  Sudan	  is	  an	  aspiring	  member	  to	  the	  community	  after	  its	  separation	  from	  Sudan	  in	  2011	   and	   Kenya	   has	   been	   pushing	   for	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   EAC	   to	   include	   Ethiopia,	  Djibouti	  and	  Somalia.	  There	  have	  been	  more	  recent	  efforts	  to	  create	  economic	  corridors	  between	  the	  east	  African	   countries	   of	   which	   the	   Uganda	   Railway	   is	   one	   example.	   The	   railway	   was	  constructed	  by	  the	  British	  and	  was	  an	  enormous	  and	  highly	  controversial	  project	  of	  its	  time,	   much	   like	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   today.	   The	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   is	   a	   highly	  ambitious	   economic	   development	   project	   which	   will	   provide	   for	   an	   oil	   pipeline	  (connecting	   the	   oil	   reservoirs	   of	   Ethiopia,	   Kenya,	   South	   Sudan	   and	   Uganda),	   railway,	  highway,	  port	   facilities,	   refineries,	  airports	  and	  resorts.	  The	  objectives	  of	   the	  LAPSSET	  according	  to	  Kenya	  Vision	  2030	  is,	  first,	  to	  construct	  an	  intra-­‐regional	  transport	  linkage	  between	  the	  above	  mentioned	  countries.	  Second,	  the	  project	  aims	  at	  promoting	  dynamic	  regional	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   along	   the	   corridor,	   in	   particular	   in	   the	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underdeveloped	   micro-­‐regions	   between	   the	   countries.	   Third,	   the	   LAPSSET	   aims	   to	  advance	  regional	  development	  through	  the	  enhancement	  of	  cross-­‐border	  trade	  (Kenya	  Vision	  2030).	  	  	  	  




1.3	  	   Research	  Problem	  To	  a	  great	  extent,	  regionalism	  is	  a	  political	  phenomenon	  driven	  by	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	   actors	   who	   apply	   it	   for	   different	   purposes.	   By	   taking	   a	   political	   perspective	   on	  regionalization	   this	   study	   attempts	   to	   identify	   the	   kind	   of	   actors	   driving	   the	   regional	  project	  in	  East	  Africa	  as	  well	  as	  their	  means	  and	  purposes.	  
The	  dashed	  red	  line	  and	  the	  black	  one	  to	  Uganda	  show	  the	  LAPSSET	  pipeline.	  (The	  Economist	  (sn.)	  2013)	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The	   construction	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   is	   a	   huge	   project	   with	   a	   price	   tag	  exceeding	  US$30	  billion.	  The	  participating	  countries	  will	  finance	  parts	  of	  it,	  but	  the	  main	  bulk	  of	   the	   expenses	  will	   be	   covered	   through	  a	  public-­‐private-­‐partnership	   (PPP),	   thus	  giving	  much	  ownership	  to	  external	  and	  private	  actors.	  The	  Treaty	  for	  the	  Establishment	  of	   the	   East	   African	   Community	   stresses	   the	   advancement	   of	   people-­centred,	   market	  driven	  integration,	  inclusive	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  participation	  of	  the	   expansion	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   development,	   and	   to	   strive	   for	   harmonious	   and	  
balanced	  growth	  and	  sustainable	  economic	  expansion	  conscious	  of	  equitable	  distribution	  (EAC	   2006).	   Therefore,	   one	   of	   the	   issues	   raised	   in	   this	   study	   is	   the	   compatibility	  between	  the	  means	  and	  strategy	  of	   the	  market	   forces	   involved	  in	  the	  LAPSSET	  project	  and	   the	   oil	   industry	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   visions	   and	   commitments	   of	   the	   East	  African	  regional	  project	  on	  the	  other.	  	   The	   LAPSSET	  Corridor	   stretches	   across	   the	   region’s	   peripheral	   and	   historically	  marginalised	   and	   excluded	   territory	   and	   thus	   its	   impact	   is	   expected	   to	   “create	   jobs,	  reduce	   poverty,	   improve	   terms	   of	   trade	   and	   lower	   the	   cost	   of	   doing	   business”	   (RoK	  2011:	   24)	   on	   a	   local,	   national	   and	   regional	   level,	   but	   the	   actual	   inclusiveness	   of	   the	  LAPSSET	   Corridor	   and	   the	   associated	   oil	   industry	   in	   terms	   of	   local	   and	   regional	  participation	  is	  being	  questioned	  by	  the	  citizenry	  and	  civil	  society	  groups	  who	  fear	  their	  interests	  will	   be	   sidelined	   for	   capital	   interests	   of	  members	   of	   the	   elite,	   as	  well	   as	   for	  external	  and	  private	  actors.	   In	  the	  same	  vein,	   the	  construction	  of	   the	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  corridor	  will	  demand	  extensive	   labour	  participation,	  but	   it	   is	  debatable	  how	  much	  socio-­‐economic	  developmental	  potential	  can	  be	  expected	  from	  the	  oil	  production	  in	  the	  region.	  	   With	   reference	   to	   the	   EAC	   Treaty	   and	   its	   commitment	   to	   work	   with	   different	  stakeholders	  on	  the	  advancement	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  development,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  goals	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  address	  the	  multidimensional	  societal	  process	  of	  regionalism	  in	  which	  states	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  such	  as	  “markets	  and	  the	  civil	  societies	  are	  all	  involved	  in	   a	   series	   of	   overlapping,	   contradictory	   and	   sometimes	   competing	   forms	   of	  regionalism”	   (Hettne	   2004:	   xiii).	   A	   key	   issue	   to	   be	   examined	   is	   the	   role	   for	   external	  actors	   and	   civil	   society	   organisations	   in	   a	   regional	   infrastructure	   and	   oil	   production	  project	  such	  as	  the	  LAPSSET.	  	   Finally,	  apart	  from	  the	  aim	  to	  provide	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  the	  East	  African	   region,	   the	   study	  assesses	   to	  what	  extent	   the	  New	  Regionalism	  Approach	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(NRA)	  can	  provide	  the	  lens	  and	  explanatory	  tools	  to	  assess	  political	  regionalisation	  and	  oil	  production	  in	  East	  Africa.	  
	  
1.4	  	   Research	  Questions	  The	   aim	   of	   this	   study	   is	   to	   analyse	   a	   regional	   project	   using	   a	   specific	   theoretical	  approach.	  This	   study	  answers	  a	   set	  of	   research	  questions.	   In	  order	   to	  answer	   them,	   it	  first	  establishes	  an	  understand	  how	  processes	  of	  regionalisation	  is	  formed	  and	  how	  they	  are	   connected	   to	   different	   agencies,	   what	   the	   motives	   are	   for	   regionalism	   and	  regionalisation,	  what	  is	  driving	  the	  ‘urge	  to	  merge’,	  how	  the	  key	  actors	  are	  involved	  in,	  supporting	   or	   opposing	   the	   process	   of	   regionalisation,	   and	   finally,	   who	   the	   different	  actors	  are	  and	  how	  their	  relative	  strengths	  are	  distributed.	  This	   study	   addresses	   the	   following	   research	   questions,	   grouped	   in	   one	   primary	  question	  and	  two	  secondary	  questions:	  	  	   1. To	   what	   extent	   is	   oil	   production	   driving	   (new)	   regionalisation	   in	   East	   Africa,	  specifically	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor?	  2. Which	  actors	  are	  involved	  in	  this	  regionalisation?	  3. What,	  if	  anything,	  does	  the	  New	  Regionalism	  Approach	  reveal	  about	  the	  current	  regionalisation	  in	  East	  Africa?	  	  	  
1.5	  	   Theoretical	  framework	  During	  and	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  a	  debate	  emerged	  from	  certain	  political	  and	  academic	  circles	  in	  Europe	  about	  regional	  cooperation	  and	  integration.	  This	  debate	  was	   mainly	   preoccupied	   with	   the	   European	   experience	   and	   applied	   a	   theoretical	  framework	  with	   states	   and	   inter-­‐state	   institutions	   as	   their	   central	   objects	   of	   analysis.	  Within	  the	  historical	  context	  and	  resulting	  from	  structural	  transformations	  of	  the	  global	  system	   in	   the	   1980s	   a	   pluralisation	   of	   the	   academic	   discourse	   developed.	   New	  approaches,	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Order	  Approach	  (Gamble	  &	  Payne	  2003,	  1996),	  the	  New	  Regionalism	  Approach	  (NRA)	  (Söderbaum	  2009,	  2004;	  Söderbaum	  &	  Taylor	  2008;	  Shaw	  2000;	  Neumann,	  2003;	  Hettne	  2003;	  Hettne	  &	  Söderbaum	  1998)	  and	  the	  NRA/Weave-­‐world	   (Bøås	   et	   al.	   1999,	   2003)	   challenge	   the	   state-­‐centric,	   market-­‐oriented,	   problem	  solving	   theorisation	  of	   ‘old	   regionalism’,	   and	   inform	   the	   theoretical	   framework	  of	   this	  study.	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Counter	   to	   the	   dominant	   perception	   in	   the	   field	   of	   regionalism,	   this	   study	  suggests	  that	  regionalism	  in	  East	  Africa	  is	  comprehensive	  and	  has	  many	  dimensions.	  In	  line	  with	  this	  argument	  the	  study	  questions	  the	  applicability	  of	  rationalist	  and	  to	  a	  large	  respect	   positivist	   theoretical	   frameworks,	   in	   particular	   with	   regard	   to	   their	   way	   of	  producing	   knowledge	   and	   their	   limited	   focus	   on	   formal	   and	   inter-­‐state	   frameworks	  (Smith	   2002:	   70-­‐72;	   Smith	   &	   Owens	   2008:	   176-­‐177).	   Therefore,	   the	   proposed	  theoretical	   framework	   of	   this	   study	   is	   based	   on	   the	   New	   Regionalism(s)	   Approach	  (NRA).	   The	  NRA	   begins	   from	   a	   point	   of	   view	   that	   contemporary	   regionalism	  must	   be	  treated	   as	   a	   qualitatively	   novel	   phenomenon,	   in	   an	   ongoing	   process	   within	   a	   new	  context	  and	  a	  new	  content	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  30).	   It	  emphasises	  the	  historical	  context	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  inclusiveness	  of	  the	  various	  relationships	  between	  the	  state,	  the	  market,	   the	   society	   and	   external	   forces	   existing	   within	   a	   particular	   regional	   space.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  theoretical	  approaches	  dominating	  studies	  on	  regionalism,	  the	  NRA	  also	  recognises	  that	  regions	  are	  socially	  constructed	  and	  reconstructed	  by	  these	  forces	  that	  join	   together	   in	   various	   forms	   of	   associations	   serving	   interests	   not	   necessarily	  compatible	   with	   those	   of	   other	   regional	   agents.	   This	   critical	   and	   anti-­‐reductionist	  approach	  is	  intended	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  structurally	  and	  agency	  related	  multifaceted	  factors	  engaged	  in	  and	  driving	  the	  process	  of	  regionalisation	  in	  East	  Africa.	  	  	   The	   study	   is	   based	   on	   three	   directly	   inter-­‐related	   assumptions.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	  theories	  about	  our	  world	  reflect	  the	  actual	  reality	  of	  it.	  Secondly,	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  world	  depends	  on	  theories	  about	  it.	  Finally,	  and	  deduced	  from	  the	  former	  assumptions,	  all	   theories	  are	  value	   loaded	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  3;	   see	  also	  Cox	  1981).	  The	   theoretical	  framework	   in	   this	   study	   departs	   from	   the	   two	  most	   ideal	   approaches	   of	   building	   and	  testing	   theory.	   It	   transcends	   the	   deductive	   research	   approach	   because	   this	   approach	  entails	   that	   theory	   is	   created	   proceeding	   observation.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   it	   also	  transcends	   inductive	   theory	   since	   “[t]he	   limits	   inherent	   in	   inductive	   generalization	  would	  also	  circumscribe	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  theoretical	  contribution”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  3).	  Rather,	   this	   study	   complies	   with	   an	   eclectic	   and	   active	   comprehension	   of	   the	  hypothetico-­‐deductive	   research	   approach,	   alternating	   and	   bringing	   together	   theory-­‐loaded	  empirical	  data	  and	  empirically	   informed	  theory,	  which	  provides	   for	   the	  mutual	  redefinition	  of	  each	  of	  them	  against	  each	  other	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  3;	  Blaikie	  2004:	  469-­‐471).	  This	  combination	  facilitates	  a	  more	  thorough	  investigation	  of	  the	  case	  study	  (the	  LAPSSET	   Corridor),	   in	   which	   the	   theory	   (i.e.	   the	   NRA)	   and	   the	   empirical	   field	   under	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examination	  (i.e.	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  regionalism	  in	  East	  Africa)	  are	  elaborated	  in	  a	  process	  of	  reciprocal	  reinforcement.	  	   The	   theoretical	   framework	   of	   the	   study	   is	   occupied	   with	   the	   process	   of	  regionalism	   and	   agency	   within	   a	   regional	   project.	   From	   a	   global	   political	   economy	  perspective,	  this	  study	  affiliates	  with	  the	  critical	  and	  reflectivist	  branch	  and	  is	  therefore	  also	  interested	  in	  widening	  the	  focus	  on	  states	  and	  markets	  to	  include	  ideas,	  identities,	  external	   actors,	   social	   forces	   and	   civil	   societies	   to	   the	   framework.	   In	   fact,	   the	   NRA	  borrows	  from	  Karl	  Polanyi	  the	  idea	  about	  “the	  (potential)	  political	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  a	  means	  for	  the	  weak	  and	  the	  poor	  to	  protect	  themselves”	  in	  the	  process	  of	  regionalism	  (Söderbaum	   2004:	   32).	   Regionalism	   is	   not	   simply	   about	   economic	   networks	   and	  arrangements;	  it	  is	  also	  about	  social	  and	  cultural	  networks	  (Hettne	  1994:	  37).	  	   This	   study	   perceives	   regions	   of	   being	   social	   constructs	   and	   aligns	   with	   the	  proposition	   made	   by	   Iver	   Neumann	   (2003:	   161)	   that	   “[t]he	   existence	   of	   regions	   is	  preceded	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  region	  builders.”	  On	  a	  similar	  note,	  the	  NRA	  asks	  “by	  whom,	  for	  whom	   and	   for	  what	   purpose	   regionalism	   is	   being	   pursued”	   (Söderbaum	  2004:	   6).	  Regionalisms	   in	   the	   perspective	   of	   this	   study	   is	   a	   complex,	   heterogeneous,	  multidimensional	   and	   inclusive,	   but	   also	   contradictive	   phenomenon,	   which	   is	   being	  played	   out	   in	   various	   sectors,	   driven	   by	   different	   states	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors	   located	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  institutionalised	  regional	  arrangements.	  The	  plural	  form	  of	  the	  word	   indicates	   “the	   pluralistic	   nature	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   rather	   than	   the	   perceived	  ‘singularity’	  of	  other	  approaches”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  33).	  	   Despite	   the	   association	   with	   the	   NRA	   framework,	   the	   study	   is	   also	   somewhat	  critical	  about	  its	  unduly	  optimistic	  perception	  of	  formal	  regionalism	  and	  overemphasis	  on	   the	   role	  of	   states.	   Instead,	   this	   study	  aligns	  with	   the	  version	  of	   the	  NRA	  associated	  with	  Söderbaum	  (2004),	  Marchand	  (Marchand	  et	  al.	  1999),	  Bøås	  (Bøås	  et	  al.	  1999)	  and	  Shaw	  (1998,	  2000)	  (i.e.	  the	  NRA/weave-­‐world),	  which	  gives	  more	  emphasis	  to	  ‘informal	  regionalism	   from	   below’.	   This	   approach	   gives	   tribute	   to	   an	   array	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors,	  including:	   transnational	   corporations	   (i.e.	   oil	   companies),	   ecologies,	   civil	   societies	   and	  development	   corridors.	   According	   to	   this	   approach	   “[i]t	   is	   only	   when	   we	   make	  deliberate	   attempts	   to	   connect	   the	   two	   broad	   processes	   of	   formal	   and	   informal	  regionalism	   that	   we	   can	   get	   a	   clearer	   picture	   of	   the	   connections	   between	   them”	  (Marchand	  et	  al.	  1999:	  905-­‐6).	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   This	   approach	   provides	   new	   and	   critical	   knowledge	   about	   the	   logics	   of	   the	  political	  economy	  of	  regionalism	  in	  East	  Africa	  while	  also	  informing	  the	  theoretical	  body	  on	  regionalism.	  	  	  
1.6	  	   Methodology	  This	  is	  a	  qualitative	  study	  based	  mainly	  on	  secondary	  sources	  and	  gray	  literature,	  but	  includes	  a	  handful	  of	  interviews	  with	  key	  informants.	  The	  study	  applies	  an	  eclectic	  and	   dynamic	   perception	   of	   the	   hypothetico-­‐deductive	   research	   approach.	   Thus,	   it	  combines	   and	   interchange	   between	   empirically	   informed	   theory	   and	   theory-­‐loaded	  empirical	  data,	  reciprocally	  reinterpreted	  (Blaikie	  2004:	  469-­‐471;	  Alvesson	  &	  Sköldberg	  1992:	  42).	  	   In	  complex	  situations	  like	  the	  one	  under	  examination,	  when	  separating	  cause	  and	  context	   is	   difficult,	   a	   case	   study	   is	   often	   recommended	   (Yin	   2013:	   23).	   The	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  case	  study	  approach	  is	  also	  justified	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  generates	  mutually	   informative	   cross-­‐communication	   between	   theory	   and	   empirical	   analysis	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  4).	  A	  combination	  of	  ‘theoretical	  sampling’	  and	  ‘snowball	  sampling’	  is	  applied	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  socio-­‐political	  processes	  of	  the	  case	  under	  assessment	   in	   this	   study.	   With	   theoretical	   sampling	   “cases	   are	   selected	   specifically	  because	   the	   analysis	   is	   intended	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   some	   aspect	   of	   theory”	   of	   particular	  interest	   (Henn	   et	   al.	   2009:	   71;	   see	   also	   Neuman	   2011:	   270).	   Snowball	   sampling	   “is	   a	  multistage	   technique	   [that]	  begins	  with	  one	  or	   a	   few	  people	  or	   cases	  and	   spreads	  out	  based	  on	  links	  to	  the	  initial	  cases”	  (Neuman	  2011:	  269;	  see	  also	  Henn	  et	  al.	  2009:	  183).	  Semi-­‐structured	   or	   informal	   respondent	   interviews	   have	   been	   applied,	   involving	  selected	  representatives	  from	  different	  sectors	  and	  on	  different	  levels.	  The	  flexible	  and	  fluid	   structure	   of	   this	   method	   allows	   the	   interview	   to	   be	   shaped	   more	   by	   the	  perspectives	   of	   the	   interviewees	   rather	   than	   by	   a	   strictly	   structured	   list	   of	   prepared	  interview	  questions	  which	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  constrain	  the	  respondent’s	  answers.	  The	  informal	   structure	   of	   the	   semi-­‐structured	   interview	   also	   generates	  more	   exposure	   to	  information	   and	   aspects	   unknown	   to	   the	   interviewer	   (Mason	   2004:	   1021-­‐1022).	   The	  selection	  of	  the	  interviewees	  will	  depend	  on	  their	  roles	  and	  relevance	  for	  the	  particular	  issue	   under	   investigation,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   general	   accessibility	   of	   the	   interviewee.	   The	  selection	  of	   interviewees	  will	   include	  key	  representatives	  from	  the	  civil	  society,	   the	  oil	  sector	  and	  external	  donor	  institutions.	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   In	  recognition	  of	  the	  ethical	  codes	  of	  conduct	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  policy	  for	  responsible	  research	  conduct	  at	  Stellenbosch	  University,	  this	  study	  has	  ensured	  that	  all	   relevant	   ethical	   standards	   have	   been	   applied.	   Although	   the	   participation	   in	   the	  research	  entails	  a	  low	  risk	  of	  harm	  to	  the	  participants,	  all	  necessary	  procedures	  has	  and	  will	  be	  taken	  to	  ensure	  their	  safety	  and	  confidentiality.	  No	  information	  gathered	  through	  interviewees	   has	   been	   used	   without	   written	   or	   oral	   consent.	   Participants	   were	   not	  interviewed	  without	  prior	   information	  about	   their	   right	   to	  refuse	   to	  answer	  questions	  and	  their	  right	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  interview	  at	  any	  time.	  Moreover,	  all	  data	  collection	  and	  interview	  material	  have	  and	  will	  be	  kept	  secure	  to	  protect	  any	  personal	  data	  from	  improper	   access.	   In	   the	   event	   that	   an	   emergency	   situation	   was	   revealed	   during	   the	  research,	   the	   supervisor	   and/or	   Departmental	   Chair	   would	   have	   been	   informed	  instantly	  for	  further	  guidance.	  Finally,	  any	  unsolicited	  information	  emerging	  during	  the	  research	  has	  and	  will	  not	  be	  disclosed	  except	  if	  required	  so	  by	  law.	  	  
1.7	  	   Chapter	  Outline	  1. Introduction	  and	  outline	  of	  the	  history,	  theory,	  case	  study,	  conceptualisation,	  and	  methodology;	  2. Theory:	   after	   a	   short	   introduction	   about	   theories	   on	   regions	   and	   the	   NRA	  contribution,	  this	  chapter	  will	  present	  a	  review	  of	  the	  major	  contributions	  to	  the	  field	   including	   the	   traditional	  mainstream	   approach	   to	   regionalism,	   the	   critical	  reflectivist	   contributions	   to	   the	   study,	   regionalism	   in	   Africa	   and	   civil	   society	  regionalism;	  3. Conceptualisation:	  this	  chapter	  will	  provide	  historical	  background	  on	  the	  central	  and	  east	  African	  region	  from	  pre-­‐colonial	   times	  to	  present.	  Then	   it	  will	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  strucure	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  region	  by	  elaborating	  on	  the	  evolution	   of	   the	   state-­‐society	   complex	   focusing	   on	   Uganda	   and	   Kenya.	   This	  chapter	  also	  highlights	  historical	  tensions	  in	  the	  region	  which	  currently	  are	  being	  reinvigorated	   and	   reinforced	   by	   the	   LAPSSET	   project.	   In	   order	   to	   show	   the	  intelinkages	  between	  agency	  and	  structure	  and	  to	  illustrate	  by	  whom,	  for	  whom	  and	   for	   what	   purpose	   oil	   regionalisation	   is	   being	   conducted	   it	   provides	   an	  analysis	  of	  the	  oil	  agreement	  between	  Uganda	  and	  the	  oil	  companies;	  4. Case	   study	   analysis:	   This	   chapter	   will	   integrate	   the	   theoretical	   and	   case	   study	  material	  from	  the	  second	  and	  third	  chapters	  to	  address	  the	  research	  problem	  and	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Chapter	  2	  	  
	  
2	  	   Review	  of	  theories	  of	  regionalism	  Regionalism,	  as	  the	  connection	  of	  separate	  political,	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  entities	   via	   different	   interactions	   and	   interdependencies	   is	   apparent	   in	   historical	  records	   dating	   long	   back	   to	   early	   in	   our	   history	   as	   humans	   (Söderbaum	   2004;	  Mattli	  1999).	  However,	   the	  debates	  about	   regional	   integration,	   co-­‐operation	  and	   regionalism	  only	   appeared	   in	   European	   academic	   and	   political	   debates	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	  Second	   World	   War.	   This	   debate	   was	   motivated	   by	   the	   issue	   on	   how	   to	   prevent	   the	  reoccurrence	  of	  war	   in	  Europe	  and	   the	  assurance	  of	  peaceful	  coexistence	  between	   the	  traditional	  belligerents	  of	  the	  region	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  16;	  see	  also	  2008:	  4	  Mattli	  1999:	  69;	   see	   Hettne	   and	   Söderbaum	   2008:	   63).	   Since	   then,	   the	   academic	   development	   has	  introduced	  a	  delineation	  between	  the	  “early”	  and	  a	  more	  “recent”	  debate	  on	  regionalism	  which	  has	  widely	  gained	  acceptance.	  Simultaneously,	   these	   two	  categories	  correspond	  empirically	  with	  an	  ‘old’	  and	  a	  ‘new’	  wave	  of	  regionalisms.	  The	  early	  debate	  was	  largely	  Euro-­‐centric,	  as	  it	  was	  predominantly	  engrossed	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  European	  states	  and	  inter-­‐state	  frameworks	  as	  the	  key	  objects	  in	  formal	  regionalism.	  This	  changed	  with	  the	  second	   empirical	   wave	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1980s	   with	   regionalism	   witnessing	   a	  global	   ‘renaissance’	  prompted	  by	  major	  structural	  transformation	  in	  the	  global	  system,	  which	   saw	   the	   pluralisation	   of	   the	   academic	   discourse	   (Hettne	   2005:	   545-­‐550;	  Söderbaum	   2003a:	   3-­‐4;	   2009:	   479-­‐483	   and	   2011:	   51).	   However,	   it	   has	   been	  convincingly	   argued	   that	   the	   temporal	   perception	   of	   ‘old’	   and	   ‘new’	   regionalism	   has	  limited	  relevance	  because	  of	  several	  continuities,	  similarities	  as	  well	  as	  discontinuities	  between	  earlier	  practices,	  processes	  and	  theorisation	  of	  regions	  and	  more	  recent	  ones	  (Hettne	   &	   Söderbaum	   2008:	   62;	   see	   also	   Hettne	   2005:	   543;	   Söderbaum	   2004:	   16).	  Therefore,	   instead	   of	   differentiating	   between	   temporal	   regionalisms	   (cf.	   de	   Melo	   &	  Panagariya	   1993:5),	   Björn	   Hettne	   (1999b:	   8)	   suggests	   that	   “the	   identification	   of	   new	  patterns	   of	   regionalization	   (co-­‐existing	   with	   older	   forms)	   [as]	   more	   relevant.”	   This	  entails	  an	  understanding	  of	  new	  regionalism	  not	   in	  a	   temporal	  but	  an	  empirical	   sense	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  16).	  	   This	  chapter	  will	  present	  a	  theoretical	  review	  of	  the	  major	  contributions,	  in	  terms	  of	  conceptualisation	  and	  empirical	  research	  and	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  regionalism.	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It	  will	   provide	   a	   critique	  of	   rationalist	   theories	   and	   sketch	  out	   this	   study’s	   theoretical	  framework.	  This	  chapter	  presents	  a	   theoretical	  background	  on	  how	  regions	  have	  been	  understood	   and	   theorised	   since	   the	   Second	  World	  War.	   Base	   on	   this	   background,	   the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  comprehensive	  theoretical	  framework	  designed	  to	   address	   the	   multidimensional	   and	   heterogeneous	   features	   of	   the	   regionalisation	  project	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  and	  its	  associated	  oil	  production.	  After	  a	  presentation	  of	  influential	  theoretical	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  regions,	  the	  chapter	  ends	  by	  looking	  closer	  at	  three	  contemporary	  critical/reflective	  approaches	  in	  order	  to	  build	  a	  capacity	  to	   understand	   by	   whom,	   for	   whom	   and	   for	   what	   purpose	   regionalism	   emerge	   (see	  Söderbaum	  2003b;	  2004).	  Using	  this	  approach	  and	  these	  questions	  as	  a	  reference	  point	  the	  next	  chapters	  will	  answer	  the	  research	  questions:	  (1)	  to	  what	  extent	  oil	  production	  is	   driving	   (new)	   regionalism	   in	   East	   Africa,	   specifically	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	  Corridor;	  (2)	  which	  actors	  are	  involved	  in	  this	  regionalisation;	  and,	  (3)	  what,	  if	  anything	  does	   the	   New	   Regionalism	   Approcah	   reveal	   about	   the	   current	   regionalisation	   in	   East	  Africa.	  Rationalist	   theory,	   according	   to	   Smith	   (2001:	   184-­‐5),	   is	   a	   categorisation	   of	   the	  theories	  of	  neo-­‐realism	  and	  neo-­‐liberalism	  as	  well	  as	  several	  of	   their	   forerunners.	  The	  reflectivist	   category	   contains	   various	   approaches,	   such	   as	   feminism,	   postmodernism,	  normative	  and	  critical	  theory	  and	  historical	  sociology.	  In	  between	  these	  two	  categories	  (middle-­‐ground)	   social	   constructivists	   studying	   international	   relations	   (IR)	   attempt	   to	  transcend	   (bridge)	   the	   two	   positions.	   The	   rationalist	   approaches	   relate	   to	  epistemological	   and	  ontological	   assumptions	  built	   on	   rational	   choice	  and	  perceives	  all	  actors	   as	   egoistic	   with	   pre-­‐given	   interests,	   ideas	   and	   identities.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  reflectivists	   and	   constructivists	   take	   interests,	   ideas	   and	   identities	   as	   activated	   and	  informed	  after	   interaction.	   In	  other	  words,	   reflectivists	  and	  constructivists	  understand	  and	   study	   interests,	   ideas	   and	   identities	   as	   formed	   by	   inter-­‐subjective	   practices	   and	  processes	  of	  social	  interaction	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  15).	  	  	   This	  chapter	  is	  subdivided	  into	  four	  sections,	  where	  the	  first	  two	  sections	  address	  some	   of	   the	  most	   influential	   rationalist	   and	  mainstream	   contributions.	   The	   third	   and	  fourth	  sections	  will	  focus	  on	  some	  of	  the	  critical	  and	  reflectivist	  approaches,	  divided	  into	  the	  World	  Order	  Approach	  (WOA)	  and	  the	  earlier	  and	  more	  contemporary	  versions	  of	  the	   New	   Regionalism(s)	   Approach	   (NRA).	   The	   reflectivist	   approaches	   dispute	   the	  exclusionary	  mainstream	  and	  rationalist	   focus	  on	  states,	  markets	  and	   their	  normative,	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formalistic	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  theorisation	  of	  regionalism.	  An	  updated	  version	  of	  the	  New	  Regionalism	  Approach	  serves	  as	  this	  study’s	  theoretical	  framework.	  	  	  
2.1	  	   The	   early	   debate:	   the	   European	   Integration	   Theories	   and	   the	  
Developmental	  Integration	  Model	  
2.1.1	  	   Europe:	  the	  pivot	  of	  conventional	  approaches	  to	  regionalism	  The	  early	  political	  debate	  on	  regionalism	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  preservation	  of	  European	  peace	   and	   security	   was	   directed	   by	   elements	   from	   within	   the	   federalist	   idealists	  movement,	  who	   after	   two	  world	  wars	   had	   grown	   highly	   sceptical	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state.	  This	  movement	   of	   European	   federalism	   should	   therefore	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   political	  programme	  rather	  than	  an	  integration	  theory	  (Hettne	  2005:	  546;	  Rosamond	  2000:	  23;	  Söderbaum	   2009:	   480;	   Burgess	   2009:	   31).	  Within	   this	   federalist	  movement	   existed	   a	  division	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   strategy	   of	   unifying	   Europe.	   Two	   influential	   figures	   are	  representative	  of	  the	  two	  branches	  of	  federalist	  Europe:	  Altiero	  Spinelli	  were	  the	  main	  proponent	   of	   the	   “democratic	   radicalism”,	   envisioning	   the	   construction	   of	   Europe	  through	  political	  institutions	  with	  a	  European	  constitution	  drafted	  by	  a	  strong	  European	  parliamentary.	   Jean	   Monnet	   stood	   in	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   other	   federalist	   branch	  advocating	   “federalism	   through	   instalments”.	   Monnet	   believed	   that	   “the	   political	  strategy	   of	   small,	   concrete,	   economic	   steps	   would	   culminate	   in	   a	   federal	   Europe”	  (Burgess	   2009:	   32;	   italics	   in	   original).	   However,	   certain	   national	   decision	   makers	  opposed	   the	   federalist	   project	   and	   had	   some	   of	   their	   ventures,	   such	   as	   the	   European	  Political	  Community	  (EPC)	  and	  the	  European	  Defence	  Community	  (EDC),	  to	  fail.	  Setbacks	   to	   the	   aspirations	   of	   key	   proponents	   of	   European	   federalism	   through	  the	   creation	   of	   a	   federation	   of	   Europe	   by	   means	   of	   a	   popular	   constitutional	   process	  witnessed	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	   less	  political	  but	  more	   functional	  approach	  to	  European	  transnational	  cooperation.	  While	  functionalism	  had	  in	  common	  with	  federalism	  many	  of	  the	   same	   normative	   aspirations,	   peace	   building	   and	   diminishing	   the	   nation-­‐state,	  functionalism	   favoured	   technocracy	   and	   emphasised	   economics	   to	   politics.	   In	   the	  functionalists’	   view	   form	   was	   secondary	   to	   function.	   For	   David	   Mitrany,	   the	   main	  theorist	  of	  the	  functionalist	  school,	  the	  federalist	  picture	  of	  a	  European	  community	  was	  merely	   a	   reproduction	   of	   the	  Westphalian	   logic	   of	   territoriality,	  which	   entails	   conflict	  and	  war	  (Hettne	  2005:	  546).	  Therefore	  the	  European	  Coal	  and	  Steel	  Community	  (ECSC),	  witch	   was	   based	   on	   the	   technical	   question	   of	   how	   best	   to	   organise	   coal	   and	   steel	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production,	   was	   the	   solution,	   while	   the	   European	   Community	   (EC),	   a	   political	  community	   based	   on	   the	   traditional	   relationship	   between	   authority	   and	   a	   defined	  territory	  was	  unacceptable.	  Instead,	  authority	  should	  be	  ascribed	  “to	  activities	  based	  in	  areas	  of	  agreement”	  (Mattli	  1999:	  21).	  Rejecting	  a	  political	  governance	  where	  the	  motive	  is	   the	   achievement	   and	   withholding	   of	   power,	   Mitrany	   proposed	   a	   technocratic	   and	  rational	  vision	  of	  human	  governance	  which	  relates	  to	  economics	  rather	  than	  politics	  and	  where	   the	   creation	   of	   transnational	   organisations	   are	   driven	   by	   the	   technocratic	   and	  rational	  pursuit	  of	  common	  needs	  and	  goods	  (Söderbaum	  2009:	  480;	  Rosamond	  2000:	  33).	   While	   functionalism	   was	   more	   of	   a	   strategy,	   “or	   a	   normative	   method”	   than	   a	  theory	   (Söderbaum	   2009:	   480),	   the	   first	   essential	   theory	   of	   regional	   integration	  appeared	   with	   the	   offspring	   of	   functionalism.	   Neo-­‐functionalism	   appeared	   in	   the	   late	  1950s	  through	  the	  theoretical	   framework	  elaborated	   in	  the	  work	  of	  Ernst	  Haas	  and	  is,	  arguably,	  the	  first	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  political	  integration	  (Burley	  &	  Mattli	  1993:	  53).	  Neo-­‐functionalism	   acquired	   a	   profound	   reputation	   during	   the	   1960s	   and	   has	   been	  identified	  as	  “the	  paradigm	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  (EC)”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  21).	  In	   addition,	   succeeding	   regional	   integration	   projects,	   e.g.	   in	   Africa	   and	   Latin	   America,	  have	   used	   neo-­‐functionalism	   as	   their	   model.	   Neo-­‐functionalism	   builds	   on	   its	  predecessor	   emphasising	   “mechanisms	   of	   technocratic	   decision-­‐making,	   incremental	  change	  and	  learning	  processes”	  around	  specific	  sectors	  of	  co-­‐operation	  and	  pertains	  the	  spur	   for	   regional	   cooperation	   as	   economic	   interdependency	   (Niemann	   &	   Schmitter	  2009:	  2,	  6).	  An	  important	  aspect	  to	  Haas’	  theory	  is	  the	  logic	  of	  “spillover	  effects”,	   from	  one	  policy	  coordination	  area	  to	   the	  other,	   i.e.:	   technical	  and	   functional	  pressures	  upon	  decision-­‐makers	  would	  cause	  deepened	  integration.	  Neo-­‐functionalism	  differs	  from	  functionalism	  in	  its	  rejection	  of	  “the	  functionalist	  assumption	  of	   separability	   of	   politics	   and	   economics”	   and	   it	   directs	  more	   attention	   to	  the	  centres	  of	  power	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  21;	  see	  Haas	  1958,	  1964).	  It	  applies	  a	  utilitarian	  notion	   of	   interest	   politics,	   and	   the	   main	   actors	   in	   the	   process	   of	   integration	   are	  supranational	  regional	  institutions,	  states,	  regionally	  formed	  interest	  groups	  and	  social	  movements	   and	  political	   parties	   (Mattli	   1999:	  24;	   Söderbaum	  2004:	  21).	   From	  a	  neo-­‐functionalist	   perspective,	   integration	   does	   not	   postulate	   benevolence,	   harmony	   of	  interests,	   or	   a	   commitment	   to	   the	   common	   good:	   “Ruthless	   egoism	   does	   the	   trick	   by	  itself”	   (Burley	   &	   Mattli	   1993:	   54).	   States	   maintain	   an	   important	   role	   as	   actors	   and	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initiators	  of	  the	  institutions	  and	  supranational	  authorities,	  but	  the	  regional	  institutional	  design,	   which	   is	   emphasised	   in	   the	   framework,	   recognises	   the	   subsequent	   regional	  bureaucrats,	  interest	  groups	  and	  self-­‐organised	  interests	  as	  also	  important	  actors	  in	  the	  process.	  	  	   As	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  deepening	  economic	  integration	  in	  Europe	  in	  the	  1950s	  further	  elaboration	  in	  the	  field	  of	  economics	  was	  developed.	  This	  was	  in	  particular	  the	  case	  with	  regard	  to	  Jacob	  Viner’s	  (1950)	  theory	  for	  the	  customs	  union.	  Its	  focus	  was	  on	  trade	  and	  contained	  the	  step-­‐wise	  vision	  of	  integration	  which	  include	  a	  free	  trade	  area	  (FTA),	  customs	  union,	  common	  market,	  economic	  union/community	  before	  reaching	  the	  final	   stage	   of	   political	   union.	   The	   theory	   on	   optimum	   currency	   areas	   pioneered	   by	  Robert	  Mundell	  (1961)	  contemplated	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	   incorporation	  or	  the	  novel	  creation	   of	   currencies	   and	   established	   certain	   criteria	   for	   the	   success	   of	   a	   currency	  union.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  Béla	  Balassa	  (1961,	  1967	  &	  1975)	  developed	  a	  model	  of	  linear	  consecutive	  steps	  of	  deepening	  economic	  integration	  or	  market	  integration.	  This	  model	  is	   based	   on	   the	   assumption	   of	   liberalised	   intra-­‐regional	   trade	   in	   which	   economic	  integration	   starts	   with	   a	   FTA,	   before	   ensuing	   a	   customs	   union,	   a	   common	   market,	   a	  monetary	   union	   before	   the	   final	   step	   of	   an	   entirely	   integrated	   economic	   union	  (Söderbaum	   2004:	   23;	   Robson	   1998;	   Østergaard	   1993:	   29-­‐30;	   Belassa	   1961,	   1967	   &	  1975).	   The	   dynamics	   of	   these	   theories	  were	   the	   anticipation	   of	   a	   successive	   spillover	  effect	  from	  the	  first	  step	  to	  the	  last	  driven	  by	  economic	  necessity	  once	  they	  were	  set	  up.	  Moreover,	  (because	  of)	  the	  inherited	  costs	  of	  economic	  market	  integration	  each	  step	  had	  to	  be	  properly	  implemented	  before	  the	  next	  step	  was	  commenced,	  otherwise	  resources	  will	  fail	  to	  allocate	  fairly	  or	  efficiently.	  Moreover,	   such	   market-­‐led	   approaches	   to	   regional	   integration	   takes	   several	  prerequisites	  for	  granted,	  and	  presupposes	  several	  factors	  in	  order	  to	  have	  the	  market	  creating	   effect	   and	   to	   produce	   welfare	   gains:	   including	   economic	   complementarity	  between	   the	   related	   states,	   structural	   pre-­‐conditions	   such	   as	   infrastructure,	   services,	  competitiveness	  and	  labour	  skills,	  the	  need	  for	  the	  integrating	  states	  to	  have	  reached	  a	  certain	   level	   of	   development,	   regional	   macroeconomic	   policies	   to	   be	   stabile	   and	  harmonised,	  a	  high	  intensity	  of	  intra-­‐regional	  trade,	  broad	  based	  allocation	  of	  eventual	  benefits	   of	   integration,	   and	   the	   compliance	   of	   member	   states	   to	   partly	   surrender	  sovereignty	   to	   an	   executive	   authority	   which	   transcends	   the	   national	   governments	   or	  boundaries	  (Østergaard	  1993:	  31-­‐32;	  Söderbaum	  2004:	  24;	  Gibb	  2009:	  712-­‐13).	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This	  theory	  of	  regionalism	  and	  model	  of	  economic	  market	  integration	  was	  fixed	  on	  the	  welfare	  effects	  of	  a	  free	  market	  and	  the	  protectionist	  (discriminating)	  barriers	  to	  such	   a	   system.	   But	   it	   was	   unconcerned	   with	   the	   institutional	   political	   feature	   of	   the	  regionalisation	   process,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   reasons	   actors	   within	   the	   region	   decide	   on	   a	  regional	   construction.	   Finally,	   the	   theory	   is	   unable	   to	   explain	   the	   construction	   and	  deconstruction	   of	   a	   region,	   which	   are	   the	   drivers	   behind	   the	   construction,	   the	  beneficiaries	  and	  the	  motives	  of	  region-­‐builders	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  23).	  Both	   market-­‐led	   integration	   theory	   and	   neo-­‐functionalism	   are	   indicative	   of	  automaticity,	  “the	  idea	  that	  the	  logic	  of	  integration	  is	  somehow	  self-­‐sustaining,	  rational	  and	   teleological”	   (Rosamond	   2005:	   244),	   leading	   to	   deepening	   integration	   by	  moving	  from	   one	   stage	   to	   another	   owing	   to	   economic	   incentives	   and	   evolving	   welfare	  implications	   (Rosamond	  2005:	  244;	   see	  also	  Söderbaum	  2004:	  23;	  Hettne	  2005:	  546).	  As	  Carol	  Webb	  points	  out,	  “the	  expansive	  functional	  logic	  laid	  out	  by	  Haas	  and	  Lindberg	  reproduced	  the	  thinking	  of	  economists	  writing	  about	  economic	  integration	  at	  the	  time”	  (Webb	  1983:	  19,	  see	  Rosamond	  2000:	  60).	  	  
2.1.2	  	   The	  intergovernmental	  backlash	  against	  regional	  integration	  The	   political	   strategies,	   normative	  methods	   and	   theories	   of	   functionalism,	   neo-­‐functionalism	   and	   economic	   integration	   theory	   have	   had	   much	   impact	   on,	   and	   still	  greatly	   influences	   regionalist	   thought	   both	   in	   the	   academic	   and	   political	   spheres.	  However,	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1960s	  is	  noted	  “not	  only	  a	  slowdown	  of	  integrative	  momentum,	   but	   also	   the	   reassertion	   of	   nationalist	   sentiment	   at	   elite	   level	   in	   West	  European	  politics”	  (Rosamond	  2000:	  75).	  The	  “fit	  between	  the	  neofunctional	  description	  (and	   prescription)	   and	   the	   empirical	   world	   […]	   disappeared”,	   thus	   disproving	   the	  hypothesis	  of	  the	  linear	  process	  of	  stepwise	  integration	  (Hettne	  &	  Söderbaum	  2008:	  64).	  	   This	   period,	   sometimes	   termed	   the	   “Eurosclerosis”	   saw	   the	   theory	   of	   neo-­‐functionalism	   criticised,	  mainly	   from	   state-­‐centric	   approaches,	   and	   even	   from	   its	   own	  advocates.	  Haas	  himself	  even	  pronounced	   it	   “obsolescent”	  and	  “Lindberg	   ‘retired	   from	  studying	   the	   EEC/EC”	   (Nieman	   &	   Schmitter	   2009:	   9).	   The	  work	   of	   Stanley	   Hoffmann	  (1964,	   1966)	   provided	   a	   systematic	   contextualisation	   of	   this	   period	   and	   at	   the	   same	  time	   engaged	   critically	   with	   neo-­‐functionalist	   arguments.	   Hofmann	   claimed	   that	   even	  though	   post-­‐war	   Europe	  was	   undergoing	   significant	   social	   changes	  where	   the	   nation-­‐state	  was	   being	   challenged	   the	   nation-­‐states	  were	   still,	   and	   in	   spite	   of	   these	   changes,	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central	   units	   in	   European	   integration,	   as	   they	   are	   in	  world	   politics	   (Rosamond	   2000:	  76).	   Most	   importantly,	   Hofmann	   criticised	   the	   neo-­‐functionalists	   of	   having	   failed	   to	  locate	  the	  particular	  dynamics	  within	  the	  appropriate	  historical	  picture:	  “[t]he	  emphasis	  on	  the	  process	  led	  to	  a	  certain	  neglect	  of	  the	  context,	  or	  at	  least	  to	  a	  view	  of	  the	  context	  that	  may	   have	   been	   too	   selective”	   (Hoffmann,	   1964:	   85;	   italics	   in	   original).	   Based	   on	  Hofmann’s	  arguments	  emerged	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  regional	  integration	  theory	  –	  intergovernmentalism	  –	  which	  initially	  was	  spearheaded	  by	  Roger	  Hansen.	   The	   scholars	   from	   this	   school	   held	   that	   regional	   integration	   only	   occurs	   if	   it	  corresponds	   with	   the	   national	   interests	   of	   the	   member	   states,	   and	   that	   the	   supra-­‐national	   institutions	   function	   simply	   as	   facilitators	   to	   manage	   and	   implement	   the	  interests	   of	   the	   member	   states.	   The	   intergovernmentilsts	   also	   stressed	   that	   regional	  integration	   could	   not	   expand	   from	   “low	   politics”	   or	   economics	   to	   “high	   politics”	   or	  security,	  which	  opposed	  requisites	  of	  the	  (neo-­‐)functionalists	  (Söderbaum	  2008:	  5;	  also	  Hettne	   &	   Söderbaum	   2008:	   64).	   Simultaneously,	   the	   perception	   of	   the	   EC	   began	   to	  alter/”deviate”.	  The	  new	  comprehension	  of	  the	  EC	  was	  no	  longer	  as	  a	  federation,	  but	  as	  a	  confederation.	   “The	  ontological	   shift	   thus	   implied	  an	  epistemological	   shift	   towards	  a	  more	  state-­‐centric,	  realist	  analysis”	  (Hettne	  &	  Söderbaum	  2008:	  64).	  	  
2.1.3	  	   The	  European	  Blueprint	  and	   the	  Euro-­centrism	  of	   the	   theories	  of	  regional	  
integration	  While	   the	   intergovernmentalists	   were	   challenging	   neo-­‐functionalism,	   other	  researchers	   criticised	   the	   functionalist	   and	   neo-­‐functionalist	   approaches	   in	   applying	  ideas	   about	   political	   and	   economic	   integration	   based	   on	   the	   European	   experience	   on	  regional	  integration	  in	  different	  places,	  such	  as	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  where	   the	   same	   market	   integration	   logic	   were	   not	   readily	   appropriate	   (Söderbaum	  2008:	  5-­‐6;	  Breslin	  et	  al.	  2002:	  6;	  Marchand	  et	  al.	  1999:	  901;	  see	  for	  instance	  Nye	  1970;	  Schmitter	  1970;	  Hansen	  1969;	  Haas	  1967;	  Dell	  1966;	  Etzioni	  1965).	  Thus,	  even	  though	  regional	   integration	   studies	   expanded	   beyond	   the	   European	   case	   and	   increasingly	  presented	  comparative	  studies,	  the	  European	  experience	  still	   informed	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	   studies	   (Söderbaum	  2008:	  5-­‐6,	   see	  Gibb	  2009:	  708).	  Trying	   to	  move	  beyond	   their	  own	   Eurocentrism,	   neo-­‐functionalist	   scholars	   (e.g.	   Ernst	   Haas	   1961;	   Haas	   &	   Philippe	  Schmitter	  1964;	  Leon	  Lindberg	  &	  Stuart	  Scheingold	  1970;	  and	  Joseph	  Nye	  1968,	  1971)	  tried	  to	  identify	  some	  universal	  characteristics	  and	  “background	  conditions”	  of	  regional	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integration	   prevalent	   in	   the	  Western	   European	   experience,	   such	   as,	   “pluralistic	   social	  structures,	   substantial	   economic	   and	   industrial	   development	   and	   common	   ideological	  patterns	  among	  participating	  units”	  (Rosamond	  2000:	  69;	  see	  also	  Söderbaum	  2008:	  6).	  However,	   as	   Breslin	   et	   al.	   (2002:	   6)	   points	   out,	   these	   scholars,	   “used	   the	   European	  experience	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   the	   production	   of	   generalizations	   about	   the	   prospects	   for	  regional	  integration	  elsewhere”.	  The	  European	  Blueprint	  focusing	  on	  market	  integration	  and	  institutionalisation,	  was	  not	  only	  leading	  the	  discourse	  in	  the	  academic	  forum,	  but	  increasingly	   adopted	  at	   the	  political	   level,	   in	  particular	   in	   the	   ‘South’	   (Marchand	  et	  al.	  1999:	  901).	  With	  reference	   to	  Africa,	  policy	  prescriptions	  such	  as	   the	   formation	  of	   the	  West	   African	   Customs	   Union	   (UDAO)	   in	   1959,	   the	   Economic	   and	   Customs	   Union	   of	  Central	   African	   States	   (UDEAC)	   in	   1964	   and	   the	   East	   African	   Economic	   Community	  (EAEC)	   in	   1967	   represent	   such	   strategies.	   These	   institutions	   were	   informed	   by	   the	  “traditional	  customs	  union	  model	  based	  on	   laissez-­faire	  approach	  of	  freeing	  trade”	  and	  orthodox	   economic	   integration	   (Aly	   1994:	   11,	   14,	   60-­‐61;	   Axline	   1996:	   2).	   Both	   the	  composition	  of	  the	  regional	  institutions	  and	  their	  economic	  orientation	  towards	  regional	  market	   liberalisation	   by	   the	   establishment	   of	   customs	   unions	   and	   Free	   Trade	   Areas	  (FTA)	  are	  highly	  influenced	  by	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  (EEC)	  model	  (Olivier	  2010:	  28;	  Østergaard	  1993:	  28).	  Based	  on	  this	  record,	  scepticism	  developed	   in	  certain	  scholarly	   circles	   about	   the	   convenience	   of	   trade	   and	   market	   integration	   or	   orthodox	  economic	   integration	   to	   spur	   regional	   integration	   and	   development	   in	   developing	  regions.	  This	  scepticism	  saw	  the	  development	  of	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  regionalism.	  	  
2.1.4	  	   Alternative	   approaches	   to	   regionalism:	   The	   regional	   co-­operation	   and	  
developmentalist	  model	  During	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s	   alternative	   models	   to	   regional	   integration,	   co-­‐operation	   and	   development	   merged	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   classical	   Euro-­‐centred	  models	  and	  economic,	  market	  driven	  approaches.	  Even	  Balassa	  argued	  that	  there	  could	  not	   be	   one	   universal	   model	   for	   regional	   integration/co-­‐operation:	   “present	   day	  underdeveloped	   countries	   need	   more	   state	   interference	   in	   economic	   affairs	   than	   do	  advanced	  economies,	  since,	  in	  the	  former,	  market	  incentives	  are	  often	  not	  conductive	  to	  development”	  (1961:	  10;	  also	  cited	  in	  Haarlov	  1997:	  31.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  both	  ‘regional	  cooperation’	  and	  the	  ‘development	  integration	  approach’	  economic	  integration	  as	  achieved	  through,	  for	  instance,	  the	  orthodox	  liberalisation	  of	  intra-­‐regional	  trade	  and	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the	   establishment	   of	   customs	  unions	   as	   inexpedient	   to	   developing	   countries	   owing	   to	  their	   economic	   susceptibility.	   According	   to	   these	   approaches,	   the	   attainment	   of	   long-­‐term	  economic	   integration	   thus	   entailed	   alternative	   strategies	   to	   the	  non-­‐interference	  market	  integration.	  	  	   According	  to	  the	  advocates	  of	  regional	  cooperation,	  the	  fields	  of	  cooperation	  and	  harmonisation	   should	   not	   solely	   be	   within	   the	   economic	   sector.	   In	   addition	   the	  collaboration	   should	   take	   place	   on	   a	   voluntary	   basis.	   Regional	   cooperation	   can	   be	  defined	  as	  “a	  process	  whereby	  nation	  states	  in	  common	  solve	  tasks	  and	  create	  improved	  conditions	   in	   order	   to	   maximise	   internal	   and	   external	   economic,	   political,	   social	   and	  cultural	   benefits	   for	   each	   participating	   country”	   (Haarlov	   1997:	   15).	   To	   arrive	   at	  intensified	   economic	   integration	   with	   a	   mutually	   beneficial	   accelerated	   trade	  liberalisation	   and	   gradual	   renouncement	   of	   national	   sovereignty	   the	   preliminary	  emphasis	   should	   be	   on	   moderate	   progressiveness,	   pragmatism	   and	   technical	   focal	  points	  (Haarlov	  1997:	  15-­‐23;	  see	  also	  Ravenhill	  1990).	  	   The	  second	  approach	  that	  emerged	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  economic	  integration	  approaches	   was	   the	   development	   integration	   approach,	   inspired	   by	   development	  economists,	  such	  as	  Gunnar	  Myrdal,	  Raúl	  Prebisch,	  Hans	  Singer	  and	  Arthur	  Lewis	  during	  the	   1950s.	   Following	   the	   rationale	   of	   the	   structuralist	   tradition	   from	   which	   these	  economists	   belonged	   successful	   regional	   cooperation	   and	   integration	   among	   less	  developed	  countries	  did	  not	  result	  through	  functional	  cooperation	  or	  marginal	  economic	  change	   within	   the	   existing	   structure.	   Instead,	   “there	   was	   a	   need	   to	   consider	   changes	  other	  than	  purely	  marginal	  ones	  operating	  within	  the	  existing	  structure;	  the	  problem	  is	  one	  of	  fostering	  structural	  transformation	  of	  the	  economies”	  (Østergaard	  1993:	  34;	  see	  Robson	   1968:	   34;	   see	   also	   Søderbaum	   2008:	   6).	   Rather	   than	   focusing	   on	   “efficiency	  maximization	   of	   existing	   capacity”,	   which	   is	   minor	   in	   developing	   countries,	   the	  development	   integration	   model	   “focuses	   on	   how	   to	   stimulate	   the	   creation	   of	   that	  productive	  capacity”,	  in	  order	  to	  break	  the	  dependency	  of	  development	  countries	  on	  the	  West	  (Østergaard	  1993:	  34).	   It	   is	  therefore	  proposed	  that	  extensive	  economic	  capacity	  in	   developing	   countries	   is	   low,	   or	   where	   it	   is	   found,	   is	   controlled	   by	   transnational	  corporations	  (TNCs)	  (Østeggaard	  1993:	  34;	  Aly	  1994:	  43-­‐45).	  Consistent	   with	   the	   development	   integration	   model,	   its	   two	   objectives:	   “a	  ‘planned	   stimulation	   of	   productive	   capacities	   and	   investment”	   and	   “a	   balanced	  distribution	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  economic	  cooperation	  and	  integration”	  is	  only	  achievable	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if	   high	  profile	  political	   cooperation	   and	   integration	  has	   already	  been	  established.	  This	  position	   grew	  out	   of	   the	   experiences	   from	   the	  African	  post-­‐independence	  RECs	  of	   the	  1960s.	   Here,	   laissez-­faire	   market	   integration	   created	   a	   ‘backwash’	   or	   ‘polarisation’	  process,	  of	  which	  distributional	  equity,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  asymmetrical	  economic	  benefits	  for	  the	  trading	  partners	  and	  unequal	  “networks	  of	  power,	  information	  and	  knowledge”	  between	  the	  respective	  countries	  witnessed	  the	  collapse	  of	  most	  of	  these	  communities	  (Saasa	  1991;	  see	  also	  Haarlov	  1997:	  29;	  Gathii	  2009:	  33-­‐34).	  The	  objectives	  established	  on	  the	  background	  of	  these	  experiences	  are	  indicative	  of	  the	  different	  opinion	  from	  the	  neofuntionalist	  and	  orthodox	  market	  oriented	  integration	  approaches,	  and	  “implies	  that	  the	   gains	   should	   not	   be	   allocated	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   market	   exchange	   and	   comparative	  advantage”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  24;	  see	  Axline	  1977:	  103;	  Haarlov	  1997:	  31).	  In	  addition,	  the	  model	   applies	   “at	   least	   two	   broad	   sets	   of	   distributive	   instruments:	   compensatory	  mechanisms	   (transfer	   tax	   system,	   budgetary	   transfers,	   preferential	   tariffs)	   and	  corrective	   mechanisms	   (planned	   industrial	   strategy,	   regional	   development	   banks	   or	  funds,	  common	  investment	  code)”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  24).	  	  	   Today,	   the	   model	   has	   little	   influence	   on	   practical	   policies	   of	   economic	  regionalism,	   but	   at	   the	   time	  both	   the	   approaches	   had	  major	   political	   impact,	   and	   to	   a	  great	   extent	   they	   were	   “considered	   to	   be	   instruments	   for	   enhancing	   industrial	  production,	  as	  in	  the	  strand	  of	  development	  thinking	  associated	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  Economic	   Commission	   for	   Latin	  America	   (UNECLA)	   and	  Africa	   (UNECA)	  and	   the	   even	  more	  ambitious	  strategy	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	  (UNCTAD),	  both	  led	  by	  Raúl	  Prebisch”	  (Hettne	  2005:	  551).	  This	  process	  went	  as	  far	  as	  transforming	  regionalism	  into	  “a	   form	  of	  global	  mobilisation	  against	  an	  unequal	  world	  order”	  in	  a	  demand	  for	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  (NIEO),	  which	  dates	  back	  to	  the	   Algiers	   conference	   of	   the	   Non-­‐Aligned	   countries	   in	   1973	   (Hettne	   2005:	   551;	   Cox	  1979:	   257).	   In	   response	   to	   the	   economic	   depreciation	   of	   the	   African	   sub-­‐regional	  communities	  and	  their	  external	  dependence	  through	  associations	  and	  agreements	  with	  the	   European	   Economic	   Community	   during	   the	   post-­‐independence	   period,	   a	   new	  strategy	  was	  introduced	  with	  the	  Lagos	  Plan	  of	  Action	  (LPA)	  in	  the	  1980s	  indicating	  an	  orientation	  towards	  a	  less	  market	  directed,	  more	  inward	  looking	  regional	  development	  integration.	   The	   LPA	   was	   highly	   inspired	   by	   a	   pan-­‐African	   theme	   emphasising	   “the	  concepts	   of	   African	   solidarity,	   collective	   self-­‐reliance	   and	   self	   sufficiency,	   economic	  progress	   on	   self-­‐sustaining	   socio-­‐economic	   development,	   reducing	   its	   dependence	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vulnerability	  vis-­à-­vis	   ‘external	  nations’”	  (Olivier	  2010:	  29;	  se	  also	  Ikome,	  2004:	  ch.	  2	  &	  3).	   In	   East	   Africa,	   both	   regional	   cooperation	   and	   development	   integration	  was	   highly	  influential	   in	   the	  context	  of	   the	  EAC	  (1967-­‐1977).	  However,	  neither	  of	   the	  approaches	  succeeded	   in	   initiating	   significant	   socio-­‐economic	  development,	   nor	  were	   any	  of	   them	  long-­‐lasting	   strategies.	   Despite	   the	  models’	   apparent	   superiority	   to	   the	   solely	  market	  driven	   integration	   models,	   practical	   problems,	   political	   and	   structural	   issues	   of	   both	  internal	  and	  external	  origins	  could	  not	  be	  overcome	  (Østergaard	  1993:	  35-­‐39).	  Instead,	  and	   also	   as	   a	   decisive	   factor	   in	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   above	   alternative	   approaches,	  rationalist	   regional	   theories	  of	  market	   integration	   theories	   achieved	  hegemonic	   status	  academically	  and	  politically.	  	  
2.2	  	   The	   contemporary	   debate	   I:	   the	   domination	   of	   rationalist	  
theorisation	  The	  collapse	  of	   regionalist	   integration	  projects	   in	   the	  developing	  world	  and	   the	  coinciding	  slow	  down	  of	  European	  integration	  resulted	  in	  a	  dwindling	  of	  the	  academic	  debate	  on	   regional	   integration	   towards	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1960s	  within	  both	   the	   ranks	  of	  economists	   and	  political	   scientists	   (Marechand	  et	   al.	   1999:	  901).	  However,	   during	   the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1980s	  the	  historical	  context	  of	  the	  bipolar	  world	  order	  changed	  as	  the	  Cold	  War	   logic	   eventually	   became	   invalid.	   In	   the	   ashes	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	   remerged	   the	  debate	  on	  regionalism,	  only	  on	  an	  even	  larger	  scale.	  The	  most	  significant	  characteristics	  of	  the	  “new	  regionalism	  are	  its	  truly	  worldwide	  reach,	  extending	  to	  more	  regions,	  with	  greater	  external	  linkages”	  (Mittelman	  2000:	  113:	  De	  Melo	  &	  Panagariya	  1992).	  	  	  Differences	  between	  the	  theorisation	  of	  old	  and	  new	  regionalism	  have	  also	  led	  to	  several	  scholars	  emphasising	  qualitative	  distinctions	  between	  the	  approaches.	  While	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  regionalism	  was	  characterised	  as	  introverted	  and	  proceeding	  protectionist	  strategies,	   the	  new	  regionalism	  followed	  “extroverted	   forms	  of	  market	   integration	  and	  open	   regionalism”	   (Söderbaum	   2004:	   68),	   implying	   an	   interacting	   and	   overlapping	  relationship	  between	  globalisation	   and	   regionalism	   (Söderbaum	  2008:	  7;	   Cooper	   et	   al	  2008;	  Farrell	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Schulz	  et	  al.	  2001;	  Bøås	  et	  al.	  1999;	  Hettne	  et	  al.	  1999;	  Coleman	  &	  Underhill	  1998).	   Subsequently,	   the	   reinvigorated	   debate	   on	   regionalism	   in	   the	   first	  part	  of	  the	  1990s	  was	  much	  concerned	  with	  whether	  “regionalization	  was	  a	  stumbling-­‐block	   or	   a	   stepping-­‐stone	   towards	   globalization	   and	   improved	   multilateralism”	  (Söderbaum	   2003a:	   5;	   Hettne	   &	   Söderbaum	   2008:	   61-­‐62).	   Finally,	   the	   term	   ‘new	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regionalism’	  with	   the	   added	   prefix	   ‘new’	   is	   indicative	   of	   the	   distinguished	   theoretical	  novelty	   from	  the	  preceding	   framework	  and	  “is	  best	  understood	  as	  an	   indication	  of	   the	  richness	  of	  new	  regionalism	  theory”	  (Söderbaum	  2003a:	  5).	  Theoretical	   innovations	   notwithstanding,	   the	   study	   and	   practice	   of	   regionalism	  carry	   significant	   continuity	   which	   will	   be	   addressed	   later	   in	   this	   chapter.	   The	   main	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  synopsis	  of	  the	  recent	  debate.	  It	  will	  therefore	  first	  try	   to	   identify	   the	   main	   rationalist	   approaches	   towards	   regions	   and	   regionalism	   by	  examining	  significant	  realist	  and	   liberal	   IR	  theory	  contributions	  to	  the	  broader	   field	  of	  studies	  on	  regions.	  Secondly,	  it	  will	  turn	  attention	  to	  the	  paradigm	  of	  ‘open	  regionalism’,	  which	   has	   been	   dominant	   for	   the	   preceding	   twenty	   years	   in	   the	   political	   discourse	  surrounding	  regionalism.	  	  
2.2.1	  	   ‘Grand	  theories’	  of	  rationalism	  in	  IR,	  IPE	  and	  regionalism	  	   The	  solitary	  situation	  of	   theories	  of	  regionalism	  and	  regional	   integration	  within	  the	  broader	  disciplines	  of	  IR	  and	  International	  Political	  Economy	  (IPE)	  came	  to	  an	  end	  towards	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  1980s.	  With	  the	  most	  dominant	  theoretical	  approach	  of	  that	  era	  being	   structural	   realism	   this	   is	   not	   very	   surprising	   since	   the	   adherent	   scholars,	   “like	  Waltz	  have	  not	  been	  much	  interested	  in	  European	  integration	  processes”	  (Stone	  Sweet	  1994	  457;	   also	   cited	   in	  Rosamond	  2000:	   132).	   Furthermore,	   “several	   prominent	  Neo-­‐realists	   basically	   shun	   the	   idea	   of	   European	   integration	   as	   a	   relevant	   phenomenon	   in	  International	  Relations”	  (Pilegaard	  &	  Kluth	  2010:	  7).	  With	  respect	  to	  their	  worldview,	  a	  nation	   state	   which	   on	   a	   voluntarily	   basis	   cedes	   the	   apexes	   of	   national	   sovereignty	   is	  irrational	   behaviour.	   Indeed,	   “they	   would	   be	   expected	   to	   jealously	   guard	   their	  autonomy,	   making	   international	   cooperation	   precarious	   at	   best”	   (Pilegaard	   &	   Kluth	  2010:	  7;	  see	  Waltz	  1996,	  1979).	  The	  only	  instance	  where	  realism	  accepts	  the	  possibility	  of	   cooperation	  among	  states	   is	  when	   the	  balance	  of	  power	  necessitates	   it	   in	  order	   for	  one	  group	  of	  states	  to	  check	  the	  power	  of	  another	  state	  or	  group	  of	  states	  (Söderbaum	  2011:	  53;	  see	  Gilpin	  1987,	  Buzan	  1991;	  Söderbaum	  2004:	  18).	   In	  accordance	  with	   the	  widely	  held	  realist	  proposition	  captured	  in	  Robert	  Gilpin’s	  theory	  of	  hegemonic	  stability	  a	   regional	   hegemon	   can	   stimulate	   the	   establishment	   of	   regional	   cooperation	   and	  associated	  institutions	  in	  different	  ways	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  18;	  see	  Hurrell	  1995:	  51-­‐3;	  Gilpin	   1987).	   Following	   this	   proposition	   international	   economic	   cooperation	   depends	  heavily	  on	  a	   local	  hegemon	  with	  sufficient	   “political-­‐military	  and	  diplomatic	   resources	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needed	   to	   establish	   the	   institutions	   through	   which	   such	   interdependence	   can	   be	  attained”	  (Grieco	  1997:	  173;	  see	  Gilpin	  1987;	  Krasner	  1976).	  Despite	  the	  reluctance	  of	  many	   realists	   to	   theorise	   on	   the	   occurrences	   of	   cooperation	   among	   states	   not	   only	   in	  Europe	   but	   globally,	   attempts	   were	   made	   to	   explain	   the	   increasing	   salience	   of	   the	  phenomenon,	   if	   not	   simply	   to	   uphold	   the	   theoretical	   relevance	   of	   realism	   in	   a	   world	  order	  where	   the	   circumstances	   are	   challenging	   the	   traditional	   position	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state.	   Grieco	   1995:	   35:	   Grieco	   thus	   tries	   to	   create	   a	   hypothesis	   to	   explain	  intsitutionalism	  based	  on	  neo-­‐realist	  premises:	  	  	   “if	   states	   share	   a	   common	   interest	   and	   undertake	   negotiations	   on	   rules	  
constituting	   a	   collaborative	   arrangement,	   then	   the	   weaker	   but	   still	  
influential	   partners	   will	   seek	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   rules	   so	   constructed	   will	  
provide	  sufficient	  opportunities	  for	  them	  to	  voice	  their	  concern	  and	  interests	  
and	   thereby	   prevent	   or	   at	   least	   ameliorate	   their	   domination	   by	   stronger	  
partners”	  (Grieco	  1995:	  34,	  italics	  in	  original).	  	  	  However	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  without	  very	  controversial	  assumptions,	  reproducing	  core	   assumptions	   in	   which	   “states	   are	   the	   key	   actors	   in	   world	   politics,	   […]	   self-­‐help	  agents	  […]	  in	  an	  anarchical	  environment,	  […]	  concerned	  about	  their	  safety	  and	  relative	  independence.	  Moreover,	  the	  thesis	  assumes	  state	  rationality”	  (Grieco	  1995:	  34;	  see	  also	  Rosamond	  2000:	  134;	  Söderbaum	  2004:	  19).	  	  Barry	  Buzan	  is	  another	  (liberal)	  realist,	  belonging	  to	  the	  English	  School	  of	  IR,	  who	  disputes	   traditional	   realism	   as	   it	   is	   promoted	   by	   Waltz.	   Buzan’s	   conception	   of	   the	  ‘regional	  security	  complex’	  has	  been	  a	  strongly	   influential	  contribution	  to	  the	  research	  field.	  Originally	  this	  was	  defined	  as	  “a	  group	  of	  states	  whose	  primary	  security	  concerns	  link	   together	   sufficiently	   closely	   that	   their	   national	   securities	   cannot	   realistically	   be	  considered	  apart	  from	  one	  another”	  (Buzan	  1991:	  190;	  see	  also	  Söderbaum	  2004:	  20).	  Although	  the	  realist	  perception	  of	  states	  as	  a	  given	  and	  as	  key	  actors	  is	  dominating	  the	  analysis	  it	  nevertheless	  marks	  the	  increased	  significance	  of	  the	  region	  as	  another	  level	  of	  analysis	  within	  the	  broader	  field	  of	  IR.	  	   Intensified	  global	  interdependence,	  economic	  globalisation	  and	  the	  pluralisation	  of	   international	   cooperation	  have	  been	  central	   aspects	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	   inter-­‐paradigm	  debate	   in	   IR,	   especially	   between	   liberal	   institutionalists	   and	   neo-­‐realists	   (see	   Smith	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2007:	   4-­‐5).	   Functionalist	   assumptions,	   pluralist	   reasoning	   and	   traditional	   liberal	  thinking	   have	   been	   influencing	   features	   of	   early	   liberal	   institutionalism	   which	   is	  reflected	  in	  peace	  building	  and	  reconciling	  institutions	  (Söderbau	  2004:	  20;	  see	  Mitrany	  1966).	   Robert	   Keohane	   and	   Joseph	   Nye	   formulated	   the	   theory	   of	   “complex	  interdependence”	   and	   became	   the	   intellectual	   trendsetters	   for	   liberal	   institutionalism	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  international	  system	  and	  the	  international	  economy	  especially	  (see	  Keohane	   &	   Nye	   1977).	   However,	   while	   they	   continued	   to	   perceive	   complex	  interdependence	   taking	   place	   within	   an	   anarchical	   system,	   their	   followers	   –	   the	  neoliberal	  institutionalists	  –	  believe	  that	  “[p]olicy-­‐makers	  and	  other	  relevant	  actors	  can	  create	  and	  reshape	  institutional	  structures	  in	  order	  to	  more	  effectively	  obtain	  collective	  interests”	   (Sterling-­‐Folker	   2013:	   115).	   In	   other	   words,	   neoliberal	   institutionalists	  modifies	   one	   of	   the	   most	   fundamental	   pillars	   of	   realist	   assumptions	   by	   arguing	   that	  international	   collective	   action	   can	   “substantially	   mitigate	   the	   negative	   impact	   of	  anarchy”,	  without	  rejecting	  the	  anarchic	  environment	  altogether	  (Sterling-­‐Folker	  2013:	  115;	  see	  also	  Rosamond	  2000:	  142;	  Cornett	  &	  Caporaso	  1992:	  233).	  Even	  though	  state	  preference	   is	  given	  primacy	   in	  an	   institutionalist	  analysis	  where	   the	  state	   is	  driven	  by	  rationality	   and	   self-­‐interest	   (Keohane	   1989:	   142),	   the	   state	   pursues	   absolute	   gains,	  hence	  against	  the	  proposition	  that	  it	  seeks	  relative	  gains.	  Therefore,	  if	  absolute	  gains	  are	  made	   relative	   to	   national	   priorities,	   international	   cooperation	   is	   advantageous	   to	   the	  state.	  Following	  the	  logic	  of	  neoliberal	  institutionalism,	  efficient	  regionalisation	  is	  bound	  to	  become	  increasingly	  institutionalised.	  Neoliberal	  institutionalists	  hold	  regionalism	  to	  be	   motivated	   predominantly	   “by	   the	   procurement	   of	   public	   goods,	   the	   avoidance	   of	  negative	   externalities	   from	   interdependence,	   and	   absolute	   gains”	   (Söderbaum	   2004:	  22).	  Regionalism	  constitutes	  an	   incremental	  problem-­‐solving	  process	  chiefly	  driven	  by	  or	  through	  institutions,	  both	  formal	  and	  informal,	  where	  “[t]ransactions	  and	  commerce	  generate	   a	   demand	   for	   regulation,	   institutionalization	   and	   supranational	   governance”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  22).	  	  	   There	  are	  some	  scholars	  from	  within	  the	  ranks	  of	  neoliberal	  institutionalism	  and	  regional	  economic	  integration	  theory	  who	  aim	  to	  develop	  or	  challenge	  the	  perception	  of	  their	  own	  peers.	  Diana	  Tussie	  takes	  a	  step	  “away	  from	  one-­‐dimensional	  views	  that	  posit	  regionalism	   and	   multilateralism	   as	   dilemmas	   of	   building-­‐blocks	   versus	   stumbling	  blocks”	   (Tussie	   2003:	   100).	   She	   argues,	   new	   regionalism	   is	   the	   best	   “solution	   in	  response	   to	  dysfunctional	  multilateralism	  and	  globalism”	  (Söderbaum	  2003a:	  13),	  and	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that	  “regions	  may	  well	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  good	  vehicle	  for	  smaller	  countries	  to	  enjoy	  more	  of	  a	  voice	  in	  international	  trade	  –	  magnified	  by	  their	  combined	  market	  share	  and	  political	  power”	  (Tussie	  2003:	  115).	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  while,	  coming	  from	  the	  camp	  of	  regional	  economic	   integration	   theorists,	   Percy	   Mistry	   (2003:	   136,	   137)	   argues	   that	   although	  “regionalism	   in	   the	   developing	  world	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   temporal	   convenience	   to	   bypass	  dysfunctional	   multilateralism”,	   it	   is	   “the	   most	   tractable	   risk	   management	   strategy	  available	  to	  development	  countries	   for	  coping	  with	  the	  challenges	  they	  confront	   in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	   century”.	   While	   these	   scholars	   are	   sceptical	   towards	   certain	   aspects	   of	  liberal	  institutionalism	  and	  economics,	  they	  are	  still	  “first	  and	  foremost	  geared	  towards	  the	  analysis	  of	  states	  and	  interstate	  frameworks”	  (Söderbaum	  2003a:	  14).	  	  
2.2.2	  	   The	  perseverance	  of	  the	  Euro-­centric	  theories	  	   The	  implementation	  of	  the	  White	  Paper	  of	  1985	  with	  the	  Single	  European	  Act	  in	  1987	  signalled	  the	  reappearance	  of	  European	  integration,	  and	  the	  obstinacy	  of	  European	  integration	  theories.	  Jacques	  Delors	  and	  the	  technocratic	  direction	  within	  the	  European	  Commission	   and	   the	   shift	   towards	   a	   new	   political	   entrepreneurship	   to	   effectuate	  negotiations	  and	  distributional	  outcomes	  coincided	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  school	  of	  supranational	   integration.	   The	   shift	   in	   the	   Commission	   concurred	   with	   strengthened	  engagement	  from	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  push	  for	  incremental	  integration	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	   These	   developments	   were	   taken	   as	   empirical	   evidence	   of	   neo-­‐functionalist	  assumptions	  about	  functionality	  before	  integration	  and	  that	  of	  the	  institutions	  as	  agents	  of	   regional	   integration.	   The	   new	   approach	   did	   therefore	   draw	   on	   insights	   from	   neo-­‐functionalism	  (Rosamond	  2000:	  98-­‐102;	  Sanholtz	  &	  Zysman	  1989:	  96	  126-­‐128;	  see	  also	  Sandholtz	  &	  Stone	  Sweet:	  1998;	  Moravcsik	  1998).	  From	  an	  economic	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  transformation	   of	   the	   Common	   Market	   into	   the	   Single	   Market	   is	   interpreted	   as	   a	  strengthening	  of	  theories	  of	  neoclassical	  economic	  integration	  (see	  Baldwin	  &	  Wyplosz	  2012:	  23-­‐27).	  Liberal	  intergovernmentalism,	  with	  Andrew	  Moravcsik	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  contributors,	  which	  “emphasizes	   the	  power	  of	  states	  and	  their	  preferences”	  (Söderbaum	   2004:	   26)	   interprets	   these	   events	   differently,	   stressing	   the	   “interstate	  bargains	  between	  […]	  leading	  member	  states”	  in	  the	  European	  Community	  (EC),	  where	  the	  major	  initiatives	  are	  initiated	  and	  negotiated	  by	  “[h]eads	  of	  government,	  backed	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  ministers	  and	  advisers	   […]	   in	   the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  or	   the	  European	  Council”	  based	  on	  the	  rational	  of	  preferred	  national	  interests	  (Moravcsik	  1991:	  25;	  see	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also	   Söderbaum	   2004:	   26).	   The	   analysis	   and	   debate	   about	   regional	   integration	   has	  therefore	  been	  dominated	  by,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  process	  as	  the	  interaction	   between,	   and	   the	   outcome	   of,	   national	   preferences	   informed	   by	   domestic	  politics,	  while	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   “the	   logic	   behind	   large	   Council	  meetings	   and	   treaty	  reforms	  such	  as	  Maastricht,	  Amsterdam,	  and	  Nice”	   (Söderbaum	  2009:	  483;	  Rosamond	  2000:	  136-­‐138;	  see	  also	  Moravcsik	  1998;	  Sandholtz	  &	  Stone	  Sweet	  1998).	  	   Casual	   explanatory	   dissimilarities	   with	   regards	   to	   regional	  integration/cooperation	   in	   between	   neo-­‐realists	   and	   neo-­‐liberal	   institutionalists	  notwithstanding,	  their	  rationalist	  inclinations	  and	  shared	  ontological	  assumptions	  about	  states	   as	   unitary	   actors	   in	   an	   anarchical	   world	   as	   well	   as	   their	   preoccupation	   with	  formal	   interstate	   relations,	   economic	   interdependence	   and	   the	   market	   leaves	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘neo-­neo	   synthesis’	   standing	   as	   an	   intra	   paradigm	   debate.	   Liberal	  integovernmentalist,	   Andrew	   Moravcsik’s	   “model	   of	   a	   two-­‐level	   game	   to	   explain	  European	  integration	  consisting	  of	  a	  liberal	  theory	  of	  national	  preference	  formation	  and	  an	   intergovernmentalist	   account	   of	   strategic	   bargaining	   between	   states”	   (Rosamond	  2000:	   136)	   is	   indicative	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   these	   rationalist	   frameworks	   in	   IR.	  Interestingly,	   despite	   the	   Euro-­‐centrism	   of	   the	   debate	   on	   regional	  integration/cooperation,	  the	  theories	  were	  not	  developed	  in	  Europe,	  but	  came	  from	  the	  United	   States	   of	   America	   (Wæver	   1998:	   723-­‐24).	   Another	   feature	   which	   keeps	  characterising	   theories	   of	   integration/cooperation	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   is	   the	   discourse	  which	   maintains	   the	   process	   of	   European	   integration	   as	   quasi-­‐ideal	   model	   for	  regionalism.	   Europe’s	   apprehension	   “of	   the	   regional	   paradigm	   has	   been	   hard	   to	   shift,	  and	  persists	   in	  the	  newer	   literature”	  (Fawcett	  2005:	  26;	  also	  cited	   in	  Gibb	  2009:	  717).	  This	   apprehension	  has	   also	  been	   informative	  of	   the	  new	  wave	  of	   regionalism	  globally	  (Söderbaum	   2011:	   58).	   The	   subordination	   of	   regionalisms	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   world	   is	  partly	  caused	  by	  “the	  underlying	  assumptions	  and	  understandings	  about	   the	  nature	  of	  regionalism	  (which	  most	  often	  stem	  from	  a	  particular	  reading	  of	  European	  integration)”	  informing	   conceptions	   on	   the	   validity	   of	   regionalism	   in	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   world	  (Söderbaum	   2009:	   490).	   The	   blueprint	   manual	   for	   regional	   integration	   and	  institutionalisation	   for	   extra-­‐European	   regional	   projects	   has	   therefore	   “resulted	   in	   a	  return	   to	   a	   neoclassical	   economic	   agenda,	   underpinned	   by	   a	   belief	   in	  modernity,	   and	  supportive	  of	  a	  more	  aggressive	  market	  integration	  approach”	  in	  line	  with	  the	  neoliberal	  Washington	  Consensus	  termed	  open	  regionalism	  (Gibb	  2009:	  706).	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2.2.3	  	   Open	  regionalism:	  the	  hegemony	  of	  a	  regional	  project	  	   Open	  regionalism	  entered	   into	  the	  debate	  during	  the	   first	  half	  of	   the	  1990s	  and	  should	   be	   seen	   in	   relation	   with	   the	   adoption	   of	   neo-­‐liberal	   policies	   most	   strongly	  advocated	   by	   the	   Reagan	   and	   Thatcher	   governments,	   and	   it	   has	   been	   defined	   as	   a	  “negotiating	   framework	   consistent	   with	   and	   complementary	   to	   GATT	   [the	   General	  Agreement	   on	   Tariffs	   and	   Trade]”	   (Cable	   &	   Henderson	   1994:	   8;	   also	   cited	   in	   Hettne	  2005:	   549).	   Open	   regionalism	   aligns	  with	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   orthodox	  market	  integration	  contiguous	  with	   laissez-­faire	  market	   fundamentalism	  and	  neo-­‐liberal	   ideas.	  According	   to	   promoters	   of	   open	   regionalism,	   regional	   projects	   should	   be	   outward-­‐looking	  and	  refrain	  from	  high	  levels	  of	  protection	  by	  eliminating	  internal	  trade	  obstacles	  and	   external	   barriers	   in	   order	   to	   “form	   part	   of	   the	   ongoing	   globalisation	   and	  internationalisation	   process	   of	   the	   world	   political	   economy”	   (Hettne	   2005:	   549).	  Consequently,	   they	  are	  critical	  of	   the	  establishment	  of	  customs	  unions,	  since	   this,	   they	  argue	  raise	  “the	  real	  and	  potential	  risk	  of	  protectionism	  and	  trade	  diversion	  inherent	  in	  such	  ventures”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  25).	  	   From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s,	  a	  new	  orientation	  within	  international	  financial	  institutions	  (IFIs)	  promotes	  open	  regionalism	  “as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  enhance	  multilateral	  liberalisation	  and	  promote	   integration	   in	   the	  world	  economy”	   (Gibb	  2009:	  706)	   (“The	  Preferential	   Trade	   Area	   for	   Eastern	   and	   Southern	   Africa	   (PTA),	   later	   known	   as	   the	  Common	  Market	   for	   Eastern	   and	   Southern	   Africa	   (Comesa),	   established	   in	   1994	   and	  1981,	   respectively,	   provide	   good	   examples	   of	   ‘open	   regionalism’”	   (Gibb	   2009:	   n.	   27)).	  Margaret	  Lee	  (2003:	  32)	  argues	  that	  this	  policy	  shift	  developed	  on	  “the	  realisation	  that	  promoting	  trade	  liberalisation	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  first	  was	  more	  acceptable	  to	  African	  leaders	  than	  unilateral	  liberalisation	  at	  the	  global	  level”.	  This	  argument	  is	  built	  upon	  the	  opinion	   in	   the	  World	  Bank	  where	   open	   regionalism	   reflects	   the	   ambition	   “to	   create	   a	  sub-­‐regional	   unified,	   open	   economic	   space	   for	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   goods,	   services,	  capital	   &	   people;	   and	   move	   away	   from	   unsuccessful	   import	   substitution	   strategies	  (World	   Bank	   2001;	   also	   cited	   in	   Söderbaum	   2004:	   92).	   According	   to	   the	   African	  Development	  Bank	  (AfDB	  2000),	  open	  regionalism	  aims	  to	  increase	  intra-­‐regional	  trade.	  Jamie	   De	   Melo	   and	   Arvind	   Panagariya	   (1992:	   20)	   posit	   that	   “the	   temptation	   to	   use	  regionalism	   as	   a	   vehicle	   for	   import-­‐substituting	   industrialization	   […]	   will	   only	   divert	  attention	   from	   efforts	   to	   integrate	   Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  with	   the	  world	   economy”	   (also	  cited	  in	  Lee	  2002:	  2).	  Thus,	  regional	  integration	  has	  been	  used	  to	  integrate	  Sub-­‐Saharan	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African	  countries	  “more	  fully	  within	  the	  global	  economy”	  and	  as	  “an	  important	  tool	  for	  solving	  the	  continent’s	  most	  urgent	  problem,	   lack	  of	  structural	  change”	  (Page	  2012:	  6;	  see	  also	  Lee	  2002:	  5).	  Structural	  Adjustment	  Programmes	  (SAPs),	  promoted	  by	  IFIs	  and	  directed	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   were	   instruments	   to	   “reduce	   inflation,	   government	  expenditure,	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   government	   in	   the	   economy,	   including	   trade	  liberalization,	  privatization,	  and	  deregulation”	  (Woods	  2011:	  251).	  	   Devotion	   towards	   open	   regionalism	   has	   been	   “[o]ne	   of	   the	   most	   striking	  characteristics	   common	   to	   all	   the	   regional	   projects	   (Gamble	   &	   Payne	   1996:	   251),	  especially	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Africa.	   In	   1991,	   the	   Abuja	   Treaty	   was	   introduced	   as	   a	  prescription	  to	  the	  deficiency	  of	  the	  Lagos	  Plan	  of	  Action	  (LPA).	  The	  LPA	  was	  criticised	  for	  its	  “inward-­‐looking	  regionalism	  and	  self-­‐reliance”	  (Olivier	  2010:	  31).	  Abuja	  launched	  the	   African	   Economic	   Community	   (AEC)	   with	   supranational	   authority	   to	   make	  accessible	   African	   economies	   and	   to	   “give	   directives,	   coordinate	   and	   harmonise	   the	  economic,	   scientific,	   technical,	   cultural	   and	   social	   policies	   of	   member	   states”	   (Article	  8(3)	   of	   the	   Treaty;	   see	   also	   Olivier	   2010:	   31-­‐32).	   Kenya	   became	   one	   of	   the	   pioneer	  countries	  to	  sign	  for	  a	  Structural	  Adjustment	  loan	  with	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  1980,	  “which	  was	   conditional	   on	   the	   government	   adopting	   more	   liberal	   trade	   and	   interest	   rate	  regimes	  as	  well	  as	  a	  more	  outward-­‐oriented	  industrial	  policy”	  (Gertz	  2009:	  2,	  3).	  From	  the	   end	   of	   the	   1980s	   Uganda	   has	   undertaken	   substantial	   programmes	   for	   economic	  liberalisation,	  and	  is	  still	  striving	  to	  continue	  the	  implementation	  of	  neo-­‐liberal	  reforms.	  “Since	  1990,	  Uganda	  has	  received	  US$2,03	  billion	  per	  year	  from	  the	  World	  Bank”,	  which	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  promotion	  of	  neo-­‐liberalism	  in	  the	  country	  (Vasher	  2011:	  167).	  The	  Kampala	   Document	   –	   “a	   nongovernmental	   process	   of	   institution-­‐building	   developed	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  […]	  Organization	  for	  Security	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  Europe”	  (OSCE)	  (Stedman	  1996:	  261),	  the	  ‘African	  Renaissance’,	  contemporary	  EAC	  policies	  and	  Spatial	  Development	   Initiatives	  (SDIs)	  aim	  to	   interlace	  the	  orthodoxy	  of	  neo-­‐liberalism	  within	  the	   state-­‐led	   regionalism	   of	   African	   countries	   and	   in	   that	   way	   cultivate	   “an	  unquestioning	   belief	   that	   integration	   of	   their	   territories	   into	   the	   global	   economy	   is	  absolutely	  crucial	  and	  inevitable”	  (Taylor	  2003:	  313;	  see	  also	  Taylor	  2005).	  	  
2.2.4	  	   The	  study	  of	  regions:	  continuities	  and	  discontinuities	  ‘New	  regionalism’	   is	  not	  only	  about	  new	  content,	  as	  highlighted	   in	   the	  previous	  section.	   Departing	   from	   the	   view	   during	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s,	   “[t]he	  most	   important	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features	   of	   the	   new	   regionalism	   are	   its	   truly	   worldwide	   reach,	   extending	   to	   more	  regions,	  with	  greater	  external	  linkages”	  (Mittelman	  2000:	  113).	  In	  addition,	  regionalism	  emerged	   “as	   a	   potent	   forces	   in	   the	   globalization	   process”	   (Mittelman	   1996:	   189).	  Therefore,	  when	  we	  compare	  the	  earlier	  debate	  with	  rather	  introverted	  analyses	  to	  the	  new	   regionalism	   analyses	   with	   more	   extroverted	   perceptions	   about	   what	   influences	  regionalism,	   the	   difference	   lies	   “very	   much	   in	   the	   ontological	   and	   epistemological	  perspectives”	   (Hettne	   2005:	   549).	   In	   a	   reading	   of	   many	   rationalist	   assessments	   the	  influence	  of	  external	  factors	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  regionalism	  and	  processes	  of	  multilateralism	  and	  globalisation	  is	  highlighted	  (Söderbaum	  2003a:	  4-­‐5;	  See	  Telò	  2007;	  Baldwin	  et	  al.	  1999;	  Sander	  1996).	  	  	   Theoretical	   overlaps	   exist,	   nonetheless,	   whether	   addressing	   the	   broader	  theoretical	  landscape	  in	  IR	  or	  in	  the	  more	  narrow	  integration	  theories.	  Both	  fields	  share	  an	   ontological	   preoccupation	   with	   interstate,	   formal	   regionalism	   and	   trade/market	  oriented	  regionalism	  and	  integration,	  which	  signals	  a	  continued	  Euro-­‐centric	  perception	  and	   a	   scepticism	   towards	   the	   inclusion	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors	   into	   their	   analysis	   of	  processes	  of	  regionalisation	  (Bøås	  et	  al.	  2005:	  1).	  However,	  the	  studies	  on	  regions	  have	  dedicated	   little	   attention	   to	   civil	   society.	   Even	   though	   civil	   society	   and	   other	   interest	  groups	   have	   been	   included	   in	   some	   neofunctionalist	   theorisation,	   such	   accounts	   “are	  still	  generally	  neglected	  in	  the	  description	  and	  explanation	  of	  new	  regionalism”	  (Hettne	  2005:	   555;	   see	   also	   Söderbaum	   2007:	   320).	   This	   narrowsightedness	   of	   mainstream	  IR/IPE	   is	   accompanied	   by	   an	   empirical	   deprivation	   in	   where	   only	   Europe,	   North	  America	   and	   East	   Asia	   are	   represented	   (Hettne	   &	   Söderbaum	   2008:	   67-­‐68;	   see	  Mansfield	  &	  Milner	  1997).	  	   Related	  to	  this	  is	  the	  strong	  domination	  of	  neo-­‐classical	  economics	  enhanced	  with	  neoliberal	   logics	   in	   the	   body	   of	   theories	   on	   regions.	   Market/trade	   driven	   integration	  constitutes	   both	   an	   ideal	   type	   and	   a	   discourse,	   embodying	   certain	   values	   and	   norms.	  Inherent	  in	  this	  approach	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  regional	  integration	  informed	  by	  Euro-­‐centric	   ideas,	   inspired	  by	  Western	   ideals	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  modernity.	  Richard	  Gibb	   (2009:	   707)	   points	   out	   “[t]he	   conceptual	   flaws	   inherent	   in	   market	   integration	  theory	   […],	   from	  a	  developing-­‐country	  perspective”,	   notably	   “its	   failure	   to	   explore	   the	  influence	   of	   spatial	   and	   temporal	   individuality	   of	   the	   states	   involved.	   In	   particular,	   it	  neglects	   the	   influence	   of	   how	   domestic	   politics,	   particularly	   African-­‐state	   politics,	   can	  call	   into	  question	  many	  of	   the	  economic	  (and	  political)	  assumptions	   that	  underpin	   the	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market	   integration	  approach.	  However,	   the	  resilience	  of	   the	  market-­‐led	  approach,	  and	  its	   associated	   structures	   and	   values,	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   a	   powerful	   and	   hegemonic	  postcolonial	   international	   political	   economy	   (IPE)	   discourse	   dominated	   by	   a	  prioritisation	  of	  global	  neoliberal	  values.”	  	   Gibb	  highlights	   a	   significant	   gap	   in	   the	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	   approaches	   to	  regionalism.	  In	  this	  critique	  of	  mainstream,	  rationalist	  theorising,	  it	  is	  not	  suggested	  that	  these	   contributions	   should	   be	   invalidated.	   Instead,	   it	   is	   posited	   that	   an	   appropriate	  approach	   which	   is	   sensitive	   of	   the	   comprehensiveness	   of	   the	   respective	   regional	  phenomenon	  under	  scrutiny	  free	  from	  rigid	  analytical	  constraints.	  As	  Hettne	  eloquently	  points	  out:	  “The	  problem	  with	  rigid	  theorising	  is	  that	  it	  must	  delimit	  the	  object	  for	  study,	  even	  while	  the	  object	  refuses	  too	  much	  reductionism”	  (2005:	  550).	  	  
2.3	  	   Contemporary	   debate	   II:	   the	   pluralisation	   of	   the	   academic	  
debate	  on	  regionalism	  In	   this	   section	   the	   focus	   will	   be	   turned	   against	   the	   critical	   and	   reflectivist	  approaches	   which	   have	   broadened	   the	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	   landscape	   of	   the	  studies	  on	  regions	  since	  the	  1990s.	  The	  section	  integrates	  the	  perspective	  of	  Söderbaum	  who	  transcends	  the	  World	  Order	  Approach	  as	  well	  as	  a	  selection	  of	  applications	  of	  the	  New	   Regionalism(s)	   Approach	   and	   the	   New	   Regionalisms	   Approach/Weave-­‐world	  which	  offers	  an	  exceptionally	  perceptive	  account	  of	  the	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  region.	  	  	  
2.3.1	  	   The	  World	  Order	  Approach	  	   The	   World	   Order	   Approach	   (WOA)	   originated	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   from	   the	  theorisation	   of	   world	   order	   launched	   by	   Robert	   Cox	   (1981,	   1983	   &	   1987)	   as	   a	  contribution	  to	  a	  ‘new	  international	  political	  economy’,	  investigated	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  influential	  scholars	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  Since	  then,	  Cox’s	  theoretical	  perception	  has	  been	  applied	   in	   studies	   on	   regions	   (i.e.	   Payne	   &	   Gamble	   1996;	   Gamble	   &	   Payne	   2003),	  although	  Cox	  himself	  became	  interested	  in	  the	  field	  of	  study	  only	  later	  on	  (see	  Cox	  1999;	  2004).	   Cox’s	   “theory	   of	   history	   [is]	   concerned	   not	   just	   with	   the	   past	   but	   with	   a	  continuing	   process	   of	   change;	   it	  was	   directed	   to	   the	   social	   and	   political	   complex	   as	   a	  whole	  rather	  than	  to	  its	  separate	  parts;	  and	  it	  contained	  within	  its	  brief	  the	  possibility	  of	  identifying	   the	   outlines	   of	   alternative	   distributions	   of	   power	   from	   those	   prevailing	   at	  any	   particular	   time”	   (Gamble	   &	   Payne	   2003:	   46).	   The	   WOA	   is	   developed	   upon	   a	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historicist	   methodology	   and	   defines	   regionalism	   “as	   a	   state-­‐led	   or	   states-­‐led	   project	  designed	  to	  reorganise	  a	  particular	  regional	  space	  along	  defined	  economic	  and	  political	  lines”	   (Gamble	  &	  Payne	  2003:	  50).	  This	   implies	   the	  acceleration,	  modification	  or	   even	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  course	  of	  social	  change,	  like	  emergent	  structures	  such	  as	  globalisation	  and	  regionalisation	  (Gamble	  &	  Payne	  2003:	  50).	  This	  further	  means	  that	  regionalism	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  strategy	  towards	  unrestricted	  neo-­‐liberal	  economic	  globalisation,	  but	  proponents	  of	   the	  WOA	  do	  believe	  that	  “[t]he	  move	  towards	  regionalism	  at	   the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  during	  the	  1990s	  [i.e.	  open	  regionalism]	  was	  on	  the	  whole	  a	  step	  towards	  globalism	  rather	  than	  an	  alternative	  towards	  it”	  (Gamble	  &	  Payne	  2003:	  51).	  Following	  this	   line	  of	   thought,	  open	  regionalism	  is	  a	  regional	   instrument	   informed	  by	  neo-­‐liberal	  norms	   formulated	  by	   elite	  policy-­‐makers	   in	   the	   core	   and	   large	   capital	   commanded	  by	  IFIs	   (Söderbaum	  2004:	  29).	   In	   the	  new	  world	  order,	  where	   there	   is	  no	  clear	  hegemon	  directing	  global	  capitalism	  open	  regionalism	  has	  emerged	  as	  the	  vehicle	  to	  protract	  the	  hegemony	   of	   neo-­‐liberal	   capitalism	   of	   what	   in	   Cox’s	   terminology	   is	   called	   the	  “transnational	  managerial	  class”	  (1993:	  261;	  see	  also	  Gill	  1995;	  Gamble	  &	  Payne	  1996:	  252-­‐253;	  Gamble	  &	  Payne	  2003:	  58-­‐59;	  Söderbaum	  2004:	  29).	  	   The	   relevance	   of	   the	  WOA	   to	   this	   study	   is	   notable	   by	   several	   means.	   First,	   in	  applying	   the	  method	  of	  historical	   structures	   the	  power	   relationship	  between	  different	  social	   forces	  can	  be	   identified.	  Cox	  also	  employs	  a	  perspective	  on	  states,	  which	  rejects	  the	   mainstream	   perception	   of	   states	   as	   ‘black	   boxes’,	   and	   rather	   treats	   them	   as	  heterogeneous	  units	  existing	  in	  a	  ‘state-­‐society	  complex’.	  In	  addition,	  and	  fundamentally	  for	   the	   theory,	   it	   raises	   the	   question	   on	   how	   social	   forces	   (related	   to	   production)	   are	  connected	   to	  different	   kinds	  of	   states	   and	  world	  orders	   (Leysens	  2008:	  38-­‐39).	  While	  Cox’s	   account	   of	   different	   modes	   of	   relations	   of	   production	   in	   the	   1987	   article	  
Production,	  Power,	  and	  World	  Order:	  Social	  Forces	  in	  the	  Making	  of	  History	  is	  eloquently	  applicable	  to	  the	  socio-­‐political	  and	  economic	  situation	  in	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  region	  it	  is	  more	  complicated	  to	  directly	  pass	  it	  on	  to	  other	  regions	  (ch.	  2,	  3	  &	  4).	  In	  relation	  to	  this	  the	   WOA	   can	   be	   rightly	   criticised	   for	   having	   a	   perception	   of	   social	   relations	   of	  production	  which	   today	   looks	  considerably	  different	   than	   in	   the	   late	  1980s,	   especially	  with	  regards	  to	  regions	  like	  Eastern	  Africa,	  where	  the	  informal	  economy	  and	  “excluded”	  groups	   from	  the	  processes	  of	  production	  constitutes	  a	  significant	  bulk	  of	   the	  economy	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(see	  Cox	  1999:	  25-­‐26;	  Leysens	  2000	  266;	  Bieler	  &	  Morton	  2001:	  22-­‐23).1	  However,	   in	  the	   conduct	   to	   capture	   a	   realistic	   snapshot	   of	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   regionalism,	  perceptive	  recognition	  of	  Cox’s	  framework	  should	  inform	  the	  analysis.	  In	  addition,	   it	   is	  important	   to	   establish	   an	   understanding	   “of	   how	   neopatrimonial	   systems	   operate”	   in	  order	   to	   provide	   “a	   good	   grounding	   for	   understanding	   how	   Africa’s	   regions	   “work””	  (Söderbaum	  &	  Taylor	  2010:	  54).	  	   The	  second	  importance	  of	  the	  WOA	  to	  this	  study	  is	  the	  emphasis	  granted	  to	  the	  structures	   and	   processes	   (i.e.	   the	   hegemony	   of	   the	   neo-­‐liberalist	   and	   global	   capitalist	  ideology)	   in	  which	   regionalism	   is	   constituted.	  Moreover,	   the	  WOA	  highlights	   that	   like	  globalisation,	   regionalisation	   “is	   normally	   uneven	   in	   its	   impact”	   and	  with	   potential	   to	  lead	  to	  “increasing	  polarization”	  between	  and	  within	  regions	  (Gamble	  and	  Payne	  2003:	  57-­‐58;	   Hout	   1999:	   23).	   Further,	   with	   the	   WOA,	   Cox	   “allows	   us	   to	   grasp	   the	   vertical	  dimension	   of	   power	   to	   the	   neo-­‐realist	   horizontal	   rivalry	   among	   powerful	   states	   by	  constructing	   categories	   like	   domination-­‐subordination	   of	   metropolis	   over	   the	  hinterland,	   centre	   over	  periphery”	   and	   core	   over	   intermediate	   and	  peripheral	   regions	  (Moolakkattu	  2009:	  447;	  see	  also	  Hettne	  2005:	  549-­‐550).	  Therefore,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	   assessment	   of	   external	   actors	   and	   the	   civil	   society	   as	   regional	   agents,	   Cox’s	  conception	  of	  hegemony	  is	  of	  substantial	  significance	  in	  the	  study	  of	  regionalism.	  	   Finally,	   and	   despite	   the	   preoccupation	   with	   states-­‐led	   regionalism,	   the	   WOA	  embodies	  a	  normative	  position	  to	  the	  world	  order	  which	  potentially	  opens	  for	  structural	  transformation	   and	   regionalisation	   by	   non-­‐state	   actors	   and	   civil	   society	   (Söderbaum	  2004:	  49;	  see	  Cox	  1995:	  34).	  The	  WOA	  is	  built	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  Antonio	  Gramsci	  where	  civil	  society	  was	  both	  “the	  ground	  that	  sustained	  the	  hegemony	  of	   the	  bourgeoisie	  but	  also	  that	  on	  which	  an	  emancipatory	  counterhegemony	  could	  be	  constructed”	  (Cox	  1999:	  3).	  	  
2.3.2	  	   The	  New	  Regionalism	  Approach	  	   The	   research	   project	   on	   new	   regionalism,	   which	   would	   later	   be	   known	   as	   the	  “New	   Regionalism	   Approach”	   (NRA)	   grew	   out	   of	   a	   United	   Nations	   University/World	  Institute	  for	  Development	  Economics	  Research	  (UNU/WIDER)	  seminar	  in	  Helsinki	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  recognition	  of	  this	  division	  Cox	  adds	  that	  “[m]any	  people	  would	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  more	  in	  their	  relationship	   to	   consumption	   (or	   the	   inability	   to	   consume	   adequately)	   rather	   than	   to	   production	   –	   the	  more	  or	  less	  permanently	  unemployed,	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  shanty	  towns,	  welfare	  recipients,	  and	  students.	  The	  old	  production-­‐related	  categories	  are	  not	  entirely	  superseded;	  but	  the	  scheme	  of	  categories	  of	  people	  relevant	  to	  the	  problematic	  of	  social	  change	  needs	  to	  be	  rethought”	  (1999:	  26).	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mid	  1990s	  and	  has	  a	  similar	  preoccupation	  with	  change	  and	  global	  transformation	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  “supranational	  or	  ‘world’	  regions”	  (Hettne	  1999a:	  xv;	  see	  also	  Hettne	  &	  Inotai	  1994;	  Hettne	  et	   al.	   1999).	  The	  New	  Regionalism	  Approach	   sees	   “the	   two	  processes	  of	  globalization	   and	   regionalization	   […]	   articulated	   within	   the	   same	   larger	   process	   of	  global	  structural	  change”	  (Hettne	  1999b:	  2;	  see	  also	  1994:	  10).	  New	  Regioanlism,	  taking	  place	  in	  a	  multipolar	  world	  is	  therefore	  qualitatively	  distinct	  from	  the	  first	  wave	  which	  was	  constituent	  with	  a	  bipolar	  Cold	  World	  system.	  The	   first	  wave	  of	   regionalism	  “was	  created	  ‘from	  above’	  (by	  the	  superpowers),	  the	  new	  is	  a	  more	  spontaneous	  process	  from	  within	   the	   region	   and	   also	   ‘from	   below’	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   constituent	   states	  themselves,	   but	   increasingly	   also	   other	   actors,	   are	   the	   main	   proponents	   for	   regional	  integration”	  (Hettne	  1999b:	  7).	  New	  regionalism	  should	  therefore	  be	  understood	  as	  “a	  heterogeneous,	  comprehensive,	  multidimensional	  phenomenon,	   taking	  place	   in	  several	  sectors,	  and	  at	  least	  potentially	  ‘pushed’	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  formal	  regional	  institutional	  arrangements”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  31).	  	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   occupation	   of	   rationalist	   theorising	   of	   regions	   and	   states	  defined	  as	  predetermined	  and	  static	  units,	  “the	  NRA	  is	  more	  eclectic	  and	  more	  focused	  on	  the	  processes	  and	  consequences	  of	  regionalization	  in	  various	  fields	  of	  activity	  and	  at	  various	   levels,	   i.e.	   the	   processes	   through	  which	   regions	   are	   being	  made	   and	   unmade”	  (Söderbaum	   2004:	   31).2	   The	   new	   regionalism	   “can	   be	   defined	   as	   a	   multidimensional	  process	   of	   regional	   integration	  which	   includes	   economic,	   political,	   social	   and	   cultural	  aspects”	  and	  must	  therefore	  necessarily	  be	  an	  interdisciplinary	  field	  of	  research	  (Hettne	  1999b:	  17;	  2003:	  25).	  	   The	   NRA	   is	   normatively	   related	   to	   the	  WOA	   in	   their	   critique	   of	   contemporary	  economic	   globalisation	   as	   a	   process	   with	   highly	   uneven	   implications	   for	   the	   world	  populations	   (Söderbaum	   2004:	   31).	   However,	   whereas	   the	   WOA	   employs	   a	   more	  pessimistic	  observation	  of	   regionalism	  as	  predominantly	   “a	  manifestation	  of	  economic	  globalization	   and	   prevailing	   forms	   of	   hegemony	   (i.e.	   as	   neoliberal	   open	   regionalism)”	  the	   NRA	   perceives	   new	   regionalism	   as	   a	   potential	   response	   to	   balance	   the	  disproportionate	   implications	   of	   globalisation.	   The	   NRA	   chief	   architect,	   Björn	   Hettne	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  advocates	  of	  the	  NRA	  apply	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘regionness’	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  “relative	  convergence	  of	  dimensions	  such	  as	  cultural	  affinity,	  political	  regimes,	  security	  arrangements	  and	  economic	  policies	  (ie	  relative	  sameness)”	  (Marchand	  et	  al.	  1999:	  900).	  The	  term	  indicates	  that	  “a	  region	  can	  be	   ‘more	  or	   less’	  and	  the	  level	  of	  regionness	  can	  both	  increase	  and	  decrease	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  n.	  6,	  p.	  215;	  see	  also	  Hettne	  1993,	  1999;	  Hettne	  &	  Söderbaum	  2000).	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(1997:	   86)	   incorporates	   the	   thinking	   of	   Karl	   Polanyi	   (1957)	   in	   associating	   new	  regionalism	  with	  “a	  return	  of	  ‘the	  political’”	  (1999b:	  7):	  	   The	  current	  phenomenon	  of	  regionalism	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  manifestation	  of	   the	   second	   movement,	   the	   protection	   of	   society,	   on	   the	   level	   of	   the	  macroregion,	   as	   a	   political	   reaction	   against	   the	   global	   market	   expansion	  which	   gained	  momentum	   in	   the	   1980s.	   Thus	  we	   can	   speak	   of	   a	   ‘Second	  Great	  Transformation’.	  	  	   According	   to	   Hettne,	   “[r]egionalism	   is	   thus	   part	   of	   both	   the	   first	   and	   second	  movement,	  with	  a	  neoliberal	  face	  in	  the	  first,	  and	  a	  more	  interventionalist	  orientation	  in	  the	  second”	  (Hettne	  2005:	  548).	  	   The	  launch	  of	  the	  NRA	  clearly	  marked	  a	  split	  from	  conventional	  theorising	  about	  regional	   integration/cooperation	  and	   its	  critical,	   reflectivist	   theoretical	   framework	  has	  attracted	  a	  number	  of	  followers.	  However,	  it	  has	  also	  received	  criticism	  from	  within	  its	  own	  academic	  camp	  due	  to	  “its	  implicit	  tendency	  to	  use	  highly	  institutionalized	  forms	  of	  regionalization,	   the	   EU	   in	   particular,	   as	   the	   norm	   for	   understanding	   contemporary	  practices	  and	  processes	  of	  regionalization”	  (Bøås	  et	  al.	  2003:	  203).	  This	  criticism	  is	  most	  explicitly	   evident	   when	   Hettne	   (1994:	   12)	   argues,	   “Europe	   represents	   the	   most	  advanced	   regional	   arrangement	   the	  world	   has	   seen,	   and	   it	  will	   consequently	   serve	   as	  our	  paradigm	  for	  the	  new	  regionalism”	  (Hettne	  1994:	  12;	  also	  cited	  in	  Bøås	  et	  al.	  2003:	  203).	  In	  a	  more	  recent	  volume,	  some	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  promoters	  of	  the	  NRA	  self-­‐critically	  confess,	  “our	  project,	   in	  spite	  of	  good	  intentions	  to	  the	  contrary,	  has	  been	  too	  state-­‐centric	   and	   too	   focused	   on	   formal	   organizations	   rather	   than	   pinpointing	   the	  process	  of	  more	   informal	   regionalization	   that	   take	  place	  on	   the	  ground”	   (Hettne	  et	  al.	  2001:	  xxxii).	  Despite	  such	  criticism,	  but	  also	  with	  help	   from	   its	  critical	  peers,	   the	  NRA	  has	  developed	  appreciably	  from	  its	  foundation.	  	  
2.3.3	  	   The	   New	   Regionalisms	   Approach/Weave-­world:	   informal	   regionalisms	  
from	  below	  	   The	   New	   Regionalism	   Approach	   paved	   new	   ground	   in	   the	   study	   of	   regions	   in	  which	   new	   contributions	   have	   advanced	   related	   assumptions	   and	   critical/reflectivist	  approaches	   (see	   Bøås	   et	   al.	   1999;	   Marchand	   et	   al.	   1999).	   The	   NRA	   and	   the	   New	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Regionalisms	   Approach/Weave-­‐world	   are,	   for	   instance,	   “linked	   in	   varying	   degree	   to	  more	   or	   less	   the	   same	   epistemic	   network”	   and	   share	   fundamental	   meta-­‐theoretical	  assumptions,	   perhaps	   most	   importantly	   their	   emphasis	   on	   the	   pluralisation	   of	  regionalisms	  (Grant	  &	  Söderbaum	  2003:	  4;	  Bøås	  et	  al.	  2003:	  198,	  202-­‐204),	  hence	   the	  uncomplicated	  ideational	  cross-­‐fertilisation	  and	  networking	  between	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	   NRA	   and	   the	   advocates	   of	   the	   NRA/weave-­‐world.	   For	   this	   reason,	   and	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  I	  use	  the	  abbreviation	  ‘NRsA’	  to	  account	  for	  both	  approaches.	  	   The	  1999	  special	  edition	  of	  Third	  World	  Quarterly	  titled	  New	  Regionalisms	  in	  the	  
New	   Millennium	   introduced	   several	   new	   insights	   to	   the	   study	   of	   regions.	   Despite	  important	  communalities	  with	  the	  NRA	  the	  NRA/weave-­‐world	  disagrees	  with	  the	  state-­‐centric	  orientation	  to	  processes	  of	  regionalisation.	  They	  can	  be	  state-­‐led,	  and	  the	  states	  are	   often	   involved,	   but	   “[w]ithin	   each	   regional	   project	   there	   will	   be	   more	   than	   one	  regional	  vision,	  and	  often	  also	  more	  than	  one	  actor	  pursuing	  regionalism”	  (Marchand	  et	  
al.	  1999:	  900).	  Other	  actors,	  such	  as	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (NGOs),	  CSOs,	  the	  media	   and	   TNCs,	   only	   to	   mention	   a	   few,	   may	   coexist,	   providing	   the	   region	   with	  ideational	  content,	  and	  as	  such	  “are	   involved	   in	  processes	  of	   ‘making	  the	  region	   into	  a	  region’”	   (Bøås	   et	   al.	   2003:	   201).	   As	   a	   consequence,	   for	   NRA/Weave-­‐world	   research	  agenda	   it	   becomes	   important	   to	   emphasis	   the	   “multitude	   of	   overlapping,	   disjunct	   and	  often	  contradictory	  regionalisation	  processes”,	  which	  in	  turn	  makes	  it	  more	  accurate	  “to	  speak	  of	  new	  regionalisms	  instead	  of	  new	  regionalism”	  (Marchand	  et	  al.	  1999:	  903).	  In	  order	  to	  better	  grasp	  the	  wide	  scope	  of	  regionalising	  actors	  the	  NRA/Weave-­‐world	  tries	  to	  transcend	  the	  contracted	  analytical	  focus	  on	  formal	  regionalism,	  and	  “make	  deliberate	  attempts	   to	   connect	   the	   two	   broad	   processes	   of	   formal	   and	   informal	   regionalism”	  (Marchand	   et	   al.	   1999:	   906).	   According	   to	   the	  NRA/Weave-­‐world	   protagonists,	   “often	  the	   distinction	  between	   formal	   and	   informal	   is	   purely	   cosmetic”,	   and	   “[i]f	  we	  want	   to	  study	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   regionalization	   from	   below	   we	   must	   give	   agency	   to	  ordinary	   people	   and	   their	   daily	   activities	   as	   well	   as	   the	   more	   formalized	   aspects	   of	  regionalization”	  (Bøås	  et	  al.	  2003:	  207,	  208).	  	   The	   determinants	   for	   the	   regional	   delineation	   should	   not	   simply	   be	   the	  “geographical	   proximity	   […]	   or	   formal	   political	   and	   economic	   cooperation”	   but	   “the	  actual	  practices”	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  of	  regionalisation	  (Marchand	  et	  al.	  1999:	  905).	  In	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  NRA/Weave-­‐world,	  the	  region	  should	  therefore	  be	  understood	  as	   a	   social	   space	   where	   “state,	   market,	   civil	   society	   and	   external	   actors	   often	   come	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together	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   mixed-­‐actor	   collectivities,	   networks	   and	   modes	   of	   regional	  governance”	  (Söderbaum	  &	  Shaw	  2003:	  222;	  see	  Marchand	  et	  al.	  1999:	  898;	  Bøås	  et	  al.	  2003:	   204-­‐207).	   Relevant	   for	   this	   study,	   is	   the	   emphasis	   on	   regional	   civil	   societies,	  whether	   they	   are	   informed	   by	   political,	   academic	   or	   cultural	   interests,	   as	   well	   as	  companies,	  defining	  their	  own	  regions	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  visions	  and	  strategies,	  as	  drivers	  for	  regionalisation	  (Shaw	  2000:	  408;	  2002).	  	   The	   idea	   of	   the	   “weave-­‐world	   of	   regionalisation	   and	   globalisation”	   implies	   that	  “we	   are	   confronted	  with	   […]	   juxtaposition,	   contradictory	   processes	   and	   simultaneous	  cooperation	  and	  conflict	  interwoven	  into	  streams	  of	  ideas,	  identities	  and	  more	  tangible	  resources”	   (Bøås	   et	   al.	   1999:	   1063).	   In	   order	   to	   reveal	   the	   “complexities	   of	   the	  formal/informal	   nexuses”	   the	   NRA/Weave-­‐world	   argues	   “that	   we	   will	   have	   to	  incorporate	   into	   our	   research	   strategies	   and	   analyses	   a	  whole	   range	   of	   elements	   and	  practices	   that	   have	   been	   considered	   outside	   the	   domain	   of	   political	   research	   and	   the	  study	   of	   regional	   organisation”	   (Marchand	   et	   al.	   1999:	   905).	   The	   NRA/Weave-­‐world	  protagonists	  posit	  that	  “most	  regional	  organisations	   in	  the	  South	  are,	  at	   least,	  partially	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  everyday	  reality	  and,	  moreover,	  that	  so	  far	  their	  achievement	  record	  has	  been	  rather	  mixed”	  (Bøås	  et	  al.	  1999:	  1066).	  From	  this	  point	  of	  departure,	  they	  pose	  the	  question,	  “how	  to	  reattach	  these	  organisations	  to	  their	  contextual	  realities”	  (Bøås	  et	  
al.	  1999:	  1066).	  	   The	   emphasis	   on	   the	   informal/formal	   nexus,	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors,	   and	   their	  orientation	   towards	   processes	   and	   agency,	   therefore	   entails	   some	   epistemological	  alterations	   (see	   Marchand	   et	   al.	   905-­‐906).	   The	   NRA/Weave-­‐world	   emphases	   the	  multidimensionality	   of	   regional	   processes	   and	   thus	   aims	   to	   establish	   a	   holistic	  perception	  of	   regionalism.	   It	   therefore	  stresses	   the	   importance	  of	   integrating	   “insights	  from	  parallel	  disciplines/discourses	  such	  as	  critical	  geography,	  post-­‐colonial	  theory	  and	  cultural	   studies,	   and	   post-­‐structuralism	   in	   addition	   to	   international	   relations,	  international	  political	  economy,	  development	  and	  ‘new	  security’	  (Bøås	  et	  al.	  2005:	  2;	  see	  Söderbaum	   &	   Shaw	   2003).	   While	   the	   WOA	   and	   the	   younger	   editions	   of	   the	   NRA	  incorporate	  a	  systemic	  and	  universalistic	  perspective	  to	  their	  analysis,	  the	  NRA/Weave-­‐world	   rejects	   such	   a	   logic,	   “emphasising	   instead	   the	   contradictory	   nature	   of	   informal	  regionalism	  from	  below	  in	  particular	  regions	  in	  the	  South.”	  In	  this	  regard,	  Söderbaum’s	  argument	   that	   a	   priori	   construction	   of	   “a	   particular	   regionalism	   theory	   only	   for	   the	  South,”	   should	   be	   avoided,	   is	   more	   appropriate	   (Söderbaum	   2004:	   35).	   This	   study,	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therefore,	  maintains	   an	   eclectic	   and	   flexible	   application	   of	   the	   reflectivist	   and	   critical	  approaches	  deliberated	  above.	  	  
2.4	  	   Conclusion	  	   This	   chapter	  has	  provided	  a	   review	  of	   some	  of	   the	  most	   influential	   theories	  on	  regionalism	  and	  has	  proposed	  a	  critical/reflectivist	  framework	  combining	  insights	  from	  the	  WOA,	  the	  NRA	  and	  the	  NRsA/Weave	  World.	  The	  rationalist	  theories	  addressed	  in	  the	  first	   parts	   of	   the	   chapter	   are	   all	   to	   different	   extents	   based	   on	   similar	   assumptions	   of	  state-­‐,	  market-­‐	  and	  Euro-­‐centrism	  and	  the	  “status	  quo	  bias”	  (see	  Schweller	  1996).	  These	  theories	  have	  also	  dominated	  academic	  and	  political	  discourses	   for	  decades	  with	   their	  market	   oriented,	   inter-­‐state	   frameworks,	  which	   provides	   a	   good	   argument	   for	   testing	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  regionalism.	  Indeed,	  rationalist	  theories	  on	  regionalism	  have	  much	   influence	   on	   policies	   and	   politics	   of	   regionalism	   through	   formal	   institutions.	  However,	   they	   fail	   to	   account	   for	   important	   forces	   and	   dynamics	   within	   the	   broader	  state-­‐society	  nexus	  and	  thus	  neglecting	  central	  activity	  within	  the	  regional	  space,	  such	  as	  shadow	  regionalism,	  informal	  economies	  and	  the	  reality	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  	   As	   the	  next	   chapters	  will	   illustrate,	   the	   regional	   activity	   is	  much	  more	   complex	  and	  multileveled	   than	   what	   the	   rationalist	   theories	   envision.	   Various	   regional	   actors,	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental,	  from	  within	  as	  well	  as	  from	  outside	  of	  the	  region	  pursue	  different,	  often	  contradictory	  regional	  strategies	  to	  serve	  their	  own	  interests.	  It	  is	  diverse	  regional	  agendas	  like	  these	  that	  create	  the	  region.	  Studying	  the	  potential	  of	  oil	  production	   as	   a	   driver	   for	   regionalisation	   requires	   a	   nuanced	   and	   contextualised	  understanding	  of	  the	  region.	  The	  detrimental	  socio-­‐economic	  effects	  of	  oil	  production	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   are	   often	   connected	   to	   the	   historically	   and	   socially	   constructed	  patterns	  of	  society.	  The	  following	  chapter	  illustrates	  how	  the	  state-­‐society	  complex	  has	  evolved	  in	  East	  Africa	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  experience	  in	  Uganda	  and	  Kenya.	  The	  chapter	  also	   addresses	   how	   structural	   adjustment	   programmes	   of	   decentralisation	   and	  liberalisation,	  backed	  by	  IFIs	  and	  the	  donor	  community,	  have	  been	  squarely	  imposed	  on	  the	  region	  and	  used	  by	  political	  elites	  to	  strengthen	  regimes,	  patronage	  networks,	  and	  to	  impede	  political	  opposition.	  Finally,	   the	  next	  chapter	  will	  demonstrate	  the	   influence	  of	  TNCs	  on	  the	  state	  and	  policy-­‐making	  in	  East	  Africa.	  	  	  




3	  	   The	  social	  and	  political	  economy	  of	  East	  Africa	  	   The	   centre	   of	   interest	   in	   this	   study	   necessarily	   puts	   emphasis	   on	   certain	  dimensions	   more	   than	   others.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   remaining	   chapters	   will	   show	   how	  aspects	  of	  agency,	  structure	  as	  well	  as	  both	  formal	  and	  informal	  forms	  of	  regionalisms,	  and	  the	  interlinkages	  between	  these	  two,	  are	  important	  to	  create	  a	  comprehensive,	  anti-­‐reductionist	   image	  of	   the	  political	   economy	  of	   regionalism	   in	  East	  Africa.	   The	   chapter	  provides	  a	  broad	  historical	  overview	  of	  the	  East	  African	  region,	  focusing	  on	  Uganda	  and	  Kenya	   to	   highlight	   the	   social,	   cultural,	   political	   and	   economic	   evolution	   of	   the	   region.	  This	   is	  done	   to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	   the	   structure	  and	  nature	  of	   the	   region	   in	  which	  processes	  of	  regionalisation	  are	  being	  pursued.	  The	  chapter	  also	  addresses	  how	  programmes	   of	   structural	   adjustment	   have	   been	   introduced	   in	   the	   region,	   how	   they	  have	  served	  to	  discipline	  actors,	  but	  also	  how	  they	  have	  been	  manipulated	  to	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  political	  elites.	  The	  sections	  in	  this	  chapter	  also	  demonstrate	  how	  historical	  tensions	   in	  and	  between	   regions	  are	  being	   reinforced	  by	   the	   current	  LAPSSET	  project	  and	  oil	  development.	  Finally,	  an	  assessment	  of	  Uganda’s	  oil	  agreements	  is	  made	  in	  this	  chapter	  to	  illustrate	  by	  whom	  and	  for	  whom	  oil	  development	  is	  being	  conducted.	  	  
3.1	  	   Setting	  the	  historical	  scene	  	   Despite	   vows	   from	   both	   governments	   and	   oil	   companies	   about	   the	  developmental	   potential	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   and	   the	   associated	   regional	   oil	  production,	   it	   is	   safe	   to	   say	   that	   the	   ultimate	   aim	   of	   the	   project	   is	   to	   enhance	   and	  facilitate	  resource	  extraction.	  As	  Petrus	  de	  Kock	  (2012a:	  11)	  notes,	  “Resource	  extraction	  is	   not	   a	   process	   that	   is	   devoid	   of	   historical	   context,	   which	   can	   take	   place	   in	   a	   socio-­‐political	  vacuum.”	  It	  is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  elaborate	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  Eastern	  Africa.	  While	   recognising	   the	  variety	  of	   the	  historical	   and	  socio-­‐political	  history	  of	   the	  various	  countries	  in	  the	  region,	  limitation	  in	  space	  does	  not	  allow	  this	  study	  to	  make	  a	  full	  assessment	  of	  all	  the	  regional	  actors.	  The	  analysis	  will	  therefore	  concentrate	  on	  the	  territorial	  boundaries	  of	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda.	  	  It	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  state	  finances,	  government	  structures	  and	  the	  general	  macro-­‐economic	  prospects	  of	  the	  country	  which	  will	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  oil	  extraction.	  Revenues	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and	  rents	  accruing	  from	  oil	  extraction	  are	  also	  bound	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  political	  psychology	  of	  the	  governments	  and	  the	  regional	  citizenry.	   In	  order	  to	   identify	  some	  of	  the	  regional	  political	  implications	  derived	  from	  oil	  production	  it	  is	  indispensible	  to	  put	  the	  impending	  oil	  exploration	  and	  production	  within	  a	  historical	  perspective.	  	   Instead	   of	   elaborating	   a	   detailed	   East	   African	   historiography,	   the	   goal	   of	   this	  section	   is	   to	   establishing	   a	   selection	   of	   reference	   points	   which	   have	   impacted	   on	   the	  political	   evolution	   of	   Uganda	   and	   Kenya.	   Certain	   similarities	   are	   discovered	   when	  comparing	   different	   petro-­‐states	   in	   Africa.	   For	   instance,	   they	   tend	   to	   by	   highly	  militarised,	   but	   oil	   related	   contestations	   will	   often	   “have	   its	   roots	   in	   pre-­‐existing	  tensions	   in	   society”	   (Banfield	   2009:	   22).	   Tensions,	   in	   this	   regard,	   do	   not	   exclusively	  imply	   violent	   conflict,	   and	   an	   analysis	   of	   key	   issues	   in	   the	   socio-­‐political	   economy	   of	  eastern	  Africa	  will	  help	  illuminate	  some	  of	  the	  political	  dynamics	  or	  tensions	  preceding	  the	  discovery	  of	  oil	  and	  preparations	  for	  oil	  production.	  Another	  important	  commonality	  between	   states	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa,	   which	   also	   brings	   an	   important	   dimension	   to	  resource	  rich	  regions,	   is	  the	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  structure	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  next	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  therefore	  briefly	  assess	  the	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  state	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  	  
3.1.1	  	   The	  neo-­patrimonial	  state	  in	  sub-­Saharan	  Africa	  As	   pointed	   out	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   approach	   of	   the	   NRsA	   attempts	   to	  transcend	   the	   conventional	  overemphasis	  on	   the	   state	  as	  actors	   in	   formal	   regionalism	  and	   inter-­‐governmental	   organisations.	   In	   addition,	   it	   has	   now	   been	   provided	   for	   the	  importance	   granted	   to	   the	   connection	   between	   the	   formal	   and	   the	   informal	   in	   the	  theoretical	   framework	  applied	  in	  this	  study.	  When	  studying	  regions	  in	  Africa,	  this	   is	  of	  particular	  value	  considering	  the	  often	  blurred	  distinction	  between	  what	  is	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  formal	  and	  informal,	  public	  and	  private	  (Söderbaum	  &	  Taylor	  2010:	  54).	  	  By	  applying	  the	  WOA	  this	  analysis	  rejects	  the	  mainstream	  perception	  of	  states	  as	  ‘black	   boxes’,	   but	   treats	   them	   as	   diverse	   units	   in	   a	   ‘state-­‐society	   complex’,	   and	   not	  necessarily	   ‘rational’,	   as	  will	   be	   illustrated	   in	   this	   section.	   Before	   continuing	  with	   this	  analysis	  of	   the	  East	  African	   region	  where	  Uganda	  and	  Kenya	  will	  be	  assessed	  more	   in	  detail,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  establish	  an	  understanding	  about	   the	   logic	  of	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  systems	  as	   this	  will	   create	   a	  better	   comprehension	  of	   the	   functioning	  of	   the	   region	   in	  Africa	  (Söderbaum	  &	  Taylor	  2010:	  54).	  Indeed,	  this	  study	  is	  concerned	  with	  identifying	  contradictory	  features	  of	  agents	  within	  a	  specific	  regional	  space.	  While	  Chabal	  and	  Daloz	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(1999:	  9)	  points	  out	  that	  the	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  approach	  “seeks	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  (real	  or	  imaginary)	  contradictions	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  state	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa”,	  this	  study	  adds	  that	  they	  are	  more	  ‘real’	  than	  they	  are	  ‘imaginary’.	  Drawing	   on	  Max	  Weber’s	   (1978)	   concepts	   of	   patrimonialism	   and	   legal-­‐rational	  bureaucracy,	   neo-­‐patrimonialism	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   combination	   of	   these	   partly	  intertwined	   and	   co-­‐existing	   forms	   of	   domination.	   While	   patrimonialism	   can	   be	  understood	  as	  a	  society	  where	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  realm	  is	  non-­‐existing,	   in	   the	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   state	   this	   distinction	   is	   formally	   prevalent	   and	   is	  accepted	   and	   referable.	   Neo-­‐patrimonial	   rule	   is	   attained	   within	   the	   framework	   and	  assertion	   of	   the	   modern	   state’s	   legal-­‐rational	   bureaucracy.	   With	   the	   formal	  representation	   of	   the	   structures	   of	   the	   modern	   state	   there	   is	   no	   clear	   distinction	  between	   the	   private	   and	   public	   sphere,	   i.e.	   the	   patrimonial	   system	   of	   the	   personal	  relations	  exists	  next	  to	  the	  legal-­‐rational	  system	  of	  bureaucracy.	  Instead	  of	  being	  clearly	  separated	   from	   each	   other	   they	   pervade	   each	   other.	   In	   other	  words,	   “the	   patrimonial	  penetrates	   the	   legal-­‐rational	   system	   and	   twists	   its	   logic,	   functions,	   and	   effects”	  (Erdmann	  &	  Engel	  2006:	  18).	  In	  this	  system	  formal	  institutions	  are	  invaded	  by	  informal	  politics.	  The	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  state	  is	  therefore	  an	  institutionalisation	  of	  “type	  of	  political	  domination	   which	   is	   characterised	   by	   insecurity	   about	   the	   behaviour	   and	   role	   of	   the	  state	   institutions	   (and	   agents)”	   which	   in	   turn	   “structures	   the	   reproduction	   of	   the	  system”	  (Erdmann	  &	  Engel	  2006:	  19).	  In	   the	  African	   context,	   the	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   state	   is	   a	   legacy	   of	   the	   colonial	   era.	  The	   colonial	  African	   state	   contained	   a	   legal-­‐rational	   sphere	   restricted	   to	   the	   centre	   of	  power	  and	   the	  European	   immigrant	  population.	  Beyond	   this	  sphere	   “was	   the	  realm	  of	  patrimonial	   rule,	   of	   kings,	   chiefs,	   and	   elders”	   exercising	   indirect	   rule	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	  colonial	  capital	  (Erdmann	  &	  Engel	  2006:	  19).	  Only	  between	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  decolonisation	  did	  the	  colonial	  powers	  attempt	  to	  bring	  the	  entire	  population	  under	  the	  legal-­‐rational	  bureaucracy.	  However,	  this	  period	  was	  too	  short	  to	  establish	  a	  self-­‐sufficient	  culture	  of	  legal-­‐rational	  bureaucracy.	  Subsequently,	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  state	  in	   Africa	   witnessed	   at	   the	   same	   time	   the	   formation	   of	   authoritarian	   rule	   and	   the	  expansion	  of	  bureaucracy	  which	  simultaneously	  was	   infiltrated	   from	  below	  and	  above	  by	   informal	   politics.	   Therefore,	   “the	   state	   in	   Africa	   has	   always	   been	   a	   hybrid	   or,	   a	  mixture	  of	  patrimonial	  and	  legal-­‐rational	  domination”	  (Erdmann	  &	  Engel	  2006:	  20).	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3.2	  	   The	  evolution	  of	  a	  dysfunctional	  state-­society	  relationship	  
	   Focusing	  on	  Uganda	  and	  Kenya,	  the	  next	  two	  sections	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  state	  in	  East	  Africa	  has	  created	  a	  state	  society	  complex	  of	  mistrust	  and	  tensions.	  As	  de	  Kock	  (2012a:	  13)	  observes:	  “The	  role	  military	  forces	  play	  in	  the	  development	  of	  states	  differs	  according	  to	  history,	  and	  political-­‐economic,	  cultural	  and	  social	  conditions.”	  The	  evolution	  of	  the	  state-­‐society	  complex	  in	  East	  Africa	  is	  linked	  to	   pre-­‐existing	   tensions	   in	   society,	   which	   again	   are	   fuelled	   and	   reproduced	   by	   the	  current	  developments	  of	  the	  oil	  and	  LAPSSET	  project.	  	  
3.2.1	  	   Civil-­military	  regimes	  –	  the	  historical	  repression	  of	  the	  East	  African	  people	  Since	   colonial	   times,	   the	   armed	   forces	   in	   East	   Africa,	   but	   especially	   in	   Uganda	  have	  been	   elemental	   in	   establishing	   and	   re-­‐establishing	   the	  political	   leadership	   in	   the	  countries.	  Additionally,	  the	  armed	  forces	  have	  played	  a	  central	  part	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  country.	  In	  Uganda	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  Milton	  Obote	  used	  the	  military	  in	  order	  to	  repeal	  the	   constitution,	   removed	   the	   privileged	   position	   of	   Kabaka	  Mutesa	   I	   (former	   king	   of	  Buganda)	  along	  with	  those	  of	  his	  people,	  and	  drafted	  a	  new	  constitutions	  in	  which	  Obote	  himself	   surmounted	   as	  president	   (Omara-­‐Otunnu	  1987:	  75,	   76-­‐77).	  The	   abrogation	  of	  the	  constitution	  also	  led	  to	  the	  abolishment	  of	  all	  kingdoms	  in	  Uganda	  (de	  Kock	  2012b:	  26).	  “Although	  the	  struggle	  was	  of	  a	  political	  nature,	   it	  was	  only	  resolved	  by	  one	  party	  using	   the	   military	   as	   the	   instrument	   to	   attain	   its	   objective	   […]	   Henceforth	   the	  administration	  relied	  on	  the	  Army	  as	  its	  principal	  safeguard”	  (Omara-­‐Otunnu	  1987:	  77).	  	   This	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  situation	  in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  political	  evolution	  in	  which	   Uganda	   was	   “caught	   in	   a	   classic	   civil-­‐military	   relations	   conundrum”	   (de	   Kock	  2012a:	  14).	   In	   the	  civil-­‐military	   relationship	   the	  civilian	  becomes	   the	  enemy	  on	  which	  the	  military	   is	  meant	   to	  exercise	   its	  coercive	   force,	  and	  thus	  to	  “enforce	   its	  will	  on	  the	  community	   that	   created	   it”	   (Feaver	   1999:	   214).	   When	   Obote	   used	   the	   military	   as	   a	  means	   to	  win	   a	   political	   dispute	  with	  Kabaka	  Mutesa	   I,	   “Obote	   paved	   the	  way	   for	   the	  military	   to	   become	   a	   major	   power	   broker	   in	   Ugandan	   politics”	   (de	   Kock	   2012a:	   14).	  Increasingly,	  tensions	  grew	  between	  Obote	  and	  the	  senior	  officers	  in	  the	  armed	  forces,	  especially	   with	   Idi	   Amin	   who	   became	  major	   general	   in	   1968.	   Amin	   strengthened	   his	  position	  in	  the	  army	  by	  appointing	  people	  from	  his	  region	  of	  origin	  in	  the	  north.	  When	  Amin	  launched	  a	  successful	  coup	  d’état	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  1971	  the	  pattern	  of	  military	  behaviour,	  commenced	  by	  Obote,	  became	  firmly	  entrenched.	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   The	   end	   of	   Amin’s	   rule	   did	   not	  mean	   an	   end	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   army	   in	  political	   affairs.	   Not	   only	   was	   the	   Amin’s	   regime	   toppled	   by	   another	   military	   coup:	  political	  disputes	  continued	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  army.	  Political	  and	  social	  instabilities	   resulted	   in	   the	   seizure	   of	   power	   by	   a	  military	   council	   which	   organised	   a	  rather	   dubious	   election	   after	   which	   Obote	   again	   rose	   to	   power	   in	   1980.	   Contentions	  about	   the	   election	   result	   led	   to	   Obote’s	   second	   fall	   from	   power	   after	   military	  intervention	   in	   mid-­‐1985.	   This	   time	   it	   was	   Brigadier	   Bajulio	   Olara	   Okello	   who	   took	  command	  of	  both	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  the	  political	  leadership.	  But	  his	  reign	  would	  only	  last	  for	  six	  months.	  His	  government	  was	  fragmented	  and	  powerless	  and	  could	  not	  put	  up	  any	  resistance	  when	  Yoweri	  Museveni	  moved	  on	  State	  House	  to	  stage	  yet	  another	  coup.	  Amii	   Omara-­‐Otunnu	   (1987:	   179)	   outlines	   the	   consolidation	   of	  Museveni’s	   regime	   and	  captures	  the	  pivotal	  role	  of	  the	  military	  in	  his	  government	  to	  come:	  	   As	  under	  previous	  administrations,	  Museveni’s	  army	  plays	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  political	  processes	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  military	  in	  the	  new	  regime	  is	  underscored	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Museveni	  himself	  has	  occupied	  the	  portifolio	  of	  Minister	  of	  Defence.	  There	  are	  two	  major	  reasons	  why,	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  the	  military	  will	  remain	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  politics.	  First,	  it	  is	  needed	  to	  pacify	  the	  country	  after	  five	  years	  of	  savage	  civil	  war.	  Second,	   military	   means	   are	   the	   only	   way	   to	   keep	   a	   firm	   hold	   over	   the	  country	  while	  Museveni	  creates	  a	  political	  constituency	  for	  himself.	  In	  this	  respect	   the	   National	   Resistance	   Army	   –	   which	   he	   both	   instituted	   and	  moulded	   and	   which	   owes	   considerable	   allegiance	   to	   him	   –	   is	   his	   most	  dependable	  ally.	  	   The	  turbulent	  and	  violent	  post-­‐independent	  period,	  in	  which	  the	  military	  made	  an	  indelible	   niche	   for	   themselves	   in	   the	   country’s	   politics	   draws	   a	   clear	   picture	   of	   the	  political	   significance	   of	   uniformed	  men	   in	   the	   political	   evolution	   of	   Uganda.	  However,	  even	  though	  Museveni	  took	  power	  with	  military	  force	  in	  1986,	  and	  his	  most	  loyal	  allies	  still	   may	   be	   the	   army,	   “he	   never	   sought	   to	   rule	   Uganda	   militarily”	   (Nganda	   2011).	  Instead,	  Museveni	  has	  used	  political	  skills	  to	  establish	  a	  patronage	  network	  through	  co-­‐option	  of	  party	  officials	  from	  the	  previous	  party.	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  In	   the	  course	  of	  Uganda’s	  post-­‐colonial	  history,	  at	   least	  13	  armed	  rebel	  groups3	  have	  been	  fighting	  different	  governments	  for	  power.	  Each	  of	  these	  insurgencies	  provides	  an	   illustration	   of	   a	   history	   of	   internal	   political,	   ideological	   and	   ethnic	   divergences	  incorporated	   with	   regional	   biases	   of	   the	   respective	   presidents	   which	   caused	   a	  disruption	   of	   the	   national	   consensus,	   often	   resulting	   in	   extreme	   violence.	   Like	   Amin,	  Obote	  had	   recruited	   soldiers	   from	  his	   own	   region,	   in	   the	  north.	  When	  Obote’s	   regime	  came	   to	   a	   sudden	   end	   thousands	   of	   soldiers	   fled	   back	   to	   the	   north.	   There,	   these	  dishonoured	   and	   disaffected	   soldiers	   became	   the	   recruit	   base	   of	   the	   insurgencies	  ravaging	  Uganda	  and	  much	  of	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  region	  from	  1986	  to	  present.	  As	  is	  most	  often	   the	   case	   in	   war,	   the	   most	   significantly	   affected	   from	   the	   fighting	   is	   the	   civilian	  population.	  In	  northern	  Uganda	  the	  National	  Resistance	  Movement	  (NRM)	  government	  forced	   the	   civilian	   population	   into	   camps	   for	   internally	   displaced	   people	   (IDP),	   or	   so-­‐called	   ‘protected	   villages’,	   of	   which	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   2005	   amounted	   to	   about	   1,8	  million	  people	  (IDMC	  2010).	  	  The	  violent	  history	  of	  post-­‐independent	  Uganda	  portends	  an	  uncertain	  future	  for	  the	   impending	   oil	   production	   in	   the	   country	   when	   compared	   to	   other	   oil	   producing	  regions	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  with	  a	  similar	  past,	  such	  as	  the	  Niger	  Delta.	  With	  that	  said,	  “the	   NRM	   government,	   under	   Museveni’s	   leadership,	   has	   made	   positive	   progress	   in	  developing	   the	   economy,	   stabilising	   the	   territory	   and	   moving	   Uganda	   away	   from	   its	  history	  of	  internal	  conflict”	  (de	  Kock	  2012a:	  19).	  But	  there	  are	  already	  signals	  indicating	  an	   increased	   militarisation	   of	   the	   country	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   country’s	  transformation	   into	   a	   petro-­‐state.	   Spokesman	   of	   the	   Ugandan	   People’s	   Defence	   Force	  (UPDF),	   Lieutenant	   Colonel	   Felix	   Kulayigye	   was	   quoted	   saying,	   “The	   purchase	   of	   the	  eight	  fighter	  jets	  and	  other	  military	  hardware	  is	  partly	  in	  preparation	  for	  the	  start	  of	  oil	  production	   in	   the	   Lake	   Albert	   region”	   (Olupot	   2011).	   The	   political	   apprehension	  following	   the	   increased	  significance	  of	   the	  UPDF	   is	   that	   the	   “military	  may	  revert	   to	   its	  old	  political	  tricks	  in	  Uganda	  to	  manipulate,	  influence	  and	  direct	  political	  processes	  from	  the	   shadows”	   (de	   Kock	   2012a:	   19).	   The	   ten	   ‘special	   interest	   group	   representatives’	  seated	  in	  the	  Ugandan	  parliament	  serve	  to	  further	  demonstrate	  the	  current	  significance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  These	  include:	  Kikosi	  Maluum,	  Front	  of	  National	  Salvation	  (FRONASA),	  Uganda	  National	  Liberation	  Army	  (UNLA),	  Uganda	  National	  Rescue	  Front	  (UNRF),	  Former	  Uganda	  National	  Army	  (FUNA),	  Uganda	  Freedom	  Movement	  (UFM),	  National	  Resistance	  Army	  (NRA),	  Federal	  Democratic	  Movement	  (FDM),	  Uganda	  People’s	  Democratic	  Army	  (UPDA),	  Holy	  Spirit	  Movement	  (HSM),	  Uganda	  People’s	  Army	  (UPA),	  Lord’s	  Resistance	  Army	  (LRA),	  West	  Nile	  Bank	  Front	  (WNBF),	  and	  Allied	  Democratic	  Forces	  (ADF).	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of	  the	  UPDF	  in	  the	  country’s	  political	  affairs	  and	  leverage	  regarding	  its	  national	  interests	  (Gloppen	   et	   al.	   2006:	   5).	   This	   has	   severe	   implications	   for	   the	   system	   of	   checks	   and	  balances	  in	  Uganda.	  According	  to	  Yasin	  Olum,	  “[t]he	  separation	  of	  power	  and	  provision	  of	   checks	   and	   balances,	   which	   is	   an	   essential	   feature	   of	   any	   genuine	   Presidential	  democratic	   system	   […]	   is	  only	  partly	   ensured	   in	  Uganda	  and	   indeed	  undermined	  by	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  cabinet	  ministers	  and	  army	  representatives	  in	  parliament	   and	   the	   ‘fusions	   between	   the	   NRM	   party	   and	   the	   state’”	   (Kamp	   2010;	   see	  Olum	  2010).	  Uganda’s	  violent	  past	  serves	  as	  an	  antecedent	  to	  a	  rather	  delicate	  prospect	  for	  the	  country’s	  future	  oil	  production.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  de	  Kock	  (2012a:	  19-­‐20),	  “Grievances	  related	  to	  exclusion	  from	  benefits	  accruing	  from	  or	  political	  frustrations	  inspired	  by	  the	  negative	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  oil	  production	  could,	  at	  least	  theoretically,	  unleash	  the	  genie	  of	  civil	  war	  and	  insurgency	   in	  Uganda.”	  As	  will	  be	  highlighted	   in	  the	  next	   section,	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   and	   the	   associated	   oil	  exploration	  and	  production	   incite	  existing	  political	   tensions	  and	  discourses	   relating	   to	  population	  growth,	  pressure	  on	  livelihoods,	  land	  ownership	  and	  social	  uncertainty,	  with	  the	   potential	   to	   transform	   into	   new	   political	   agitations	   and	   contention.	   From	   the	  perspective	  of	  the	  NRsA,	  this	  will	  “provide	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  the	  multiplicities,	  complexities,	  contradictions	  and	  diversities	  of	  regions	  and	  regionalization	  processes	   in	   the	   south”	   (Söderbaum	  2004:	  33;	  Marchand	  et	  al.	   1999).	  A	   story	  about	  a	  journalist	  doing	  fieldwork	  in	  Hoima	  situated	  in	  the	  Bunyoro	  sub-­‐county,	  and	  his	  meeting	  with	   some	   locals	   creates	   an	   indicative	   picture	   of	   how	   this	   development	   is	   already	  affecting	  locals	  in	  the	  corridor:	  	  The	  villagers	   complained	   that	   they	  would	  not	  benefit	   from	  oil,	  but	   that	   if	  they	   could	   only	   talk	   to	   the	   ‘oil	   people’	   they	   would	   ask	   for	   some	   oil	   for	  themselves.	  The	   journalist	   then	  asked	  what	   they	  would	  do	  with	  crude	  oil	  fresh	   from	   the	   ground.	   The	   villagers	   answered	   that	   they	  would	   put	   it	   in	  drums,	  set	  up	  a	  stall	  by	  the	  side	  of	  the	  road,	  and	  make	  money	  by	  selling	  the	  oil	  themselves	  (de	  Kock	  2012b:	  22).	  	  	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   would	   be	   technically	   impossible,	   the	   locals	   make	   a	  principally	  viable	  point	  about	   their	   right	   to	  a	  share	   in	   the	  wealth	  accrued	   from	  the	  oil	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production.	   The	   story	   also	   illustrates	   the	   precarious	   lack	   of	   information	   about	   the	   oil	  project	   which	   is	   also	   highly	   relevant	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   project	  generally.	  It	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  lack	  of	  understanding	  about	  the	  oil	  industry,	  the	  oil	  itself	  and	  the	  major	  infrastructure	  project	  constituting	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor.	  	  	  
3.2.2	  	   Kenya:	  Power	  before	  the	  people	  	   The	  Kenyan	   story	   is	   similar	   but	   differs	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   “Kenya	   is	   among	   a	   few	  African	  states	  that	  have	  never	  been	  ruled	  by	  the	  military”	  (N’Diaye	  2002)4.	  Kenya	  is	  the	  hub	  for	  investors,	  technology	  and	  industry	  in	  East	  Africa,	  and	  is	  considered	  by	  observers	  as	  a	  “beacon	  of	  stability	  in	  a	  conflict	  ridden	  region”	  (Sundet	  et	  al.	  2009:	  4).	  The	  extent	  of	  violence	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  country	  following	  the	  December	  2007	  election	  therefore	  came	   as	   a	   surprise	   for	  many	  people.	   This	   section	   shows	   that,	   despite	   the	   country	   has	  steered	  clear	  of	  military	  influence	  in	  state	  governance,	  the	  country	  share	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  region	   the	  same	  kind	  of	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  marginalisation	   illustrated	   in	  the	   section	   on	   Uganda.	   The	   purpose	   of	   this	   section	   is	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   the	  marginalisation	   of	   the	   people	   is	   constituted	   on	   the	   macro-­‐regional	   level,	   and	   further	  affects	   the	   political	   psychology	   of	   the	   East	   African	   people	   with	   resulting	   severe	  consequences	   for	   the	  perception	  on	   the	   state-­‐society	   relations	  with	  potential	   to	   cause	  grievances	  in	  the	  forthcoming	  LAPSSET	  Corridor.	  	   State-­‐society	  relations	  in	  Kenya	  have	  been	  under	  strain	  since	  independence	  due	  to	   a	   widening	   gap	   between	   the	   political	   elites	   and	   the	   population	   at	   large.	   The	   great	  inequalities	   have	   generated	   political	   resentment	   coming	   to	   expression	   through	   tribal	  segmentation,	   especially	   spawned	   by	   perceived	   injustices	   over	   allocations	   and	  distributions	  of	  land	  ownership.	  As	  this	  section	  shows,	  many	  of	  the	  historical	  grievances	  and	   tensions	   between	   the	   state	   and	   society	   are	   still	   resonant	   and	   reinforced	   by	  contradictory	   interests	   between	   the	   state,	   corporations	   and	   the	   society,	   and	   now	  highlighted	  by	  the	  LAPSSET	  project.	  	   Colonial	   Kenya	   was	   a	   typical	   British	   colonial	   state	   characterised	   by	   a	   highly	  centralised	   state	   with	   strong	   vertical	   executive	   powers.	   Unlike	   Uganda,	   Kenya	   was	   a	  European	   settler	   state	   and	   consequently	   land	   was	   very	   unequally	   distributed.	  Discriminatory	   land	   distribution,	   displacement	   from	   people	   from	   ancestral	   land	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In	  1982,	  however,	  Kenya	  did	  experience	  an	  attempted	  coup,	  and	  even	  though	  the	  military	  takeover	  only	  lasted	  six	  hours,	  the	  putsch	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  power	  could	  not	  be	  taken	  for	  granted.	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legal	  restrictions	  on	  indigenous	  Kenyans	  from	  certain	  areas	  to	  hold	  a	  tenure	  for	  land	  and	  engage	   in	   the	   commercialisation	   of	   land	   constituted	   the	   greatest	   grievances	   in	   the	  struggle	   for	   independence	  (Amis	  et	  al.	  2008).	  The	  ethnicisation	  of	  Kenyan	  politics	  was	  entrenched	  through	  the	  restriction	  of	  political	  organisation	  to	  ethnically	  defined	  regions	  and	  prohibition	  of	  nationwide	  formations	  of	  socio-­‐political	  movements	  (Kalande	  2008).	  These	   issues	   and	   grievances	   were	   influential	   in	   spawning	   a	   very	   violent	   war	   of	  independence,	   or	   the	   so-­‐called	   Mau	   Mau	   revolution.	   Eventually,	   the	   colonial	  administration	  initiated	  land	  reform,	  but	  this	  only	  resulted	  in	  the	  transfer	  of	  land	  from	  a	  European	  elite	  to	  an	  indigenous	  political	  elite	  (Branch	  &	  Cheeseman	  2008).	  “Thus,	  when	  power	  was	  handed	  over	  from	  the	  colonial	  administration	  to	  the	  Kenyans	  in	  1963,	  some	  of	   the	   key	   characteristics	   of	   today’s	   political	   situation	   were	   already	   in	   place:	   a	  centralised	   state	   with	   a	   powerful	   executive,	   political	   conflict	   around	   the	   issue	   of	  inequality,	  particularly	  with	   reference	   to	   land,	   and	  a	   tradition	  of	   violent	   confrontation	  between	  the	  state	  and	  popular	  movements	  in	  opposition”	  (Sundet	  et	  al.	  2008:	  6).	  	   Jomo	  Kenyatta	  cemented	   the	  establishment	  of	  Kenya	  as	  a	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  state	  early	   in	  Kenya’s	  post-­‐colonial	  era.	  Kenyatta	  commanded	  the	  formation	  of	  patron-­‐client	  systems,	   where	   clients	   were	   remunerated	   with	   state	   contracts,	   land	   allocations	   and	  other	  preferential	   treatment.	  A	  business	   elite	  belonging	  predominantly	   to	   the	  ethnical	  group	  of	  Kikuyu	  consolidated	  the	  leadership	  positions	  in	  politics	  and	  business.	  Kenyatta	  also	   “used	   the	   former	   settler	   land	   as	   patronage	   to	   solidify	   his	   support	   and	   build	  alliances”	   (Klopp	   2000:	   16),	   and	   subdued	   key	   political	   opponents	   by	   granting	  “ministerial	   appointments,	   parastatal	   and	   other	   jobs,	   and	   access	   to	   choice	   land	   in	   the	  Rift	  Valley”	  (Mueller	  2008:	  189)	  	   When	  Kenyatta	  died	   in	  office	   in	  1978,	   the	  presidency	  went	   to	  Daniel	   arap	  Moi,	  member	  of	  the	  Kalenjin	  ethnic	  group.	  Since	  independence,	  the	  power	  and	  resource	  base	  of	   the	   local	   authorities	   was	   gradually	   removed	   from	   the	   local	   administration	   to	   the	  central	   authority.	   This	   had	   detrimental	   impact	   on	   the	   social	   service	   deliveries	   of	  education	  and	  health,	  and	  it	  deprived	  the	  local	  authorities	  from	  its	  most	   important	  tax	  base.	   This	   policy	   line	   continued	   under	   Moi	   who	   strengthened	   the	   provincial	  administration,	   which	   is	   subordinated	   the	   president’s	   office	   and	   thus	   functions	   as	   an	  extension	  of	  the	  presidential	  power	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  local	  administration	  (Barkan	  &	  Chege	  1989;	  Sundet	  et	  al.	  2009).	  In	  addition,	  Moi	  sub-­‐divided	  existing	  districts	  in	  order	  to	   create	   new	   positions	   for	   his	   loyal	   allies,	   which	   created	   “an	   inefficient,	   corrupt	   and	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incompetent	   government	   at	   local	   levels,	   with	   little	   capacity	   or	   resources	   to	   carry	   out	  their	  responsibilities”	  (Ghai	  2008:	  222;	  see	  also	  Sundet	  et	  al.	  2009).	  	   The	   Moi	   government	   struggled	   to	   sustain	   the	   state	   structures	   established	   by	  Kenyatta.	  Moi	  did	  not	  benefit	  from	  having	  a	  large	  ethnic	  base	  nor	  did	  he	  “have	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  access	  to	  the	  spoils	  of	  independence	  as	  Kenyatta”	  (Sundet	  et	  al.	  2009:	  7).	  Moi’s	  fear	   of	   losing	   power	   was	   intensified	   by	   the	   attempted	   coup	   in	   1982,	   leading	   to	   an	  ‘informalisation’	  of	  the	  state	  in	  which	  ethnic	  welfare	  organisations,	  such	  as	  the	  Gikuyu,	  Embu	  and	  Meru	  Association	  (GEMA),	  were	  banned,	  control	  institutions	  undermined,	  and	  the	  power	  of	   the	  presidency	   increased	  (Barkan	  &	  Chege	  1989).	  State	   institutions	  were	  perceived	   as	   vehicles	   for	   the	   elite	   and	   subsequently	   ripped	   of	   executive	   powers.	   The	  presidency	   preyed	   on	   public	   land	   and	   parastatals	   which	   were	   allocated	   or	   sold	   to	  support	  Moi’s	  political	  patronage.	  State	  predation	  intensified	  during	  the	  Moi	  period	  with	  the	   state’s	   structures	   of	   accountability	   unable	   to	   secure	   liable	   management	   of	   state	  resources,	   which	   in	   turn	   further	   deteriorated	   state-­‐society	   relations	   (Branch	   &	  Cheeseman	  2008).	  	   The	   increasingly	   rapacious	   governance	   style	   and	   exacerbated	   corruption	  of	   the	  Moi	   regime	   were	   met	   with	   mounted	   pressure	   from	   the	   donor	   society	   and	   IFIs	   for	  structural	   adjustments	  which	   eventually	   forced	  Moi	   to	   introduce	  multiparty	   elections	  (Dickovick	   2013:	   215).	   However,	   the	   reintroduction	   of	   multiparty	   democracy	   further	  escalated	   corrupt	   accumulation	   since	   multiparty	   elections	   cost	   money	   and	   since	   the	  future	   positions	   of	   sitting	   politicians	   became	   less	   predictive	   (Sundet	   et	   al.	   2009).	   In	  addition,	   the	  political	   competition	  and	  entrenching	  of	   the	  Moi	   regime	   led	   to	   increased	  violence.	   The	   ruling	   party,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   opposition	   privatised	   public	   violence	   and	  “invoked	   extra-­‐legal	   forces	   to	   retain	   power”	   (Mueller	   2008:	   189;	   see	   also	   Katumanga	  2005).	   In	   order	   to	   secure	   the	   required	   votes,	   the	   different	   parties	   unleashed	   armed	  gangs	  to	  intimidate	  the	  opponent’s	  electorate	  generating	  probably	  even	  higher	  numbers	  of	  casualties	  and	  IDPs	  than	  during	  the	  2007	  election	  clashes	  (Sundet	  et	  al.	  2009:	  8).	  The	  opposition	  was	  effectively	   fragmented	  and	  Moi	  retained	   the	  presidency	  after	   the	  1992	  elections,	  although	  only	  by	  1/3	  of	  the	  votes.	  	   In	   the	  1997	  general	  election	   it	  was	  the	  same	  story	  about	  state	  predation,	   large-­‐scale	  corruption	  and	  organised	  violence.	  But	  this	  time	  his	  strategy	  of	  co-­‐option	  did	  not	  work	  and	  a	  new	  opposition	  consolidated	  around	  the	  coalision	  of	  the	  National	  Alliance	  of	  Kenya	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Democratic	  Party	  under	  the	  National	  Rainbow	  Coalition	  (NARC).	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The	   election	   in	   2002	   was	   set	   between	   two	   Kikuyu	   adversaries:	   Mwai	   Kibaki	  representing	  the	  NARC	  and	  his	  godson,	  and	  Jomo	  Kenyattas	  son,	  Uhuru	  Kenyatta	  leading	  the	  Kenyan	  African	  National	  Union	  (KANU),	  in	  the	  place	  of	  Moi,	  who	  was	  now	  prohibited	  by	  constitution	  to	  run	   for	  re-­‐election.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  major	  victory	   for	  NARC	  and	  an	  end	  to	  the	  political	  era	  of	  KANU.	  	   The	   NARC	   government	   immediately	   launched	   a	   campaign	   against	   corruption,	  which	   received	  massive	   support	   from	   the	   citizenry,	   and	  demonstrates	   the	   importance	  and	   power	   in	   national	   consensus.	   However,	   the	   revelations	   of	   the	   anti-­‐corruption	  campaign	   soon	  became	  a	   scandal	   as	   it	   tied	  grand	  corruption	   to	  Kenyan	  political	  party	  financing.	  As	  will	  be	  elaborated	  later	  in	  the	  chapter,	  the	  investigations	  also	  sketched	  out	  a	   culture	   of	   irregular	   and	   illegal	   public	   land	   allocations	   which	   today	   is	   invigorating	  public	  resentment	  against	  the	  LAPSSET	  project.	  	   The	   period	   between	   2002	   and	   2007	   tensions	   began	   to	   grow	   due	   to	   the	  government’s	   inability	   to	   address	   the	   newly	   revealed	   corruption	   and	   inequalities.	  Despite	  a	  vigorous	  economic	  growth	  of	  on	  average	  5.4	  per	  cent	   in	  real	  GDP	  during	  the	  period	  and	  a	  staggering	  7.1	  per	  cent	  in	  2007,	  the	  economic	  improvements	  were	  mostly	  to	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   already	   affluent.	   Only	   6	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   national	   income	   was	  redistributed	  to	  the	  20	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  poorest	  population,	  while	  49	  per	  cent	  went	  to	  the	  richest	  20	  per	  cent.	  Moreover,	  “the	  population	  suffered	  from	  a	  generally	  high	  consumer	  price	   inflation,	   averaging	  around	  11%	   in	  2003-­‐07”	   (Sundet	  et	  al.	   2009:	  10).	  When	   the	  close	  2007	  general	   election	  between	  Kibaki’s	   Party	   of	  National	  Unity	   (PNU)	   and	  Raila	  Odinga’s	   Orange	   Democratic	   Movement	   (ODM)	   ended	   with	   a	   flawed	   election	  administration	  the	  accumulated	  public	  resentment	  spiralled	   into	   inter-­‐group	  acrimony	  which	   quickly	   transformed	   into	   violent	   ethnic	   confrontation.	   Nevertheless,	   “this	  ethnicisation	   of	   political	   unrest	   was	   related	   to	   underlying	   conflicts	   of	   long-­‐standing	  social	  injustice,	  regional	  inequality	  and,	  especially	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  Rift	  Valley,	  of	  access	  to	  and	  ownership	  of	   land”	   (Sundet	  et	  al.	   2009:	  10).	  The	  ensuing	   rampage	   left	  more	   than	  1,000	  people	  dead	   and	  more	   than	  350,000	  displaced.	   Subsequent	   investigations	   show	  evidence	   of	   senior	   politicians	   sponsoring	   criminal	   gangs	   and	   police	   overlooking	   and	  even	  inciting	  the	  violence	  avowedly	   in	  complicity	  with	  politicians	  (Sundet	  et	  al.	  2009).	  As	  observed	  by	  Geir	  Sundet,	  Eli	  Moen	  and	  Tiberius	  Barasa	  (2009:	  5):	  “While	  the	  violence	  raged,	   the	   national	   leaders	   seemed	  more	   preoccupied	  with	   securing	   the	   best	   political	  outcome	  for	  themselves,	  than	  with	  using	  their	  influence	  to	  stop	  the	  violence.”	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3.3	  	   Decentralisation	  of	  the	  state	  in	  East	  Africa	  	   As	  noted	  above,	  IFIs	  and	  the	  donor	  community	  applied	  a	  lot	  of	  pressure	  on	  Kenya	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  combat	  corruption	  and	  reintroduce	  the	  multiparty	  system.	  However,	  the	  strategy	   went	   beyond	   just	   the	   introduction	   of	   democracy.	   Within	   the	   broader	  framework	  of	  the	  Structural	  Adjustment	  Programmes	  of	  the	  1990s	  emerged	  a	  number	  of	  market	  reforms	  and	  decentralisation	  policies	  with	  the	  overall	  objective	  “to	  promote	  an	  adjustment	   of	   the	   production	   base	   to	   suit	   international	  market	   demands”	   Söderbaum	  2004:	  147).	   In	  Uganda,	   from	   the	   late	  1980s	   the	  National	  Resistance	  Movement	   (NRM)	  led	  by	  president	  Museveni	  has	  been	  running	  a	  policy	  of	  decentralisation.	  This	  policy	  was	  launched	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  enhanced	  local	  participation	  in	  democracy	  and	  more	  efficient	  service	   delivery	   (Okidi	   &	   Guloba	   2006;	   Muriisa	   2008).	   However,	   the	   decentralisation	  system	  gradually	   shifted	   away	   from	   its	   initial	   intentions	   towards	  being	   an	   instrument	  for	   the	   promotion	   of	   political	   patronage	   and	   the	  motives	   of	   the	   central	   political	   elite	  (Larok	  2008:	  4,	  20-­‐22).	  Elliot	  Green	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  district	  creation	  is	  “an	  ongoing	  creation,	  new	  patron-­‐client	  relationships	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  same	  dynamic	  that	  has	  led	  to	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  size	  of	  the	  Cabinet	  and	  the	  Parliament.”	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  several	   decades	   after	   the	   process	   began	   “the	   quality	   of	   public	   service	   delivery	   is	   less	  than	  desirable;	  district	  local	  governments	  with	  no	  financial	  resources	  of	  their	  own	  have	  become	   mere	   agents	   of	   the	   centre	   while	   the	   accountability	   mechanisms	   for	   good	  governance	   and	   public	   service	   delivery	   are	   either	   non-­‐existent	   or	   malfunctional”	  (Tumushabe	  et	  al.	  (2010):	  vi;	  see	  also	  Mitchinson	  2003;	  Ojambo	  2012).	  	   In	  Kenya,	   the	  process	  of	  decentralisation	  had	   taken	  many	   initial	   turns	  before	   it	  was	   introduced	   with	   Moi	   from	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   1980s,	   as	   an	   effort	   to	   make	  development	   “more	   consistent	   with	   the	   needs	   and	   aspirations	   of	   wananchi	   [people]”	  (Barkan	  &	  Chege	  1989:	  431).	  But	  as	   Joel	  Barkan	  and	  Michael	  Chege	  (1989:	  446)	  point	  out:	  “decentralisation	  to	  district	  level	  and	  the	  empowerment	  of	  the	  rural	  population	  are	  not	  the	  same,	  not	  least	  because	  the	  former	  has	  resulted	  more	  in	  deconcentration	  than	  in	  devolution”	  and	  hence	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  centralised	  political	  elite.	  	  
3.3.1	  	   Decentralisation	  and	  patronage	  	   The	  ability	  of	  liberal	  or	  representative	  democracy	  to	  reproduce	  existing	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  inequalities	  is	  an	  established	  fact,	  in	  particular	  “when	  institutions	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  domination	  substantially	  overlap	  with	  or	  coincide	  with	  the	  power	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  52	  
structures	  and	  those	  who	  control	  them”	  (Crook	  2002:	  405;	  see	  also	  Rueschemeyer	  et	  al.	  1992).	   The	   processes	   of	   decentralisation	   and	   devolution	   as	   witnessed	   in	   Kenya	   and	  Uganda	   today	   reflect	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   the	   “patronage-­‐based	   party-­‐building	   efforts”	   in	  Kenya	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s,	   motivated	   by	   a	   desire	   by	   the	   central	   government	   to	  “project	   its	   power	  more	   effectively	   into	   local	   areas”	   (Crook	  2002:	   406-­‐407).	  As	  Crook	  demonstrates,	   “elite	   capture	   of	   decentralisation	   was	   actually	   facilitated	   by	   the	  government’s	   desire	   to	   create	   and	   sustain	   a	   power	   base	   in	   the	   countryside,	   and	   to	  prevent	  opposition	  forces	  coalescing”	  (Crook	  2002:	  412).	  	   The	   current	   policy	   of	   devolution	   in	   Uganda	   and	   Kenya	   can	   therefore	   be	  understood	   as	   a	   historical	   continuity	   in	   which	   the	   central	   government	   introduces	   a	  policy,	  presented	  as	  a	   tool	   for	  poverty	  alleviation,	   resource	  distribution	  and	  enhanced	  political	   economic	   participation,	   in	   order	   to	   consolidate	   its	   political	   power	   and	  capability	  to	  access	  and	  allocate	  natural	  resources.	  	  
3.3.2	  	   The	  politics	  of	  land	  and	  privatisation	  in	  East	  Africa	  The	   structural	   adjustment	   programmes	   imposed	   on	   the	   neo-­‐patrimonial	  structure	   of	  Kenya	   and	  Uganda	  have	   resulted	   in	   a	   fusion	   of	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   and	  neo-­‐liberal	  logics.	  As	  noted	  by	  Ian	  Taylor	  and	  Paul	  Williams	  (2001:	  281)	  “a	  number	  of	  state	  elites	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  and	  southern	  African	  regions	  have	  ceased	  to	  use	  the	  mantle	  of	  sovereignty	   to	   promote	   the	   collective	   good.	   Instead,	   they	   have	   used	   it	   to	   help	   bolster	  their	  own	  patronage	  networks	  and	  weaken	   those	  of	  potential	   challengers.”	  And	  at	   the	  same	   time,	   as	   Charles	  Hornsby	   (2012:	   801)	   points	   out:	   “Land	   redistribution	   and	   land	  ceilings	  have	  occasionally	  come	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  agenda,	  but	  they	  run	  counter	  to	  Kenya’s	  liberalisation	  policy,	  which	  aims	  to	  allow	  market	  forces	  to	  reign.”	  Communally	   owned	   land	   is	   a	   customary	   feature	   in	   rural	   areas	   in	   Kenya	   and	  Uganda,	  including	  the	  area	  surrounding	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  and	  oil	  explorations.	  This	  means	  that	  most	  residents	  do	  not	  hold	  formal	  title	  deeds	  proving	  their	  ownership.	  With	  increased	   interests	   in	   land	   in	   the	   areas	   “speculators	   have	   exploited	   this	   situation	   to	  access	  portions	  of	  land	  via	  local	  contacts”	  (de	  Kock	  2012b:	  29).	  Between	  75-­‐85	  per	  cent	  of	   Kenyans	   and	   Ugandans	   (UNICEF	   Kenya	   2012;	   UNICEF	   Uganda	   2012)	   live	   in	   rural	  areas	   and	   their	   livelihoods	  depend	  on	   their	   accessibility	   to	   land	   for	   substance-­‐related	  activities.	   In	   the	   Albertine	   Graben	   area	   people	   are	   dependent	   on	   small	   plots	   for	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cultivation	  and	  fishing.	  Larger	   industrialised	   farming	   is	   impossible	  many	  places	  due	  to	  wild	  animals	  and	  regulations,	  especially	  in	  and	  around	  the	  national	  parks.	  	   The	  theoretical	  approach	  applied	   in	  this	  study	  refers	  to	  the	  need	  to	   identify	  the	  multiplicity	   of	   forces	   acting	   within	   a	   regional	   space	   (see	   Marchand	   et	   al.	   1999:	   906;	  Hettne	  1999b:	  17;	  2003:	  25;	  Bøås	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Söderbaum	  2004:	  31).	  With	  regards	  to	  the	  discussion	   on	   land,	   “the	   emergence	   of	   social	   tensions	   –	   and	   a	   discourse	   of	   fear	   and	  uncertainty	  regarding	  land	  –	  results	  from	  the	  clash	  between	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  forces	  in	  the	  region”	  (de	  Kock	  2012b:	  29).	  The	  forces	  competing	  for	  the	   access	   and	   ownership	   of	   land	   include	   private	   and	   corporate	   actors	   (i.e.	   oil	  companies)	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  communities	  on	  the	  other.	  While	  the	  oil	  companies	  are	  driven	  by	  a	  necessity	  to	  acquire	  land	  to	  map	  the	  sub-­‐region	  for	  drilling	  sites,	  to	  construct	  oil	  wells	  and	  oil	  pipeline	  infrastructure	  to	  ultimately	  export	  the	  oil	  to	  the	  global	  market,	  the	  communities	  claim	  a	  social,	  cultural,	  political,	  and	  economic	  right	  and	  ownership	  to	  the	   land.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   government	   has	   made	   “temporary	   and	   permanent	  expropriations	   of	   land	   belonging	   to	   individuals	   and	   communities	   in	   the	   Albertine	  Graben”	   (PWYP	   Uganda	   2011).	   With	   population	   growth	   and	   migration	   from	   other	  regions,	  such	  as	  from	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (DRC)	  and	  Somalia,	  the	  pressure	  and	  tension	  increase.	  	  	   The	  tension	  over	  land	  is	  also	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  fuelled	  by	  fears	  and	  rumours	  about	  shadowy	   plans	   for	   oil	   development	   in	   the	   area	   between	   the	   government,	   the	   oil	  companies	   and	   speculators	   (de	  Kock	   2012b:	   29).	   Interestingly,	   in	   response	   to	   private	  speculations	  and	  land	  expropriations	  some	  of	  the	  communities	  in	  the	  Albertine	  Graben	  have	  begun	  organising	  communal	   land	  owners’	  associations,	  documenting	  residents	  of	  an	  area	  or	  a	  village	  and	  registering	  the	  land	  in	  their	  names.	  But	  the	  registration	  fee	  for	  land	  in	  Uganda	  is	  approximately	  UGX3	  million	  (about	  USD1,300)	  which	  is	  an	  expensive	  fee	  to	  cover	  for	  subsistence	  farmers	  and	  fishermen	  (de	  Kock	  2012b:	  30).	  For	   many	   people,	   this	   situation	   is	   only	   a	   reminder	   of	   the	   historical	  marginalisation	  of	  the	  periphery	  by	  the	  centre.	  And	  while	  civil	  society	  is	  trying	  to	  create	  dialogue	  with	  the	  central	  authorities	  they	  are	  met	  with	  suspicion.	  As	  Florence	  Kyalimpa	  (2014),	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Officer	  at	  World	  Wide	  Fund	  for	  Nature	  (WWF)	  Uganda,	  said	  during	  an	   interview	   “there	   is	   high	   degree	   of	  mistrust	   between	   the	   government,	   the	   citizenry	  and	  CSOs.	  CSOs	  do	  not	  trust	  the	  government	  because	  of	  its	  bad	  precedence.”	  Kyalimpa	  is	  not	  surprised	  about	  the	  resentments	  over	  the	  oil	  exploration	  and	  production,	  since	  there	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have	  been	  so	  many	  corruption	  scandals	  which	  “have	  already	  manifested	  themselves	  [in	  relation	   to	   oil	   and	   gas]	   before	  we	   even	   started	   commercial	   production.”	   According	   to	  Kyalimpa,	  the	  mistrust	  between	  the	  government	  and	  CSOs	  is	  reciprocal.	  The	  government	  “claims	   CSOs	   lack	   capacity	   on	   the	   petroleum	   sector	   and	   are	   spreading	   flawed	  information	  which	  ends	  up	  causing	  havoc	  in	  local	  communities”	  (2014)	  In	  addition,	  the	  government	  is	  suspecting	  CSOs	  to	  be	  operating	  “under	  western	  influence”	  with	  “hidden	  agendas”	  to	  sabotage	  Uganda’s	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry	  (2014).	  Kyalimpa,	  however,	  argues	  that	  the	  mistrust	  is	  caused	  by	  limited	  transparency:	  “If	  government	  opens	  up	  fully	  and	  allow	  CSOs	  to	  freely	  express	  their	  opinions,	  as	  well	  as	  giving	  them	  timely	  and	  adequate	  information,	  there	  will	  be	  less	  havoc”	  (2014).	  	  Enormous	  opportunities	  open	  for	  private	  sector	  involvement	  in	  the	  privatisation	  of	   the	  energy	  markets.	  The	  result	   is	  a	  more	  market	  and	  commercially	  oriented	  energy	  sector	   in	   which	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	   as	   decision-­‐maker	   becomes	   diminished	   and	   its	  ability	  to	  act	  in	  the	  national	  interest	  and	  for	  political	  reasons	  is	  reduced	  (see	  Söderbaum	  2004:	   154).	   Nevertheless,	   considering	   the	   historical	   competition	   in	   the	   sub-­‐region	   in	  which	  each	  government	  protects	  its	  own	  interests,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  smoothly	  the	   operation	   and	  management	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	  will	   be.	   The	   increased	   significance	   of	  market	   principles	   in	   domestic	   and	   regional	   administration	   is	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	  general	   emphasis	   on	   state	   deregulation,	   decentralisation,	   privatisation	   and	   increased	  involvement	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  the	  arrangement	  of	  water,	  oil,	  energy	  and	  services.	  However,	   as	   observed	  by	   Söderbaum	   (2004:	   158),	   “[t]his	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   positive	  development	   from	   a	   normative	   point	   of	   view.	   The	   replacement	   of	   ‘politics’	   with	  ‘economics’	  leads	  to	  new	  power	  relations	  and	  new	  patterns	  of	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion.”	  	  
3.3.3	  	   The	  politics	  of	  land	  and	  land	  grabbing	  	   As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   Kibaki	   and	   the	   NARC	   commissioned	   a	   thorough	  investigation	   of	   corruption	   and	   illegal	   land	   allocations.	   The	   problem	   had	   become	   so	  common	   that	   people	   would	   refer	   to	   it	   as	   “’nchi	   ya	   kitu	   kidogo’:	   ‘land	   of	   the	   “little	  something”’,	  homeland	  of	  the	  bribe”	  (Wrong	  2009:	  2;	  see	  also	  Branch	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Manji	  2012:	  468).	  However,	  speculation	  by	  members	  of	  the	  political	  elite	  over	  the	  prospective	  value	  of	  plots	  along	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  and	  oil	  lands	  is	  adding	  to	  the	  increasing	  migration	  of	  non-­‐residents	   to	   the	  areas,	   intensifying	  competition	  over	   land.	  Allegedly,	  more	   than	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100,000	   hectares	   of	   land	   in	   Lamu,	   Tana	  Delta	   and	   adjacent	   areas	   to	   Lamu	   have	   been	  bought	   by	   investors	   or	   speculators	   from	  outside	   the	   region	   (Nunow	  2012:	   1;	   see	   also	  Vasquez	  2013).	  However,	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Illegal/Irregular	  Allocation	  of	  Public	  Land,	  chaired	  by	  lawyer	  Paul	  Ndung’u,	  connected	  the	  crimes	  to	  the	  families	  of	  President	  Kenyatta	  and	  Moi,	  as	  well	  as	  ministers,	  members	  of	  parliament,	  civil	  servants,	  the	   military	   and	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   as	   a	   mechanism	   for	   both	   personal	   ends	   and	   as	  “political	   reward	   or	   patronage”	   (RoK	   2004:	   83;	   Southall	   2005;	   Manji	   2012).	   The	  discoveries	  were	  a	  clear	  signal	  that	  “corruption	  and	  patronage	  have	  become	  thoroughly	  embedded	   in	   Kenya’s	   politics”	   (Southall	   2005:	   143).	   Similar	   illegal	   allocations	   were	  discovered	   ahead	   on	   the	   2012	   elections,	   and	   following	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	  Corridor	   such	   allocations	   have	   led	   to	   the	   allocation	   of	  more	   than	   100,000	  hectares	   of	  land	   in	  Lamu,	  Tana	  Delta	  and	  adjacent	  areas	   to	   the	  corridor	  (Nunow	  2012:	  1,	   see	  also	  Vasquez	   2013).	   These	   examples	   represent	   a	   worrying	   prospect	   for	   the	   land	  administration	   in	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   and	   constitute	   “an	   important	   sign	   of	   the	  difficulties	   of	  wresting	   control	   over	   land	   from	   those	   long	   accustomed	   to	   using	   it	   as	   a	  ‘patronage	  resources’	  (Manji	  2012:	  483;	  Klopp	  2000:	  7).	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3.4.1	  	   Assessing	  Uganda’s	  oil	  agreements	  	   The	  exploration	  activities	  of	  the	  wildcatters,	  Tullow	  and	  Heritage	  have	  resulted	  in	  major	   oil	   discoveries	   in	   the	   Albertine	   Graben	   region	   in	  Western	   Uganda.	   Neither	   the	  government	  of	  Uganda	  nor	  the	  oil	  companies	  have	  willingly	  allowed	  public	  insight	  to	  the	  contracts.	  However,	  the	  watchdog	  CSO,	  Platform,	  has	  gained	  access	  to	  the	  contract	  terms	  and	  made	  them	  available	  online	  (see	  Carbon	  Web).	  The	  following	  contract	  assessment	  is	  based	  on	  this	  publication.	  	   The	  oil	  contracts	  signed	  in	  Uganda	  are	  contracts	  between	  the	  oil	  companies	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Uganda	  directly.	  Such	  contracts	  are	  not	  uncommon,	  but	  normally,	  a	  host	  government	  would	  avoid	  absolute	   liability	  and	  direct	  responsibility	  by	  rather	  having	  a	  national	  oil	  company	  sign	  as	  contractual	  partner.	  Engaging	  a	  national	  oil	  company	  would	  restrict	  the	  liability	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  Uganda,	  as	  only	  assets	  from	  the	  enterprises	  can	  be	  seized	  (Radon	  2007).	  	   Article	   9	   of	   the	   contract	   (see	   carbonweb)	   concerns	   bonus	   payments.	   The	  Production	  Sharing	  Agreement	  (PSA)	   for	  block	  38	  and	  2	   includes	  a	  signature	  bonus	  of	  USD300,000	   and	   USD200,000	   respectively	   (RoU	   2007:	   30).	   Such	   bonuses	   of	   cash	  upfront	  are	  often	  used	  to	  attract	  governments,	  and	  it	  seems	  such	  a	  distraction	  has	  been	  the	   case	   in	   the	   current	   contract	   with	   Uganda.	   The	   Minister	   of	   Energy	   and	   Mineral	  Development	  has	  claimed	  this	  to	  be	  a	  “significant	  improvement	  of	  the	  fiscal	  terms”	  (see	  Musinguzi	  2010).	  However,	  such	  an	  amount	  becomes	  largely	  irrelevant,	  considering	  the	  future	   revenue	   flow	   of	   billions	   of	   dollars	   determined	   by	   these	   contracts.	   In	   addition,	  compared	   to	   other	   signature	   bonuses	   USD300,000	   is	   a	   rather	   small	   reward5.	   More	  worrying	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  has	  been	  no	  accountability	  regarding	  the	  bonus	  granted	  the	   government	   and	   it	   is	   not	   known	   through	   which	   channels	   the	   revenue	   has	   been	  transferred.	  The	  money	  does	  not	   appear	  on	   any	  official	   budgets,	   and	   according	   to	   the	  
Civil	  Society	  Coalition	  on	  Oil	  and	  Gas	   (CSCO)	   in	  Uganda,	   “experts	  within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  deny	  any	  knowledge	  of	  the	  money’s	  location	  and/or	  use”	  (Muzinguzi	  2010;	  Lay	  &	  Minio-­‐Paluello	   2010:	   7).	   This	   is	   an	   indication	   of	   poor	   financial	  management	  which	  creates	  misgivings	  about	  the	  ability	  and	  intention	  of	  the	  government	  to	  properly	  manage	  its	  resources	  and	  larger	  future	  income.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  In	  2008	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  received	  a	  signing	  bonus	  of	  USD3.5	  million	  upon	  signing	  a	  PSA	  for	  Block	  1	  (Kiggundu	  2010).	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   According	  to	  the	  contract’s	  Article	  11,	  the	  Ugandan	  government	  has	  the	  right	  to	  a	  maximum	  of	  20	  per	  cent	  participation	  in	  the	  oil	  developments	  (RoU	  2007:	  32).	  For	  the	  government,	   this	   is	   a	   benefit	   as	   it	   allows	   a	   greater	   revenue	   proportion	   from	   the	  company’s	  profits,	  and	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  successful	  project	  secures	  a	  more	  even	  sharing.	  Normally,	  the	  host	  government	  will	  demand	  oil	  reserves	  to	  be	  developed	  through	  a	  joint	  venture	  by	  the	  engagement	  of	  the	  state	  through	  a	  national	  oil	  company.	  The	  proportion	  held	   by	   the	   different	   parties	   varies	   widely,	   but	   where	   the	   state	   is	   the	   subordinate	  partner,	  the	  development	  costs	  are	  commonly	  sustained	  by	  the	  private	  company,	  which	  it	   in	   turn	   recovers	   through	   capital	   and	   operational	   expenditures,	   known	   as	   ‘cost	   oil’.	  During	  the	  production	  phase	  the	  state	  company	  is	  the	  one	  carrying	  the	  production	  costs.	  Through	  a	  joint	  venture,	  Uganda	  would	  increase	  its	  domestic	  expertise	  in	  technicalities	  and	   business	   aspects	   of	   oil	   production,	   giving	   the	   state	   a	   better	   starting	   point	   in	   the	  advent	  of	  future	  deals.	  Currently,	  however,	  Uganda	  is	  not	  signifying	  any	  plan	  to	  enter	  a	  joint	  venture,	  which	  implies	  “effectively	  handling	  over	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  revenues	  to	  the	  private	  companies	  (Lay	  &	  Minio-­‐Paluello	  2010:	  8).	  	   Article	  12	  of	  the	  contract	  addresses	  cost	  recovery	  and	  gives	  the	  oil	  company	  the	  unilaterally	   beneficial	   option	   of	   using	   60	   per	   cent	   of	   oil	   profits	   to	   cover	   expenses	  induced	  from	  exploration,	  development	  and	  operation.	  When	  cost	  oil	  expenses	  increase,	  ‘profit	  oil’,	  the	  post	  shared	  between	  the	  company	  and	  the	  state,	  decreases,	  implying	  that	  increased	   expenditures	   is	   transferred	   on	   to	   the	   state.	   According	   to	   an	   Ernst	   &	   Young	  (2009)	  audit	  of	  Heritage	  Oil’s	  exploration	  activities	  in	  Uganda	  between	  2004	  and	  2006,	  Heritage	   had	   inflated	   its	   cost	   recoverable	   expenditure	   by	   more	   than	   half	   a	   million	  dollars.	   Furthermore,	   the	   contract	   places	   the	   government	   in	   an	   unfavourable	   position	  with	  regards	  to	  legal	  expenses.	  This	  is	  expressed	  in	  an	  annex	  to	  the	  contract	  where	  it	  is	  stated,	   “All	   costs	   and	   expenses	   of	   litigation	   […]	   in	   defending	   or	   prosecuting	   lawsuits	  involving	   the	   Area	   […]	   are	   recoverable”	   (RoU	   2007:	   102).	   This	   would	   make	   the	  government	  liable	  to	  any	  legal	  expenses	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  company	  was	  to	  be	  taken	  to	   court	  by	   any	   individual	   or	   institution	   in	  Uganda,	   and	   if	   the	   company	  was	   to	   sue	  or	  prosecute	  a	  Ugandan	  citizen	  or	  company	  and	  even	  the	  Ugandan	  government.	  	   Article	  13	  in	  the	  agreement	  covers	  production	  sharing	  of	  profit	  oil,	   in	  which	  the	  government’s	   share	   grows	   relatively	   to	   the	   private	   company	   according	   to	   the	   daily	  increase	   of	   oil	   barrels	   produced	   (RoU	   2007:	   35).	   Similarly,	   the	   share	   of	   the	   private	  company	  increases	  with	  a	  decrease	  in	  barrels	  produced.	  PSAs	  normally	  imply	  a	  sliding	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profit	   in	   order	   to	   “ensure	   some	   level	   of	   return	   for	   the	   private	   companies	   while	  delivering	  an	  appropriate	  rent	  to	  the	  host	  government”	  (Lay	  &	  Minio-­‐Paluello	  2010:	  10).	  However,	   the	   sharing	   agreement	   in	   this	   contract	   is	   solely	   based	   on	   the	   level	   of	  production,	  which	  implies	  that	  “the	  profit	  sharing	  terms	  provide	  no	  check	  for	  excessive	  company	  profits	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  Uganda	  –	  for	  example	  at	  times	  of	  high	  oil	  prices”	  (Lay	  &	  Minio-­‐Paluello	  2010:	  11).	  In	  addition,	  the	  contract	  is	  based	  on	  a	  false	  premise	  “that	  the	  profitability	  of	   the	  project	   is	  only	  determined	  by	   the	  volume	  of	  production”	   (Edwards	  2009),	  while	  the	  opposite	  is	  actually	  the	  case	  –	  fiscal	  structures	  derived	  from	  company	  profits	   are	  more	   capable	   to	   achieve	   bigger	   shares	   of	   rent	   than	   fiscal	   structures	   based	  simply	  on	  the	  quantity	  of	  oil	  production	  (Lay	  &	  Minio-­‐Paluello	  2010:	  11).	  	   With	   regards	   to	   state	   revenue,	   statements	   from	  both	   the	  Ugandan	   government	  and	   oil	   companies	   claim	   total	   government	   revenues	   from	   oil	   to	   exceed	   80	   per	   cent	  (Kathman	   &	   Shannon	   2011:	   35).	   However,	   a	   minute	   from	   the	   Ugandan	   Permanent	  Secretary	   Fred	   Kabagambe-­‐Kaliisa	   (2004)	   in	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Energy	   and	   Mineral	  Development	   presents	   a	   lower	   prospect	   (just	   around	   70	   per	   cent).6	   According	   to	  estimates	  made	  by	  Platform	  a	  much	  lower	  government	  revenue	  should	  be	  expected,	  and	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  Pipeline	  will	   further	  reduce	  the	  governments	  take	  on	  the	  total	   revenue.	   A	   more	   moderate	   estimation	   made	   by	   the	   US	   Energy	   Information	  
Administration	   indicates	   a	   70.7	   per	   cent	   government	   take	   including	   the	   pipeline	   or	  roughly	  75	  per	  cent	  without	  the	  pipeline	  (see	  Lay	  &	  Minio-­‐Paluello	  2010:	  13).	  	  	   Turning	   to	   the	   corporate	   profits,	   an	   assessment	   of	   the	   Internal	   Rate	   of	   Return	  (IRR)	   gives	   a	   measurement	   of	   the	   profitability	   of	   the	   oil	   project.	   The	   IRR	   gives	   a	  description	  of	  the	  company’s	  investment	  profits	  (see	  Muttitt	  2005:	  38).	  By	  assessing	  the	  IRR	  a	  conclusion	  can	  be	  made	  on	  whether	  the	  government	  or	  the	  company	  has	  made	  a	  good	  deal.	  Under	  normal	  circumstances,	  a	  project	  generating	  12	  per	  cent	  or	  more	   is	  a	  profitable	  venture	  for	  any	  oil	  company.	  Under	  more	  riskier	  circumstances	  oil	  companies	  will	   require	   an	   IRR	   between	   15	   and	   20	   per	   cent,	   with	   everything	   over	   20	   per	   cent	  representing	  a	  astounding	  profit	  rate.	  In	  their	  report	  on	  Ugandan	  oil	  contracts,	  Taimour	  Lay	   and	   Mika	   Minio-­‐Paluello	   (2010:	   14)	   “reveal	   that	   Uganda’s	   contracts	   are	   highly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  minute	  was	  written	  on	  the	  conclusion	  of	  renegotiations	  over	  Block	  3/3A,	  and	  contains	  a	  prediction	  estimate	  for	  total	  government	  revenues	  expected	  from	  Block	  1,	  2	  and	  3A.	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profitable	   for	   the	   participating	   oil	   companies.	   In	   the	  most	   likely	   scenarios,	   Tullow	  Oil	  could	  make	  a	  30-­‐35%	  return	  on	  its	  investment.”7	  (see	  also	  Veit	  et	  al.	  2011).	  	   Importantly	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   study,	   Article	   16	   in	   the	   contract	   gives	   the	  companies	  the	  right	  to	  construct	  the	  export	  pipeline	  from	  Uganda	  to	  Kenya.	  By	  granting	  the	  oil	  companies	  the	  right	  by	  contract	  to	  construct	  the	  pipeline,	  the	  contract	  bypasses	  the	   Ministry	   of	   Water	   and	   Environment’s	   approval	   which	   would	   have	   included	  environmental	   and	   social	   impact	   assessments,	   and	   an	   overall	   ability	   by	   the	   Ugandan	  government	   to	   make	   a	   well	   advised	   decision	   about	   Uganda’s	   best	   interest	   in	   the	  construction	  of	  such	  a	  pipeline.	  Moreover,	   the	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  elaborated	   in	  this	   contract	   are	   highly	   favourable	   to	   the	   companies.	   Because,	   “[w]hile	   the	   contract	  explicitly	   states	   the	   oil	   companies’	   right	   to	   construct	   a	   pipeline	   and	   the	   government’s	  obligation	  to	  support	  such	  a	  plan,	  it	  does	  not	  include	  the	  opposite	  responsibilities	  –	  i.e.	  the	   contract	   does	   not	   state	   that	   the	   oil	   companies	   will	   conduct	   adequate	   impact	  assessments	   or	   strategic	   environmental	   plans	   or	   construct	   the	   pipeline	   to	   certain	  standards.	   Nor	   does	   it	   include	   a	   contractual	   right	   for	   the	   Ugandan	   government	   to	  investigate	  and	  oversee	  proposals	  prior	   to	  approval”	   (Lay	  &	  Minio-­‐Paluello	  2010:	  18).	  The	   rights	   of	   the	   company	   in	   Article	   16	   comprise	   rights	   of	   way,	   trenching,	   coating,	  insulation	  and	  heating,	  and	  suggest	  an	  ownership	  management	  which	  includes	  rights	  of	  “international	  routes	  and	  tariffing	  arrangements”	  (Tullow	  Oil	  2007:	  25).	  These	  examples	  are	  indicative	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  oil	  and	  pipeline	  projects	  are	  being	  done	  for	  the	  oil	  companies,	  and	  raise	  doubt	  about	  the	  participatory	  and	  people-­‐centred	  development	  of	  the	  EAC	  and	  the	  Vision	  2030	  flagship	  project,	  the	  LAPSSET,	  as	  it	  has	  been	  promoted	  from	  the	  beginning	  (see	  Kibati	  2012).	  	  
3.5	  	   Conclusion	  	   This	   chapter	   has	   served	   to	   identify	   several	   structural,	   political	   and	   social	  contestations	  in	  the	  region	  which	  have	  been	  reproduced	  by	  incumbent	  political	  elites	  of	  the	  post-­‐independence	  period.	  These	   tensions	  have	   shown	  potential	   to	   transform	   into	  extreme	   acrimony	   and	   violence.	   In	   one	   instance,	   the	   political	   elite	   seems	   more	  interested	  in	  securing	  their	  own	  personal	  interests	  and	  political	  power,	  in	  the	  other	  the	  leadership	   has	   demonstrated	   the	   readiness	   to	   resolve	   to	   military	   actions	   against	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  This	  assessment	  of	  corporate	  profits	  is	  supported	  by	  a	  Credit	  Suisse	  (2009)	  report	  on	  Heritage	  Oil.	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  60	  
dissidents.	   This	   chapter	   has	   also	   served	   to	   identify	   the	   main	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	  LAPSSET	   project.	   The	  main	   proponents	   of	   the	   project	   are	   the	   state	   elites	   and	   the	   oil	  companies.	  But	  with	  a	  critical	  anit-­‐reductionist	  perspective	  the	  chapter	  has	  also	  shown	  how	   this	   regionalising	   project	   interfere	  with	   other	   regions	   and	   residents	   living	   in	   the	  vicinity	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor,	   and	   how	   processes	   of	   regionalisation	   such	   as	   the	  LAPSSET	   is	   generating	   responses	   and	   creating	   counter	   reactions	   and	   contradicting	  regional	  constellations	  on	  the	  ground.	  	   In	   accordance	  with	   the	  NRsA	   approach	   the	   chapter	   has	   also	   problematised	   the	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  so-­‐called	  national	  interest.	  It	  has	  identified	  the	  type	  of	  state	  in	  the	  region	  as	  authoritarian	  and	  neo-­‐patrimonialistic	   institutions.	   It	  has	  highlighted	  the	  significance	   of	   private	   interests	   and	   regime	   boosting	   as	   a	   result	   of	   structural	   and	  historical	  circumstances	  in	  East	  Africa,	  and	  also	  as	  a	  response	  to	  global	  programmes	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  restructuring.	  This	   study	  posits	   that	   the	  present	   regionalism	   in	  East	   Africa	   constitute	   what	   Söderbuam	   (2004:	   206)	   defines	   as	   “a	   diplomatic	   game”	  where	  the	  political	  regimes	  “praise	  regionalism	  and	  sign	  cooperation	  treaties,	   in	  order	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  promoters	  of	   the	  goals	   and	  values	  of	   regionalism.”	  Following	   these	  findings,	  “there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  remain	  sceptical	  of	  any	  type	  of	  regionalism	  that	   is	  supported	  and	  promoted	  by	  […]	  authoritarian	  and	  neopatrimonial	  regimes”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  206).	  	   The	  next	  chapter	  introduces	  the	  case	  study	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor.	  It	  explains	  how	  the	  LAPPSSET	  is	  socially	  and	  historically	  constructed.	  This	  chapter	  will	  also	  address	  its	   implementation	   mechanisms	   and	   assess	   its	   potential	   for	   inclusiveness	   of	   local	  participation	   and	   sustainable	   socio-­‐economic	   enhancement.	   The	   chapter	   has	   also	  demonstrated	   how	   the	   mixed	   actor	   coalition	   between	   the	   state	   and	   TNCs	   is	  transforming	  state-­‐society	  relationships.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




4	  	   The	  case	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  
4.1	  	   Introduction:	   The	   LAPSSET	   as	   a	   case	   of	   political	   micro-­
regionalism	  	   The	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   Spacial	   Development	   Initiative	  (SDI)	  initiated	  by	  the	  Kenyan	  government.	  It	  was	  launched	  by	  previous	  president	  Mwai	  Kibaki	   and	   continued	   by	   the	   current	   president	   Uhuru	   Kenyatta.	   Kibaki’s	   neo-­‐liberal	  orthodoxy	  marked	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  isolationism	  and	  protectionism	  featuring	  Kenya	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Moi.	  Correspondingly,	  “[a]	  key	  component	  of	  the	  SDI	  paradigm	  is	  […]	   to	   move	   away	   from	   the	   protected	   and	   isolated	   import	   substitution	   approach	   to	  economic	   development	   towards	   one	   in	   which	   international	   competitiveness,	   regional	  cooperation	  and	  a	  more	  diversified	  ownership”	   (Söderbaum	  2004:	  160).	  Furthermore,	  according	  to	  Paul	   Jourdan	  (1998:	  718),	  “SDIs	  are	  […]	  targeted	  interventions	  by	  central	  governments	   for	  helping	  unlock	  economic	  potential	  and	   facilitate	  new	   investment	  and	  job	  creation	   in	  a	   localised	  area	  or	   region”	  by	  eliminating	   infrastructural	   constraints	   to	  global	  capital	  and	  investments,	  often	  through	  close	  collaboration	  with	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  public-­‐private-­‐partnerships	  (PPPs),	  and	  via	  “strategic	  investment	  opportunities	  in	  the	  SDI	   area”	   or	   ‘anchor	   projects’,	   generating	   “sudden	   large	   injections	   of	   resources	   into	   a	  region.”	  This	   chapter	   addresses	   the	   origins,	   dynamics	   and	   impacts	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	  Corridor	   of	   East	   Africa	   as	   a	   case	   of	   micro-­‐regionalism	   in	   this	   special	   and	   politically	  contested	  part	  of	  eastern	  Africa.	  As	  indicated	  in	  the	  NRsA/Weave-­‐world,	  the	  analysis	  of	  processes	  of	  regionalisation	  must	  transcend	  the	  formal	  policy	  strategy	  and	  institutional	  structures	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	   project	   as	   such	   to	   grasp	   the	   implicit	   socio-­‐economic	   and	  socio-­‐cultural	  elements	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  holistic	  and	  historical	  understanding.	  	  	  
4.1.1	  	   The	  social	  and	  historical	  (re)construction	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  This	   section	   illustrates	   how	   a	   regional	   space	   is	   under	   continuous	   construction,	  reconstruction	   and	   deconstruction.	   The	   section	   is	   structured	   as	   follows.	   The	   next	  segment	   highlights	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   regional	   space	   in	  which	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   is	  being	   constructed	   has	   constituted	   a	   link	   between	   the	   East	   African	   countries	   and	   the	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global	   economy	   for	   more	   than	   100	   years,	   by	   way	   of	   trade,	   labour	   migration	   and	  transportation	  (see	  Abir	  1968;	  Rempel	  1998).	  It	  also	  sketches	  out	  how	  different	  actors	  have	   been	   involved	   in	   transforming	   the	   region	   through	   coercion	   and	   systematic	  marginaliation	  and	  how	  this	  has	  created	  alternative	  and	  contradicting	  regional	  relations.	  The	   regional	   space	   in	   which	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   currently	   is	   under	  construction	   is	   not	   a	   novelty	   but	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   Zanzibari	   caravan	   routes	  which	   connected	   the	   interior	   with	   the	   coast,	   opened	   up	   the	   region	   for	   trade	   and	  resource	   extraction	   and	   linked	   it	   to	   the	   larger	   trade	   networks	   between	  Africa,	   Arabia	  and	  Asia.	  The	  Zanzibari	  merchants	  established	  the	  most	  important	  caravan	  trade	  routes	  in	  this	  region	  in	  the	  early	  history	  of	  East	  Africa.	  With	  costal	  stations	  in	  Dar-­‐es-­‐Salam	  and	  Pangani,	   and	   Mombasa	   and	   Lamu	   in	   today	   Tanzania	   and	   Kenya	   respectively,	   trade	  routes	   were	   expanded	   into	   the	   hinterand	   of	   what	   is	   now	   Burundi,	   Rwanda,	   Uganda,	  South	  Sudan	  and	  Ethiopia	  (Abiri	  1968).	  Up	  until	  the	  18th	  century	  the	  East	  African	  region	  had	   suffered	   stagnation	   in	   trade	   and	   intra-­‐regional	   interconnection.	   However,	   “due	  mainly	   to	   the	   growing	   demand	   in	   ivory	   and	   other	   animal	   products,	   gum,	   ambergris,	  mangrove	   poles	   and	   slaves”	   this	   stagnation	   came	   to	   an	   end	   (Abir	   1968:	   104).	   These	  trade	   routes	   connecting	   the	   region	   of	   East	   Africa	   saw	   the	   establishment	   of	  merchant	  villages	  or	  stations	  along	  the	  route,	  and	  the	  spreading	  of	  ideas,	  culture,	  technology	  and	  language,	  such	  as	  Swahili.	  Many	  of	   the	  countries	   in	   the	   region	   (except	   for	  Burundi,	  Ethiopia	  and	  Rwanda)	  also	   share	   a	   common	   colonial	   legacy	   under	   British	   rule.	   The	   British	   established	  institutions	   in	   efforts	   to	   integrate	   the	   region.	   A	   customs	   union	   between	   Kenya	   and	  Uganda	  was	  established	   in	  1917,	  which	  was	   joined	  by	  Tanganyika	  (today	  Tanzania)	   in	  1927.	  The	  East	  African	  High	  Commission	  (EAHC)	  followed	  in	  1948	  and	  was	  preceded	  by	  the	   East	  African	   Common	   Service	  Organisation	   (EACSO)	   from	  1961	   to	   1967,	  which	   in	  turn	  was	  superseded	  by	  the	  East	  African	  Community	  (EAC)	  of	  1967	  to	  1977	  and	  of	  2000	  until	   present.	   The	   new	   EAC	   expanded	   in	   2009	   when	   it	   was	   joined	   by	   Burundi	   and	  Rwanda,	  and	  South	  Sudan	  is	  an	  aspiring	  member	  to	  the	  community	  after	  its	  separation	  from	  Sudan	  in	  2011.	  Recently	  Kenya	  has	  been	  pushing	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  EAC	  to	  include	  Ethiopia,	  Djibouti	  and	  Somalia	  (Coloma	  2013).	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  formal	  institutions,	  the	  British	  developed	  infrastructure	  that	  connected	   the	   East	   African	   countries.	   The	   Uganda	   Railway,	   or	   the	   ‘Iron	   Snake’	   (also	  called	  the	  ‘Lunatic	  Line’),	  connected	  Uganda	  with	  Mombasa	  by	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  and	  was	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constructed	   to	   aid	   Great	   Britain	   in	   achieving	   domination	   in	   the	   region.	  Moreover,	   the	  railway	   allowed	   for	   the	   export	   of	   coffee	   and	   tea	   and	   encouraged	   other	   types	   of	  commerce	  and	  settlement	  along	  the	  tracks,	  which	  had	  developmental	  impact	  on	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda	   for	   decades.	   For	   instance,	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   railway	   resulted	   in	   the	  founding	  and	  development	  of	  cities	  such	  as	  Eldoret,	  Jinja,	  Kisumu	  and	  Nairobi.	  In	  1929,	  the	  Uganda	  Railway	  became	  the	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda	  Railways	  and	  Harbours,	  and	  in	  1948	  it	  became	  the	  East	  African	  Railways	  and	  Harbours	  Corporation	  (EAR&H),	  under	  the	  East	  African	  High	  Commission,	  when	  it	  was	  merged	  with	  the	  Tanganyika	  Railway.	  When	  the	  EAC	   was	   dissolved	   in	   1977	   the	   EAR&H	   was	   split	   into	   the	   Kenyan,	   Tanzanian	   and	  Ugandan	   national	   railway	   corporations.	   During	   colonial	   time,	   the	   British	   also	  encouraged	   labour	  migration	   between	   Kenya,	   Uganda	   and	   Tanzania	   which	   continued	  after	  independence	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  EAC	  (Bakewell	  &	  de	  Haas	  2007:	  100).	  The	  history	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  East	  Africa	  is	  still	  bearing	  its	  mark	  of	  the	  old	   colonial	   master.	   East	   Africa	   was	   of	   strategic	   importance	   for	   the	   British,	   not	   only	  because	  of	  its	  position	  along	  the	  Indian	  Ocean,	  but	  also	  for	  its	  proximity	  to	  the	  source	  of	  the	   Nile.	   The	   various	   commodities	   in	   Kenya	   and	   Uganda	   also	   made	   it	   important	   for	  British	   industry.	   Therefore,	   Kenya	  was	   also	   important	   because	   of	   its	   export	   potential,	  which	   led	   to	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   industrialisation	   in	   Kenya,	   compared	   to	   Uganda.	  Following	   independence,	   the	  highly	  centralised	  structure	  of	   the	  colonial	  state	  was	  also	  adopted	   by	   the	   post-­‐colonial	   governments	   which	   is	   highly	   visible	   today.	   Kenya	   also	  adopted	   a	   better	   developed	   infrastructural	   network	   compared	   to	   its	   neighbours,	   and	  which	  still	  constitutes	  the	  developmental	  basis	  for	  the	  country’s	  economy.	  Secretary	  for	  Transport,	   Cyrus	   Njiru	   illustrates	   this	   point	   noting	   that	   “91&	   of	   Kenya’s	   GDP	   is	   now	  generated	   within	   a	   100km	   radius	   of	   the	   railway[s].	   […]	   Outside	   the	   corridor	   lies	   a	  geographical	  territory	  that	  constitutes	  over	  75%	  of	  Kenya’s	  land	  mass.	  It	  constitutes	  less	  than	  10%	  to	  national	  GDP.	  Why?	  Because	   the	   transport	   infrastructure	  has	  never	  been	  modernised”	   (Kantai	   2012).	   As	   several	   of	   the	   countries	   in	   East	   Africa	   are	   land-­‐locked	  countries,	   they	   are	   dependent	   on	   transporting	   their	   products	   over	   long	  distances	   and	  across	   borders,	   which	   combined	   with	   the	   underdeveloped	   transport	   infrastructure,	  lengthy	  administrative	  procedures	  and	  delays	  at	  ports	  and	  checkpoints	  along	  the	  road	  networks	  make	  exports	  and	  imports	  very	  expensive.	  However,	   the	   ambitious	  plan	  has	  been	  met	  by	   resentment	  by	   the	  people	   in	   the	  sub-­‐region	   where	   memories	   of	   systematic	   marginalisation	   is	   still	   fresh	   in	   mind	   (see	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  64	  
Weiss	  2004).	  Nevertheless,	  Kenya’s	  regional	  ambition	  to	  penetrate	  new	  markets,	  such	  as	  South	  Sudan	   is	  an	  opportunity	  Kenya	   is	  determined	  to	  grasp.	  Since	  1896,	   the	  Kilindini	  Harbour	   in	   Mombasa	   has	   made	   Kenya	   into	   the	   regional	   hub	   for	   trade,	   industry	   and	  energy.	  Between	  2007	  and	  2011	   the	   traffic	   through	   the	  port	   increased	  by	  23	  per	  cent	  and	  “in	  2011	  the	  port	  handled	  770,000	  TEU	  (twenty-­‐foot	  container	  equivalent	  units)	  of	  freight,	   though	   it	  was	  built	   for	   only	  250,000”	   (Coloma	  2013).	  The	  overload	   is	   slowing	  down	  transit	  and	  according	  to	  a	  US	  International	  Trade	  Commission	  (USITC)	  report,	   it	  takes	   on	   an	   average	   more	   than	   two	   weeks	   for	   a	   container	   to	   pass	   through	   the	   port	  (USITC	  2012).	  The	  discoveries	  of	  oil	   in	  Uganda	  in	  2006	  therefore	  represent	  a	  threat	  to	  Kenya’s	  position	  as	  the	  regional	  hegemon	  for	  energy.	  The	  increasing	  military	  activities	  of	  Kenya’s	   western	   neighbour	   in	   military	   intervention	   missions	   in	   Somalia	   and	   South	  Sudan,	   and	   Uganda’s	   bid	   on	   South	   Sudanese	   oil	   as	   earlier	   mentioned,	   adds	   to	   this	  dimension.	   It	   can	   therefore	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   has	   significance	  beyond	  simply	  developmental	  and	  economic	  levels.	  	  The	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  will	  undoubtedly	  have	  transformational	  effect	  on	  the	  East	  African	  region,	  and	  while	  it	  can	  constitute	  an	  incentive	  for	  an	  enlargement	  of	  the	  EAC,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  challenge	  to	  the	  EAC	  as	  it	  is	  today.	  Tanzania	  has	  recently	  complained	  about	   being	   ‘sidelined’	   in	   the	   EAC	   and	   has	   complained	   to	   the	   EAC	   following	   an	  agreement	   to	   construct	   a	   railway	   connecting	   all	   EAC	   members	   except	   Tanzania	  (Ng’wanikilala	   2013).	   Moreover,	   Tanzania	   has	   launched	   a	   USD32	   billion	   transport	  corridor,	   the	   Mwambani	   Port	   and	   Railway	   Corridor	   (MWAPORC),	   defying	   Kenya’s	  ambitions	   “to	   cement	   its	   position	   as	   the	   regional	   communications	   hub”	   (LAPSSET	  Tracker	  2013).	  	  On	   a	   lower	   regional	   level,	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   and	   oil	   production	   are	   also	  showing	   potential	   disrupting	   effects.	   In	   the	   Kingdom	   of	   Bunyoro	   in	   western	   Uganda,	  there	  are	  indications	  of	  “an	  acrimonious	  split”	  (Ssekika	  2013).	  The	  kingdom	  covers	  the	  districts	   of	  Buliisa,	  Hoima,	  Kibaale,	  Kiryandingo	   and	  Masindi,	   all	   districts	  where	   there	  has	   been	   oil	   discoveries,	   but	   the	   ethnic	   group	   of	   Bagungu	   residing	   in	   parts	   of	  Hoima,	  Buliisa	   and	  Masindi	   is	   now	  pushing	   for	   a	   breakaway	   from	  Bunyoro.	   Stephen	  Birahwa	  Mukitale,	  the	  Buliisa	  county	  MP,	  is	  blaming	  the	  secession	  dispute	  in	  external	  forces	  that	  intend	  to	  divide	  Bunyoro	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  oil	  resources	  (Ssekika	  2013).	  There	  is	  also	  a	  more	  severe	  geopolitical	  threat	  to	  the	  oil	  and	  infrastructure	  project,	  which	  goes	  back	  to	   NRM’s	   internal	   struggles,	   and	   is	   more	   recently	   linked	   to	   the	   Ugandan	   military	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engagements	   in	   Somalia.	   Beause	   of	   its	   involvement	   in	   the	   African	   Union	   Mission	   in	  Somalia	  (AMISOM),	  Uganda	  has	  become	  an	  al-­‐Shabaab	  target.	  In	  addition	  it	  has	  recently	  been	  confirmed	   that	  al-­‐Shabaab	   is	  connected	  with	   the	  Allied	  Democratic	  Forces	   (ADF)	  that	  went	  into	  hiding	  in	  the	  DRC	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Now	  back,	  and	  in	  2007	  they	  crossed	  Lake	  Albert	   into	  Uganda.	  They	  were	  pushed	  back	  by	  the	  UPDF,	  but	  since	  then	  “the	  Ugandan	  government	   has	   consequently	   become	   increasingly	   sensitive	   to	   the	   security	   threat	   a	  resurgent	  ADF	  may	  pose	  to	  the	  country’s	  oil	  operations”	  	  (de	  Kock	  2012c:	  57).	  It	   is	   also	   expected	   that	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   will	   have	   significant	   impact	   on	  intra-­‐regional	   informal	   cross	   border	   trade	   (ICBT)	   in	   East	   Africa,	   “although	   the	   nature	  and	  direction	  of	  that	  impact	  is	  hard	  to	  determine”	  at	  this	  stage	  (SID	  nd.).	  An	  AfDB	  (Afrika	  &	  Ajumbo	  2013)	  report	  shows	  how	  the	  informal	  exports	  in	  2006	  from	  Uganda	  to	  Kenya,	  Rwanda,	  Tanzania,	   the	  DRC	  and	  Sudan	   stood	  at	  USD223.89	  million,	   “corresponding	   to	  83%	   of	   official	   exports	   to	   these	   countries	   over	   the	   same	   period”,	   and	   increasing	   to	  approximately	   USD790.73	   million	   in	   2009	   (Afrika	   &	   Ajumbo	   2013:	   5-­‐6).	   The	   report	  highlights	  the	  “positive	  knock-­‐on	  effects”	  of	  ICBT	  in	  Uganda	  with	  regards	  to	  employment	  creation,	   increased	   income,	   development	   of	   the	   agricultural	   sector	   and	   “enhanced	  regional	   food	   security”	   (Afrika	  &	  Ajumbo	  2013:	   6).	   Improved	   transport	   infrastructure	  and	   a	   reduction	   of	   the	   many	   checkpoints	   in	   the	   region	   will	   increase	   efficiency	   in	  logistics,	   but	   ICBT	   has	   been	   able	   to	   thrive	   “in	   part	   because	   of	   logistical	   inefficiency	   –	  allowing	  it	  to	  serve	  markets	  and	  consumers	  that	  more	  formal	  distribution	  channels	  do	  not	   reach”	   (SID	   nd.).	   Therefore	   the	   LAPSSET	  will	   lead	   to	   a	   formalisation	   of	   ICBT,	   and	  necessarily	  a	  reduction	  thereon.	  The	  seemingly	  drift	  between	  Tanzania	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  EAC	  members	  and	  the	  possible	   expansion	   of	   the	   regional	   block	   to	   the	   north	   and	   the	   possible	   exclusion	   of	  Tanzania,	   the	   potential	   divisions	   of	   regions	   in	   western	   Uganda	   and	   regionalising	  insurgencies	  demonstrate	  the	  interlinkage	  and	  contradiction	  of	  the	  two	  broad	  processes	  of	   formal	   and	   informal	   regionalisms,	   and	   the	   LAPSSET	  Corridor	   is	   a	   tangible	   example	  and	  a	  generator	  of	  this	  contradiction.	  These	  examples	  also	  support	  the	  NRsA	  perception	  of	  the	  construction,	  reconstruction	  and	  deconstruction,	  “intentionally	  or	  unintentionally	  –	  by	  state,	  market,	  civil	  society	  and	  external	  actors,	  which	  come	  together	  in	  complex	  and	  often	   informal	   multi-­‐actor	   coalitions	   for	   a	   variety	   of	   both	   positive	   and	   negative	  purposes”	   (Söderbaum	  2004:	  2).	  As	   this	  brief	  historical	   overview	  has	   shown,	   the	  East	  African	  region	   is	  not	  a	  novel	  phenomenon,	  and	   is	  historically	  and	  socially	  constructed,	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and	   it	   is	   upon	   these	   existing	   ties	   the	   current	   (re)construction	   of	   a	   cross-­‐border	  relationship	  is	  emerging.	  	  
4.1.2	  	   The	  objectives	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  	   The	   idea	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	   goes	   back	   to	   the	   1970s,	   but	   was	   pulled	   up	   from	   the	  drawer	   by	   former	   Kenyan	   president	   Kibaki	   and	   has	   been	   advanced	   by	   the	   successor	  Kenyatta	  who	  has	  made	  the	  project	  the	  most	  high-­‐profile	  project	  in	  Kenya	  and	  the	  most	  ambitious	   project	   on	   the	  whole	   continent.	   The	   construction	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	  was	  launched	  in	  Lamu	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  March	  2012	  by	  presidents	  Kibaki,	  and	  Salva	  Kiir	  and	  foreign	  minister	  Meles	  Zenawi	  of	  Kenya,	  South	  Sudan	  and	  Ethiopia,	  respectively,	  following	   an	   official	   opening	   of	   the	   project.	   The	   LAPSSET	   Project	   is	   a	   flagship	   project	  under	  the	  development	  blueprint	  of	  the	  Kenya	  Vision	  2030.	  The	  Vision	  2030	  constitutes	  the	   guide	   and	  motivation	   of	   Kenya	   to	   become	   a	   globally	   competitive	   and	   prosperous	  middle-­‐income	  nation	  by	  2030,	  and	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  is	  among	  the	  main	  means	  to	  realise	  this	  goal.	  Kenya	  Vision	  2030	  stands	  on	  three	  pillars:	  The	  economic	  pillar	  strives	  to	   achieve	   and	  maintain	   a	   sustained	   economic	   growth	   of	   10	   per	   cent	   until	   2030;	   the	  social	   pillar	   aims	   to	   build	   a	   just	   and	   cohesive	   society	   that	   enjoys	   equitable	   social	  development;	   and,	   the	  political	  pillar	   in	  which	  an	   “issue-­‐based,	  people-­‐centred,	   result-­‐oriented	  and	  accountable	  democratic	  system”	   is	   to	  be	  achieved	  (RoK	  2007:	  2;	  see	  RoK	  2008;	   Mwenzwa	   &	   Misati	   2014).	   The	   political	   achievements	   will	   be	   secured	   through	  addressing	   “economic	   growth	   challenges	   and	   thereby	   creating	  more	   opportunities	   for	  everyone”	  (RoK	  2008:	  58).	  Reaching	   the	  objective	  of	   the	  social	  pillar	   is	   to	  be	  achieved	  through	   a	   comprehensive	   refurbishing	   of	   various	   sectors,	   including	   education	   and	  training;	   health-­‐care	   services;	   environment,	   water	   and	   sanitation;	   environment	   and	  conservation;	   gender,	   youth	   and	   vulnerable	   populations;	   housing	   and	   urbanisation;	  labour	   and	   employment,	   and	   science,	   technology	   and	   innovation.	   The	   revamping	   of	  these	   sectors	   is	   important	   parts	   of	   the	   overall	   objective	   to	   achieve	   a	   middle-­‐income	  status	   for	  Kenya	  by	  2030,	   and	   equip	   the	   country	   sufficiently	   to	   become	  a	   competitive	  player	  in	  the	  global	  market.	  The	  political	  objectives	  in	  the	  Vision	  2030	  are	  guided	  by	  the	  overall	   rule	   to	   rebuild	   confidence	   between	   the	   people	   of	   Kenya	   and	   the	   authorities,	  address	   electoral	  disputes	   and	  ensure	  participation	   for	  Kenyans	   “in	   free,	   fair,	   credible	  and	  decisive	  elections”	  (RoK	  2008:	  124).	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   Officially,	   the	   LAPSSET	   is	   supported	   based	   on	   its	   importance	   for	   GDP	   and	  increase	   in	   employment,	   its	   investment	   incentives	   and	   its	   importance	   for	   export	  products	  in	  the	  region,	  but	  also	  as	  an	  enhancement	  vehicle	  for	  other	  policy	  areas,	  such	  as	  global	  capital	  competitiveness,	  regional	  economic	  integration	  and	  as	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  ownership	  base.	  	   The	  objectives	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  are	  as	  follows:	  1	   To	   enhance	   and	   foster	   commercial	   communication	   between	   Ethiopia,	   Kenya,	  South	  Sudan	  and	  Uganda;	  2	   To	  promote	  regional	  socio-­‐economic	  development	  along	  the	  transport	  corridor,	  especially	  in	  the	  semi-­‐arid	  areas	  of	  the	  participating	  countries;	  3	   To	  enhance	  the	  GDP	  of	  the	  national	  economies;	  4	   To	  facilitate	  regional	  political	  economic	  integration;	  5	   To	  enhance	  regional	  and	  intra-­‐African	  trade;	  6	   And,	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  to	  construct	  a	  continental	  bridge	  between	  the	  Indian	  and	  the	   Atlantic	   oceans,	   thereby	   boosting	   the	   interlinkage	   among	   the	   African	  countries.	   (see	  Kenya	  Vision	  2030)	  	   The	   LAPSSET	   project	   consists	   of	   seven	   components	   and	   is	   estimated	   to	   cost	  around	   USD33	   billion.	   The	   project	   is	   also	   promoted	   as	   a	   job	   creator	   and	   the	   Kenyan	  government	  will	  also	  provide	  1000	  scholarships	  to	  youth	  from	  the	  county	  of	  Lamu.	  1	   The	  Lamu	  Port	  (Manda	  Bay);	  2	   The	  LAPSSET	  Railway;	  3	   The	  LAPSSET	  Highway;	  4	   The	  LAPSSET	  Oil	  Pipeline;	  5	   Resort	  Cities	  in	  Lamu,	  Isiolo	  and	  Lodwar	  City	  by	  Lake	  Turkana;	  6	   New	  airports	  in	  Lamu,	  Isiolo	  and	  Lochichokio;	  7	   And,	   Oil	   Refineries	   (construction	   plans	   consider	   refineries	   in	   Southern	   Sudan,	  Uganda,	  expansion	  of	  the	  refinery	  in	  Mombasa	  as	  well	  as	  a	  new	  refinery	  at	  Lamu	  Port).	   (see	  Kenya	  Vision	  2030)	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In	  addition,	  services	  related	  to	  the	  infrastructure	  project	  components	  include	  the	  Malindi	  –	  Garsen	  Road;	   the	  High	  Grand	  Falls	  Multipurpose	  Dam	  (to	  provide	  water	  and	  power	  supply);	  a	  fibre	  optic	  cable	  (to	  provide	  for	  communication),	  and;	  other	  associated	  sub-­‐projects	   to	   generate	   and	   attract	   investments	   in	   manufacturing	   and	   commercial	  sectors	  along	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor.	  The	   regional	   leaders	   are	   demonstrating	   joint	   determination	   in	   their	   bid	   for	  private	   investors	   which	   will	   be	   needed	   to	   cover	   the	   major	   bulk	   of	   the	   project	  expenditures	   USD24.5	   billion	   (total:	   30	   something	   billion).	   The	   heads	   of	   state	   of	  Ethiopia,	  Kenya,	   Southern	  Sudan	  and	  Uganda	  are	  now	   joining	   forces	  and	  are	  adopting	  the	   AfDB	   Africa50	   Infrastructure	   Fund	   Approach	   in	   order	   to	   “make	   a	   compelling	  business	  case	  to	  private	  sector	  players”,	  as	  said	  by	  the	  leaders	  (cited	  in	  Otieno	  2014).	  	  
4.1.3	  	   The	  governance	  and	  management	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  The	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  Development	  Authority	   (LCDA)	  was	  established	   in	  April	  2013	  “to	  manage	  implementation	  of	  the	  various	  project	  components”,	  and	  has	  appointed	  Silvester	   Kasuku	   as	   the	   LCDA	   CEO8	   (see	  MFA	   Ethiopia).	   This	   “autonomous	   agency”	   is	  consistent	  of	  an	  “11-­‐member	  board	  that	   includes	   five	  state	  officials,	   five	  private	  sector	  representatives	   and	   a	   chairman	   appointed	   by	   the	   President”,	   which	   was	   legally	  established	  on	  1	  March	  2013	  (Odhiambo	  2013).	  Its	  headquarters	  will	  be	  in	  Nairobi	  with	  local	  offices	  in	  Lamu,	  Isiolo,	  Lochichokio,	  Marsabit	  and	  Moyale.	  Its	  stated	  mission	  is	  “[t]o	  be	  an	  effective	  authority	  that	  plans,	  coordinates	  and	  manages	  the	  delivery	  of	  LAPSSET	  [Corridor]	   Programs	   in	   the	   region	   through	   partnership	   and	   consolidation	   for	   growth	  and	  prosperity”	  (LCDA	  Mission	  &	  Vision).	  The	   LCDA	   is	   pushing	   for	   public-­‐private-­‐partnerships	   (PPPs)	   to	   fund	   the	  implementation.	  Recently	  the	  Kenyan	  parliament	  enacted	  the	  Public	  Private	  Partnership	  Act	   No.	   15	   of	   2013.	   The	   act	   is	   timely	   considering	   the	   significance	   of	   proposed	   PPP	  funding	  of	  the	  different	  LAPSSET	  components.	  The	  PPP	  Act	  should	  be	  understood	  from	  a	  historical	  point	  of	  view,	  where	  the	  Kenyan	  government	  has	  been	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  cater	  for	  fundamental	  public	  services.	  In	  addition,	  the	  “law	  was	  adopted	  in	  line	  with	  the	  national	  development	  program	  […]	  “Vision	  2030”	  (CLR&PD	  2013),	  and	  thus	  underscores	  the	   structural	   significance	   of	   the	   programme	   of	   which	   the	   LAPSSET	   is	   a	   major	  component.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Kasuku	  is	  the	  former	  Infrastructure	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Kenya.	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4.2	  	   Refinery	  or	  pipeline:	  contradictory	  motives	  for	  regionalisation	  Despite	  efforts	  by	  the	  LCDA	  and	  the	  heads	  of	  state	  in	  the	  participating	  countries	  to	   attract	   investors	   to	   finance	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor,	   the	  whole	   project	   seemed	   to	   be	  running	  out	  of	  steam	  for	  a	  while.	  This	  was	  until	  an	  agreement	  was	  signed	  between	  the	  government	  of	  Kenya	  and	  South	  Sudan	  to	  include	  a	  pipeline	  as	  a	  main	  component	  to	  the	  LAPSSET	   Corridor	   (ABM	  2012).	  With	   the	   subsequent	   oil	   discoveries	   in	   Kenya	   foreign	  investors	   are	   showing	   increased	   interest	   in	   the	   project.	   Uganda’s	   position	   next	   to	   the	  LAPSSET	  has	  not	  been	  decided	  until	   recently.	  The	   country	  discovered	  oil	   in	  2006,	  but	  had	   initially	   other	   regional	   ambitions	   than	   to	   transfer	   it	   through	   the	   LAPSSET	   oil	  pipeline.	  This	   section	   argues	   that	   oil	   production	  has	  been	   an	   important	  driver	   for	   the	  current	  regionalisation.	  To	  illustrate	  this	  point,	  the	  next	  section	  makes	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  oil	  industry	  to	  influence	  political	  decision-­‐making	  in	  Uganda	  and	  to	  modify	   its	   regional	   ambitions.	   This	  will	   also	   illustrate	   for	  whom,	   by	  whom	   and	   for	  what	  purpose	  oil	  regionalisation	  is	  being	  conducted	  in	  East	  Africa.	  	  It	  is	  not	  only	  in	  East	  Africa	  that	  the	  carbon	  industry	  influences	  policies.	  A	  report	  by	  UK	  based	  watchdog	  NGO,	  World	  Development	  Movement	  (WDM)	  (2013:	  3,	  4)	  reveals	  how	  William	  Hague	  as	  foreign	  secretary	  (12	  May	  2010-­‐14	  July	  2014)	  “intervened	  to	  help	  UK	  company	  Tullow	  Oil	  avoid	  paying	  tax	  in	  Uganda.”	  According	  to	  the	  report,	  the	  British	  foreign	   secretary	   “is	   said	   to	   have	   telephoned	   the	   Ugandan	   president	   and	   lobbied	  strongly	   for	   Tullow’s	   £175	   million	   tax	   bill	   to	   be	   waived”	   (WDM	   2013:	   4).	   The	  WDM	  report	   also	   claims	   chief	   executive	   of	   Tullow	   Oil,	   Aiden	   Heavey	   granted	   education	  secretary	  Michael	  Gove	  £10,000	  ahead	  of	  the	  2010	  UK	  general	  election	  (WDM	  2013:	  4;	  see	   also	  Mbanga	   2012).	   Heritage	  Oil	   is	   also	   accused	   in	   the	   report	   for	   having	   donated	  £60,000	  to	  the	  Conservatives	  (WDM	  2013:	  4;	  see	  also	  Slater	  2011).	  	  Uganda	   joining	   the	   LAPSSET	   project	   is	   actually	   an	   example	   in	   itself	  demonstrating	   the	   leverage	   power	   of	   oil	   companies	   on	   East	   African	   political	   decision	  makers.	  Since	  the	  discoveries	  of	  oil	  in	  Uganda	  the	  regional	  strategic	  ambitions	  of	  Uganda	  to	  become	  a	  supplier	  of	  refined	  produce	  to	  the	  central	  and	  eastern	  African	  markets	  have	  been	  confronted	  with	  the	  oil	  companies	  desire	  to	  transport	  oil	  through	  a	  pipeline	  to	  the	  ocean	   to	   supply	   the	   global	   market.	   Uganda	   wanted	   to	   construct	   a	   refinery	   with	   the	  capacity	  of	  150,000	  barrels	  per	  day	  (BPD)	  and	  “transform	  Uganda	  into	  east	  and	  central	  Africa’s	  main	  refined	  products	  supplier”	  (Naresh	  2012).	  Indeed,	  Uganda	  had	  even	  plans	  of	  processing	  oil	  from	  South	  Sudan,	  in	  direct	  confrontation	  with	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor.	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However,	   Article	   16	   in	   the	   contract	   between	   Heritage	   Oil	   and	   Uganda	   indicates	   that	  Uganda	  has	  changed	  their	  position,	  now	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  pipeline	  instead	  of	  the	  refinery.	  Article	  16	  gives	  the	  companies	  the	  right	  to	  construct	  the	  export	  pipeline	  from	  Uganda	  to	  Kenya.	  By	  granting	  the	  oil	  companies	  the	  right	  by	  contract	  to	  construct	  the	  pipeline,	  the	  contract	   bypasses	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Water	   and	   Environment’s	   approval	   which	   would	  include	   environmental	   and	   social	   impact	   assessments,	   and	   an	   overall	   ability	   by	   the	  Ugandan	  government	   to	  make	  a	  well	   advised	  decision	  about	  Uganda’s	  best	   interest	   in	  the	  construction	  of	  such	  a	  pipeline.	  Moreover,	  the	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  elaborated	  in	   this	   contract	  are	  highly	   favourable	   to	   the	  companies.	  Because,	   “[w]hile	   the	  contract	  explicitly	   states	   the	   oil	   companies’	   right	   to	   construct	   a	   pipeline	   and	   the	   government’s	  obligation	  to	  support	  such	  a	  plan,	  it	  does	  not	  include	  the	  opposite	  responsibilities	  –	  i.e.	  the	   contract	   does	   not	   state	   that	   the	   oil	   companies	   will	   conduct	   adequate	   impact	  assessments	   or	   strategic	   environmental	   plans	   or	   construct	   the	   pipeline	   to	   certain	  standards.	   Nor	   does	   it	   include	   a	   contractual	   right	   for	   the	   Ugandan	   government	   to	  investigate	  and	  oversee	  proposals	  prior	  to	  approval”	  (Lay	  &	  Minio-­‐Paluello	  2010:	  18).	  	  	   Article	   16	   also	   grants	   the	   right	   to	   tariff	   the	   crude	   oil	   transported	   through	   the	  pipeline	   in	   order	   for	   the	   company	   to	   cover	   its	   costs	   and	   make	   “a	   reasonable	   return	  thereon;	   such	   return	   will	   be	   determined	   having	   regard	   to	   the	   risks	   assumed	   by	  shareholders	   of	   the	   Pipeline	   Company	   in	   outlaying	   the	   funds	   for	   the	   construction,	  operation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  such	  facilities”	  (RoU	  2012:	  37).	  In	  the	  contract	  it	  is	  neither	  determined	  the	  extent	  of	  “reasonable	  return”,	  nor	  how	  and	  by	  whom	  it	  will	  be	  funded.	  However,	   considering	   the	   large	   return	   projected	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   PSAs,	   there	   is	  reason	  to	  expect	  similar	  projections	  for	  the	  pipeline.	  	  	   The	  oil	  companies	  have	  promptly	  advocated	  for	  the	  need	  to	  construct	  a	  pipeline,	  given	   the	   geographical	   circumstances	   of	   Uganda	   as	   a	   landlocked	   country	   with	  insufficient	   transport	   infrastructure,	  which	   consequently	  will	   affect	   their	  margins,	   and	  have	   used	   these	   arguments	   in	   order	   to	   rationalize	   their	   excessively	   favourable	   terms.	  However,	  “given	  that	  the	  contract	  guarantees	  “a	  reasonable	  return”	  (i.e.	  strong	  profits)	  for	   the	   operators,	   this	   argument	   serves	   to	   distract	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   pipeline	  represents	  another	  source	  of	  profit	  generation	   for	  oil	  companies	  operating	   in	  Uganda”	  (Lay	  &	  Minio-­‐Paluello	  2010:	  19).	  Moreover,	  the	  fiscal	  analysis	  above	  illustrates	  how	  the	  pipeline	   will	   cut	   government	   revenue	   from	   oil,	   putting	   the	   state	   in	   an	   even	   more	  unfavourable	  position	  compared	  to	  the	  oil	  companies.	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   According	   to	   Florence	   Kyalimpa	   the	   government	   has	   tried	   to	   negotiate	   the	  contracts	   with	   the	   oil	   companies,	   but	   companies	   exercise	   much	   influence	   over	   the	  decision	  making	  process.	  She	  claims	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  oil	  companies,	  and	  their	  financial	  capability	  and	  human	  resources	  exceed	  the	  negotiating	  capacity	  of	  government.	  Another	  civil	  society	  agent	  who	  wishes	  to	  remain	  anonymous	  (Interviewee	  (sn.)	  2014)	  argues	   the	   companies	  were	   in	   favour	  of	   this	   solution	   in	   order	   to	   secure	  quick	  profits,	  adding,	  “they	  even	  threatened	  to	  withdraw	  from	  Uganda	  if	  the	  government	  had	  refused	  to	  grant	  them	  that	  option”	  (see	  also	  Wiig	  &	  Ramalho	  2011:	  11).	  	  
4.2.1	  	   Checks	  and	  balances	  in	  the	  oil	  and	  infrastructure	  sectors	  The	  increased	  attention	  during	  the	  1990s	  on	  oil	  in	  Africa	  focused	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  oil	   exploitation	   as	   a	   new	   kind	   of	   western	   imperialism,	   and	   the	   current	   discourse	   is	  largely	   preoccupied	   with	   concerns	   about	   the	   environment.	   Although	   these	   issues	   are	  important	   they	   have	   also	   “served	   mainly	   to	   obscure	   the	   true	   dynamics	   of	   what	   was	  really	   going	   wrong”	   (Shaxson	   2007:	   1125).	   The	   oil	   discoveries	   in	   East	   Africa	   are	  significant,	   and	   the	   potential	   of	   the	   oil	   development	   to	   transform	   the	   economies	  apparent.	  Host	  governments	  in	  oil	  producing	  countries	  receive	  substantial	  funds,	  such	  as	  taxes,	  royalties,	  license	  fees	  and	  support	  for	  local	  communities,	  which	  should	  contribute	  considerably	   to	  socio-­‐economic	  development.	  Yet,	  many	  oil-­‐producing	  countries	   fail	   to	  make	  wellbeing	   out	   of	   resource	  wealth.	  When	   resource	   revenue	  management	   remain	  opaque	   and	   unaccountable	   “mineral	   and	   petroleum	   wealth	   can	   fuel	   large-­‐scale	  corruption,	   as	   well	   as	   poverty,	   injustice	   and	   conflict”	   (Kowalczyk-­‐Hoyer	   2011:	   5).	  Already	   in	  2007,	   revenue	   from	  oil	  production	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  amounted	   to	   four	  times	  the	  OECD	  countries’	  total	  aid	  to	  the	  region.	  Nigeria	  earned	  USD400	  billion	  from	  oil	  between	  1970	  and	  2007,	  yet	   the	  country’s	   income	  per	  capita	   is	  25	  per	  cent	  below	  the	  average	  for	  the	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  regions.	  Despite	  substantial	  increased	  revenue	  from	  oil	   in	  both	  Angola	  and	  Equatorial	  Guinea,	  the	  “infant	  mortality	  has	  risen	  sharply”	  since	  the	   discovery	   of	   oil	   (Murphy	   &	   Shaxson	   2007).	   Increased	   transparency	   and	  accountability	   of	   the	   governments	   and	   companies	   should	   help	   alleviate	   this	   ‘resource	  curse’.	  	  However,	  structural	  weaknesses	  on	  the	  global,	  regional	  and	  national	  political	  and	  regulatory	   levels	   obstruct	   mechanisms	   of	   checks	   and	   balances,	   transparency	   and	  accountability.	  The	  1995	  Constitution	  of	  Uganda	  contains	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  separation	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of	   power,	   but	   in	   practice,	   all	   three	   powers	   of	   the	   government	   lie	   with	   the	   executive.	  Indeed,	  “[t]here	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  incumbent	  government	  has	  passed	  whatever	   laws	  (the	  Land	  Act,	  the	  Phone	  Tapping	  Act,	  the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Act,	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  districts)	   it	  wishes	  without	  due	   regard	   to	   the	   rights	   and	  objections	  of	   opposition	  political	  parties,	  civil	  society,	  and	  individuals”	  (Olum	  2010:	  65).	  These	   structural	   weaknesses	   are	   also	   visible	   in	   the	   Uganda’s	   2012	   Petroleum	  Bills.	   While	   the	   Bills	   do	   contain	   important	   legislation	   for	   sound	   governance	   of	   the	  petroleum	   sector,	   there	   are	   still	   significant	   gaps.	   According	   to	   a	   joint	   civil	   society	  statement	   by	   Global	   Witness,	   Oil	   Watch	   Network	   Uganda,	   PWYP	   Uganda	   and	   Water	  Governance	   Institute	   the	   Bill	   will	   lead	   to	   “excessive	   executive	   control”,	   “lack	   of	  parliamentary	   oversight”,	   “failure	   to	   guarantee	   transparency	   and	   best	   practice”	   and	  “inadequate	   social	   and	   environmental	   controls”	   (Global	  Witness	   et	   al.	   2012;	   see	   also	  Global	  Witness	  2012).	  Also	  with	  regards	  to	  international	  standards	  and	  global	  governance	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	   the	  Extractive	   Industries	  Transparency	   Initiative	   (EITI)	   there	  are	  weaknesses.	  EITI	   is	   a	   voluntary	   publish-­‐what-­‐you-­‐pay	   standard	   organisation.	   It	   was	   launched	   in	  2002	   and	   has	   been	  widely	   proclaimed,	  with	   important	   supporters	   such	   as	   the	  World	  Bank	  and	  with	  signatories	  like	  Total	  and	  Tullow	  Oil	  which	  are	  operating	  in	  Uganda	  and	  Kenya9.	  With	  both	  Tullow	  and	  Total	  as	  signatories	  to	  the	  EITI,	  there	  is	  some	  reason	  for	  optimism.	  Nevertheless,	  “[t]he	  onus	  of	  implementation	  rests	  on	  participating	  host	  states	  rather	  than	  resource	  companies,	  and	  the	  resource	  companies	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  domestic	  regulation	  of	   the	  host	  states”	   (Hansen	  2009:	  26).	  According	   to	  Thomas	  Hansen	  (2009:	  29),	   this	   is	   the	   weakness	   of	   the	   EITI:	   “State	   governments	   have	   the	   lowest	   degree	   of	  direct	   interests	   in	   implementation	   and,	   in	   many	   cases,	   also	   a	   vested	   interest	   in	   less	  transparency	   surrounding	   resource	   revenues.”	   Moreover,	   the	   function	   of	   the	   EITI	   is	  limited,	   because	   it	   only	   checks	   if	   anything	   is	   missing	   between	   the	   transfer	   from	   the	  companies	   to	   the	   government.	   Therefore,	   it	   does	   “not	   check	   on	   an	   accruals	   basis	  whether	   the	   cash	   paid	   was	   the	   right	   amount	   in	   the	   first	   place”	   (Murphy	   &	   Shaxson	  2007).	  In	  addition,	  the	  EITI	  treats	  corruption	  on	  a	  national	  basis,	  and	  thus	  overlooks	  the	  transnational	  element	  of	  corruption	  in	  big	  oil.	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  CMI	  researcher	  Tina	  Søreide,	  specialist	  on	  incentive-­‐structures	  in	  governance	  institutions,	  argues:	  “Although	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  CNOOC	  is	  not	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  EITI.	  Neither	  are	  Uganda	  and	  Kenya,	  although	  they	  have	  for	  a	  long	  time	  expressed	  their	  intentions	  to	  become	  signatories.	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the	  EITI	   is	   one	   step	   in	   the	   right	  direction,	   it	   is	   not	   robust	   enough	   to	   ensure	   sufficient	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  to	  impede	  corrupt	  behaviour	  in	  the	  oil	  sector”	  (Søreide	  2014).	  	  
4.3	  	   Development	  for	  whom?	  	   In	   this	  section,	  an	  assessment	  of	   the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor’s	  development	  potential	  or	  other	  consequences	  for	  the	  people	  living	  in	  the	  area	  is	  addressed.	  In	  so	  doing	  it	  pays	  special	   attention	   to	   the	   poor	   people.	   The	   section	   in	   divided	   into	   three	   sub-­‐sections;	  namely:	   the	   supposed	   development	   paradigm;	   PPPs	   and	   privatisation;	   and	   local	  inclusiveness	  in	  the	  development	  development.	  	  
4.3.1	  	   Development	  paradigm	  The	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   profiling	   as	  well	   as	   the	   regional	   oil	   production	   projects	  make	   solemn	   promises	   and	   allusions	   to	   sustainable	   developmental	   recognition.	   For	  instance,	  one	  of	  its	  core	  objectives	  commits	  it	  to	  “[d]ynamic	  promotion	  of	  regional	  socio-­
economic	   development	   along	   the	   transport	   corridor”	   (Kasuku	   2013:	   9;	   emphasis	   in	  original).	  Moreover,	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  is	  marketed	  and	  promoted	  to	  the	  public	  as	  a	  vehicle	   towards	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   inclusive	   development	   with	   great	   prospects	   for	  employment	   opportunities	   and	   broad	   based	   wealth	   creation.	   Kenyan	   Minister	   of	  Transport,	  Njiru,	  claims	  the	  LAPSSET	  is	  essential	  for	  “[i]mproving	  livelihoods	  of	  over	  15	  million	   people	   in	   North	   Eastern,	   Eastern,	   Rift	   Valley	   and	   [the]	   Coast”	   (2011:	   9),	   and	  former	  President	  Kibaki	  has	  said	  “the	  project	  will	  boost	  employment	  and	  contribute	  to	  better	  prospects	  for	  some	  167	  million	  people	  in	  the	  surrounding	  region”	  (Flattau	  2012).	  Kenya	  Vision	  2030	  Director,	   Jonathan	  Lodompui	  adds	   that	   the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  with	  its	  long-­‐term	  growth	  and	  employment	  opportunities,	  “and	  increased	  mobility	  of	  security	  forces	   also	   ”will	   resolve	   the	   security	   issues	   in	   the	   Northern	   parts	   of	   Kenya	   (Savage	  2014).	  However,	   there	   are	   clear	   contradictions	   between	   these	   statements	   and	   other	  expected	   consequences	   for	   the	   people	   residing	   within	   the	   reach	   of	   the	   corridor.	  Lodompui	  has	  also	  stated	  “pastoralists	  may	  be	  negatively	  affected	  by	  the	  project	  as	  they	  have	  been	  marginalised	  economically,	  socially	  and	  politically.”	  The	  Vision	  2030	  Director	  also	  said	  the	  pastoralists	  “are	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  respond	  to	  [the]	  set	  of	  challenges	  that	  [the	  LAPSSET]	  project	  portends.”	  Grazing	  land	  will	  be	  taken	  away	  from	  them,	  and	  the	  project	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may	   thus	   “lead	   to	   increased	   conflict,	   disruption	   of	   source	   of	   income	   and	   collapse	   of	  beliefs	   and	   cultures”	   (Salesa	   2013).	   As	   already	   illustrated	   in	   the	   above	   and	   previous	  chapter	   the	   negative	   predictions	   noted	   by	   Lodompui	   have	   already	   started	   to	   show.	  Unfortunately,	   for	   the	   local	   population,	   or	   the	   ‘really	   existing’	   LAPSSET	   Corridor,	   the	  development-­‐oriented	   ambitions	   have	   yet	   to	   illustrate	   its	   positive	   influences.	   And	   the	  promises	   of	   development	   and	   sustained	   socio-­‐economic	   growth	   through	   participation	  can	  thus	  far	  be	  understood	  as	  “mainly	  a	  rhetorical	  façade	  or	  at	  best	  a	  way	  to	  beef	  up	  the	  status	  of	   ‘bankable’	  and	  private	   investment	  projects”,	  which	   in	   the	  end	  constitutes	   the	  linchpins	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  project.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  priorities,	  resources,	  mechanisms	  and	  instruments	  have	  so	  far	  failed	   to	   demonstrate	   comprehensiveness	   and	   sufficiency	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   stated	  commitments	   to	   promotion	   of	   regional	   people-­‐centred	   socio-­‐economic	   development	  and	  participation	  through,	   for	   instance,	  employment	  generation.	  Moreover,	   the	  holistic	  and	   participatory	   framework	   is	   disproportionate	   compared	   with	   objectives	   1	   and	   5	  where	   infrastructure	   investment	   and	  mega-­‐projects	   for	   industrial	   development	   are	   so	  far	   prioritised.	   Objectives	   1,	   4,	   5	   and	   6	   are	   all	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   promotion	   and	  advancement	   of	   the	   East	   African	   Common	   Market	   Protocol	   through	   improvement	   of	  linkages	  and	   facilitation	  and	   liberalisation	  of	  movement	  of	   goods,	   labour,	   services	  and	  capital	   across	   the	   regional	   borders,	   but	   the	   element	   of	   regional	   socio-­‐economic	  development	   in	   objective	   2	   remains	   illusory,	   save	   for	   the	   award	   of	   LAPSSET	  scholarships	   by	   the	   government	   (Mbabazi	   2014,	   see	   also	   Save	   Lamu;	   LAPSSET).	  However,	   the	   recruitment	  mechanism	   has	   been	   contested	   by	  members	   of	   parliament	  from	  Lamu	  County	  who	  claim	  “the	  exercise	  has	  been	  politicised	  and	  insisted	  it	  should	  be	  called	  off”	  (Beja	  2013).	  Finally,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   the	   connection	   between	   oil	   production	   and	  development.	  As	  has	  been	  argued	  earlier	  in	  this	  study,	  the	  oil	  companies	  are	  principally	  interested	  in	  maximising	  profits,	  and	  the	  development	  for	  the	  people	  in	  East	  Africa	  is	  not	  among	   their	   concerns.	   The	   initial	   phases	   of	   the	   oil	   production	   will	   be	   quite	   labour	  intensive.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  the	  “[c]umulative	  number	  of	  people	  required	  to	  build	  and	  operate	   Lake	   Albert	   projects	   on	   site”	  will	   peak	   at	   around	   13,000	  workers	   just	   before	  year	  four	  of	  the	  construction	  phase	  (Joint	  Venture	  Partners	  2014).	  But	  the	  intensity	  will	  decrease	  to	  between	  four	  and	  five	  thousand	  from	  around	  year	  5	  until	  year	  eleven	  when	  it	  will	  depend	  only	  on	  3,000	  workers.	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4.3.2	  	   Public-­private	  partnerships	  and	  privatisation	  The	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   should	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   broader	   structural	   adjustment	  embedded	   in	   the	   development	   programme,	   Kenya	   Vision	   2030,	   and	   a	   parallel	   can	   be	  drawn	   to	   Uganda’s	   Vision	   2040	   (see	   NPA).	   As	  mentioned	   above	   the	   LAPSSET	   project	  should	   be	   seen	   in	   relations	   to	   the	   development	   blueprint	   Vision	   2030	   and	   the	  adjustment	  of	  regulations	  facilitating	  market	  access	  of	  private	  capital.	  Moreover,	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda	  are	  aligning	  their	  economies	  and	  regulatory	  frameworks	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  as	  many	  investors	  as	  possible	  to	  their	  new	  development	  programmes	  (Wachira	  2014).	  The	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   initiative	   goes	   beyond	   the	   idea	   that	   transport	   and	  communications	   development	   should	   be	   funded	   by	   international	   financial	   assistance.	  Instead,	   such	   funding	   should	   be	   raised	   via	   partnerships	   between	   governments	   and	  private	   investors.	   According	   to	   Dave	   Arkwright	   and	   Geoff	   De	   Beer,	   the	   conception	   of	  involving	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  “finance,	  develop	  and	  operate	  infrastructure”	  represents	  a	   growing	   trend	  where	   the	   public	   sector	   is	   increasingly	   compelled	   to	   incorporate	   the	  private	  sector	  in	  infrastructural	  development	  (Arkwright	  &	  De	  Beer	  1998:	  2).	  Elemental	  to	   this	   tendency	   are	   limited	   government	   incomes	   and	   public	   disillusionment	  with	   the	  service	  delivery	  by	  public	  enterprises.	  Public-­‐private	  partnerships	  (PPPs)	  “can	  serve	  to	  rectify	  some	  of	  these	  problems,	  while	  simultaneously	  allowing	  the	  public	  sector	  to	  retain	  a	   certain	   level	  of	   control”	   (Lee	  2003:	  151;	  Arkwright	  &	  De	  Beer	  1998:	  2-­‐3).	  Using	   the	  International	   Monetary	   Fund	   (IMF)	   formula	   of	   PPPs	   “the	   private	   sector	   can	   play	   an	  active	   role	   in	   financing,	   managing	   and	   maintaining	   large	   infrastructure	   projects	   that	  would	  traditionally	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  purely	  the	  public	  sector’s	  responsibility”	  (Driver	  1999:	  18;	  see	  also	  Söderbaum	  2004:	  184).	  	  All	   components	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   are	   in	   the	   Feasibility	   Study	   for	   the	  
LAPSSET	   Corridor	   and	   Lamu	   Port	   Master	   Plan	   &	   Detailed	   Design	   recommended	   to	   be	  financed,	  managed	  and	  operated	  by	  means	  of	  PPP	  schemes	  (JPC	  &	  BAC/GKA	  JV	  2011),	  which	   “imply	   commercialization	   and/or	   privatization	   of	   conventional	   state	   functions	  and	  public	  goods”	   (Söderbaum	  2004:	  184).	   Several	   service	  delivery	   sectors	  have	  been	  privatised,	  in	  particular	  the	  energy	  and	  infrastructure	  sectors.	  For	  instance,	  in	  2000	  the	  
Uganda	  Electricity	  Board	  was	  divided	  with	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  entities	  being	  privatised	  to	  the	  consortium	  Umeme	  in	  2004	  (Hall	  2007),	  and	  in	  2002	  the	  operation	  and	  maintenance	  services	   of	   the	   Ugandan	   National	   Water	   and	   Sewerage	   Corporation	   were	   privatised	  (Jerome	  2004;	  Bacwayo	  2010).	  In	  Kenya,	  in	  2012,	  twenty-­‐three	  state-­‐owned	  assets	  were	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lined	  up	  for	  sale,	  including	  the	  Kenya	  Pipeline	  and	  East	  African	  Portland	  Cement	  (Africa	  Research	  Bulletin	  2012).	  The	  investment	  decisions	  in	  the	  LAPSSET	  project	  is	  ruled	  by	  a	  forthright	   ‘market	   paradigm’,	   where	   the	   state	   as	   a	   mediating	   body	   are	   withdrawn	   at	  most	  levels.	  	   The	   result	   is	   an	   “incompatibility	  of	   the	  private	   sector’s	  quest	   for	  profit	   and	   the	  state’s	  aim	   to	   redistribute	  wealth.	  For	   the	  private	   sector,	   the	  attraction	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	  that	   the	   state	   assumes	   all	   the	   entrepreneurial	   risks	   (Coloma	  2013:	   13).	   The	   emerging	  partnership	  between	  state	  and	  capital	  is	  not	  for	  the	  public	  benefit,	  but	  reflects	  a	  contract	  between	   the	   political	   elite	   and	   transnational	   capital,	   promoted	   by	   IFIs	   and	   the	   donor	  community,	   to	   rapidly	  proceed	   into	   liberalisation	  and	  privatisation	   (Söderbaum	  2004:	  184-­‐85;	  see	  also	  Hanlon	  1991).	  Subsequently,	  the	  reward	  is	  affirmed	  in	  the	  assumption	  that	   development	   automatically	   will	   be	   triggered	   by	   economic	   growth,	   and	   ‘good	  governance’	   which	   “[a]ccording	   to	   the	   dominant	   line	   of	   neoliberal	   thinking	   […]	   is	  defined	  as	  less	  government”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  185).	  Indeed,	  the	  donor	  community	  and	  affiliated	  IFIs	  insisted	  that	  new	  aid	  packages	  to	  Kenya	  should	  be	  suspended	  until	  the	  Moi	  government	  instituted	  political	  reforms	  and	  initiated	  good	  governance	  (Barkan	  2004)10.	  In	  Uganda,	  President	  Yoweri	  Museveni,	  on	  taking	  power	  in	  1986,	  embraced	  a	  socialist-­‐nationalist	  economic	  programme	  (Museveni	  1992).	  However,	  within	  a	  year	  ”he	  and	  his	  fellow	  NRM	  [National	  Resistance	  Movement]	   leaders	  had	  agreed	  with	   the	   IMF	  and	   the	  World	  Bank	  on	  an	   economic	   reform	  programme	   that	   incorporated	  various	  neo-­‐liberal	  adjustment	  measures”	   (Mwenda	  &	   Tangri	   2005:	   452).	   Similarly,	   In	   Kenya,	  which	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  countries	  in	  Africa	  to	  introduce	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	   (Rowbotham	   2000:	   56),	   “the	   IMF	   plays	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	   policy	  formulation	  under	  the	  structural	  adjustment	  program”	  where	  the	  IMFs	  “suggestions	  are	  usually	   taken	   into	   account	  without	  much	   alteration”	   (Korir	  &	  Kioko	   2009:	   24).	   In	   the	  case	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor,	   this	   is	   further	   advanced	   to	   a	   level	   where	   “the	   state	   is	  reduced	   to	   an	   investment	   promotion	   agency	   that	   provides	   technical	   support	   in	   the	  privatization	  process”	  (Söderbaum	  2004:	  185).	  By	  embracing	  this	  neo-­‐liberal	   ideology,	  “the	   state	   has	   become	   the	   disciplining	   spokesman	   of	   transnational	   capital,	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Nevertheless,	  some	  commentators	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  imposition	  of	  good	  governance	  conditionalities	  “was	  the	  only	  way	  to	  get	  Daniel	  Arap	  Moi	  to	  reach	  some	  accommodation	  with	  domestic	  constituencies	  and	  allow	  popular	  elections”	  (Ihonvbere	  1996:	  3).	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‘transmission	  belt’	  for	  economic	  globalisation”	  (Söderbaum	  &	  Taylor	  2001:	  676),	  instead	  of	   acting	   “as	   a	   ‘buffer’,	   protecting	   the	   domestic	   economy	   from	   harmful	   exogenous	  influences”	  (Söderbaum	  &	  Taylor	  2001:	  676;	  see	  Cox	  1996).	  	   It	   is	   rather	   obvious	   that	   the	   state,	   in	   this	   context,	   is	   acting	   according	   to	   other	  interests	  than	  those	  of	  its	  citizenry.	  The	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  has	  always	  been	  dubious,	  and	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   initial	   period	   of	   post-­‐independence,	   the	   state	   has	  performed	  in	  conformity	  with	  international	  capital.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  tension	  over	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  citizenry	  is	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  historical	  marginalisation	  of	  the	  citizenry	  by	  the	  state.	  As	  Söderbaum	  (2004:	  185)	  correctly	  points	  out,	  “neoliberal	  ideology	  in	  practice	  lacks	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  victims	  of	  structural	  change”,	  which	   is	  manifested	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   inclusion	   into	   decision-­‐making	   and	   insufficient	  consultation	   about	   the	   LAPSSET	  Corridor	   strategy	   of	   the	   people	   living	   in	   the	   corridor	  (RVI	   2013:	   2,	   4;	   Save	   Lamu	   2012;	   see	   also	   Khisa	   &	   Oesterdiekhoff	   2012),	  which	   also	  illustrates	   the	  overall	  oil	  and	  gas	  activities	   in	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda	  (IHRB	  2012).	  This,	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  irregular	  land	  allocations	  and	  enduring	  non-­‐inclusive	  and	  undemocratic	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  in	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda	  amount	  to	  what	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  democratic	  deficiency.	  	   It	   is	   beyond	   doubt	   that	   “[t]he	   purely	   money	   generating	   rationale	   of	   the	  [LAPSSET]	   Project	   is	   being	   pushed	   by	   “the	   political	   and	   economic	   elite	   of	   Kenya”	  (Abdulrahman,	  Saad	  &	  Associates	  Advocates	  2012:	  para.	  26;	  see	  also	  Flattau	  2012),	  with	  the	   resulting	   negative	   consequences	   for	   the	   historically	   political	   and	   socio-­‐economic	  marginalised	  and	  excluded	  people	  of	   the	  corridor.	  The	  privatisation	  or	  PPP-­‐funding	  of	  conventional	   goods	   and	   services,	   such	   as	   ports,	   roads,	   railways	   and	   even	   cities	   is	  indicative	   of	   “a	   retreat	   of	   the	   conventional	   welfare	   ambitions	   of	   the	   state	   and	   the	  commodification	   of	   basic	   material	   needs.	   User	   fees	   are	   a	   worldwide	   trend	   but	   they	  clearly	   increase	   the	   burden	   for	   the	   poor	   and	   disadvantaged”	   (Söderbaum	   2004:	   186)	  especially	  in	  peripheral	  regions	  of	  East	  Africa	  which	  are	  the	  home	  of	  many	  of	  the	  most	  impoverished	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region	  (Save	  Lamu	  2012).	  	  
4.3.3	  	   Local	  participation	  in	  development	  As	  highlighted	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  communication	  between	  the	  central	  and	  local	   government,	   the	   local	   communities,	   private	   sector	   and	   the	   citizenry	   has	   been	  limited.	  In	  addition,	  the	  central	  authorities	  are	  showing	  ruthlessness	  in	  their	  response	  to	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frustrated	  locals	  as	  they	  have	  been	  demonstrating	  for	  transparency	  and	  inclusion	  in	  the	  oil	   and	   infrastructure	   developments.	   Jeremy	   Flattau	   (2012)	   reports:	   “Police	   have	  threatened	   local	   activists	   with	   arrest	   if	   they	   demonstrate	   against	   the	   government-­‐backed	   project	   and	   restricted	   journalists’	   access	   to	   information.”	   Paradoxically,	   while	  “senior	  officials	  of	  key	  state	  ministries	  in	  Lamu	  say	  they	  do	  not	  know	  what	  is	  going	  on”,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Transport,	  Amos	  Kimunya	  “responded	  to	  calls	  for	  more	  transparency	  by	  stating	  that	  the	  Lamu	  people	  will	  be	  informed	  of	  developments	  on	  a	  need-­to-­know	  basis”	  (Nunow	  2012:	  6;	  italics	  in	  original).	  Worryingly,	  Kimunya	  was	  exonerated	  in	  2008	  from	  his	   former	  position	  as	  Finance	  Minister	  when	  he	  was	   linked	  to	  “non-­‐publicly	   tendered	  sale	  of	  a	  government-­‐owned	  property”	  (KPMG	  2012:	  19),	  which	  makes	  a	  good	  example	  of	   Kenya’s	   culture	   of	   impunity	   of	   the	   political	   elite	   as	   well	   as	   Kenya’s	   tendency	   of	  opaqueness	   in	   the	   LAPSSET	   Process.	   As	   another	   example	   of	   the	   secrecy	   around	   the	  projects,	   “the	   Japanese	   Port	   Consultants	   contracted	   for	   the	   port	   feasibility	   study	   has	  declined	  to	  provide	  information	  on	  their	  contract	  sum	  and	  the	  tendering	  process	  to	  the	  parliamentary	   committee	   on	   Transport,	   Public	   Works	   and	   Housing,	   thus	   depriving	  Kenyans	   the	   information	   on	   the	   fiscal	   implications	   of	   the	   project”	   (Save	   Lamu	   2012).	  The	   policy	   of	   devolution	   under	   the	   Kenyan	   Constitution	   of	   2010	   “also	   creates	   new	  avenues	   through	  which	  deepened	  cases	  of	  marginalisation	  and	  disparities	   can	  emerge	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  new	  county	  structures”	  (Khisa	  &	  Oesterdiekhoff	  2012:	  2).	  	   In	   Uganda,	   the	   Industrial	   Baseline	   Survey	   commissioned	   by	   the	   Joint	   Venture	  partners	   (Tullow,	   Total	   and	   CNOOC)	   has	   revealed	   that	   the	   Lake	   Albert	   Basin	  Development	   Project,	   will	   create	   between	   100,000	   and	   150,000	   new	   jobs	   in	   the	   first	  years	  of	   the	  operationalisation,	   including	  13,000	   jobs	  generated	  directly	  by	  companies	  developing	  and	  supporting	  oil	  and	  gas	  projects	  on	  site.	  Yet,	   the	  survey	  advises	   that	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  jobs	  will	  be	  short	  term	  and	  will	   in	  time	  need	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  other	  sectors	  in	  Uganda	  or	  abroad	  (Joint	  Venture	  Partners	  2014).	  Jin	  Wei	  Gan,	  Vice	  President	  of	   the	   Chinese	   National	   Offshore	   Oil	   Company	   (CNOOC)	   Uganda	   said	   to	   the	   Ugandan	  newspaper	  Daily	  Monitor	   that	   “the	   survey	  was	   in	   line	  with	   [the]	   obligation	   to	   involve	  Ugandans	  in	  the	  sector.”	  Promoting	  “national	  content	  is	  not	  only	  a	  legal	  requirement	  but	  also	   an	   opportunity	   to	   ensure	   the	   success	   of	   the	   sector,”	   Gan	   continued	   (Imaka	   &	  Tumusiime	  2014).	  However,	   referring	   to	   the	   inadequate	  skills	   level	  of	  Ugandans	   to	   fill	  the	  employment	  gap,	  the	  report	  states,	  “[a]	  major	  challenge	  relating	  to	  human	  resources	  will	  be	   the	  number	  and	   level	  of	   certification	  of	   technicians	   to	  comply	  with	  oil	   and	  gas	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standards	  (Joint	  Venture	  Partners	  2014:	  2).	  	  So	  far	  the	  skills	  level	  of	  Ugandans	  to	  take	  on	  the	   available	   jobs	   is	   inadequate	   so	   that	   Ugandans	   are	   mostly	   occupying	   unskilled	  employment	   opportunities,	   while	   the	   technical	   jobs	   are	   occupied	   by	   foreigners.	  According	   to	   Elly	   Karuhanga,	   president	   of	   Tullow	   Oil	   Uganda	   and	   chairperson	   of	   the	  Uganda	   Chamber	   of	   Mines	   and	   Petroleum,	   “[t]his	   has	   been	   the	   practice	   because	   the	  government	   has	   an	   agreement	   with	   foreign	   firms	   to	   bring	   in	   specific	   foreigners	   with	  specific	  expertise”	  (cited	  in	  Imaka	  2012).	  	   Indeed,	   as	   Mwakali	   et	   al.	   (2011:	   6)	   notes,	   “[t]he	   collaboration	   between	   the	  government	  of	  Uganda	  and	  the	  major	  players	  in	  the	  petroleum	  activities	  should	  focus	  on	  facilitating	  participation	  of	   firms	  with	  an	   infrastructure	   in	  Uganda	  and	  employment	  of	  Ugandans	   in	   petroleum	   activities	   without	   compromising	   quality,	   health,	   safety	   and	  environmental	   standards.”	   Currently,	   the	   national	   participation	   in	   the	   Ugandan	   oil	  sector	  is	  low,	  around	  15	  per	  cent.	  It	  has	  not	  been	  possible	  in	  this	  study	  to	  ascertain	  the	  skills	   requirement	   for	   qualification	   in	   the	   various	   positions	   in	   the	   oil	   development	   in	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda	  and	  the	  preparedness	  of	  the	  labour	  force	  in	  the	  countries.	  However,	  the	  core	  oil	  industry	  has	  a	  significant	  entrance	  barrier	  for	  new	  markets	  and	  the	  process	  of	   adopting	  and	  absorbing	   the	   skills	   and	   technology	   “is	   likely	   to	   take	  15-­‐20	  years	  and	  requires	   high	   focus	   on	   education	   and	   skills	   development	   as	   well	   as	   on	   institutional	  capacity	  building”	  (Mwakali	  et	  al.	  2011:	  6).	  The	  informal	  sector	  constitutes	  a	  major	  part	  of	   the	   total	   industrial	   capacity.	  However,	   this	   capacity	   “will	  not	  be	  qualified	   to	  deliver	  services	  to	  the	  petroleum	  sector”	  without	  being	  formalised	  and	  expand	  more	  (Mwakali	  
et	   al.	   2011:	   47).	   Under	   the	   Oil	   for	   Development	   programme,	   Uganda	   has	   received	  assistance	   from	  the	  Norwegian	  government	   in	  developing	  the	  country’s	  oil	  sector.	  The	  programme	   has	   consisted	   in,	   for	   instance,	   assistance	   in	   developing	   the	   Petroleum	  (Exploration,	   Development	   and	   Production)	   Bill	   of	   2013	   and	   promoted	   state-­‐society	  dialogue	  between	  CSOs	  and	  the	  government.	  A	   legal	   framework	  establishing	  the	  “laws,	  regulations	   and	   license	   agreements	   to	   ensure	   that	   national	   content	   receives	   the	  necessary	  attention	  and	  to	  enforce	  national	  content	  ambitions”	  but	  it	   is	  also	  important	  to	   emphasise	   “that	   successful	   national	   content	   development	   cannot	   be	   achieved	   by	  regulation	  and	  legislation	  alone”	  (Mwakali	  et	  al.	  2011:	  vii).	  The	  Ugandan	  labour	  force	  is	  still	  unqualified	  for	  the	  oil	  sector,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  people	  residing	  in	  the	  oil	  producing	  areas.	  Loïc	  Laurandel,	  the	  former	  general	  manager	  of	  Total	  E&P	  Uganda	  Ltd	  argues:	  “The	  big	   challenge	   I	   have	   encountered	   is	   finding	   people	   with	   the	   appropriate	   skills	   and	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knowledge	  who	   can	  work	   in	   the	   oil	   industry.	   There	   are	   very	   few	   Ugandans	  with	   the	  required	  skills”	  (cited	  in	  Ssekika	  2014).	  	  	   Under	   these	   circumstances,	   there	   is	   no	   confirmation	   that	   the	   state	   or	   other	  regionalising	   actors	   will	   be	   able	   to	   secure	   participatory	   and	   inclusive	   people-­‐centred	  development	  in	  the	  corridor	  or	  in	  the	  related	  oil	  production	  projects,	  at	  least	  within	  the	  foreseeable	   future.	   If	   the	   indigenous	   population	   is	   unqualified	   for	   the	   jobs	   made	  available	  by	  the	  oil	  and	  infrastructure	  sectors	  the	  labour	  force	  will	  have	  to	  be	  imported	  from	  abroad.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  transfer	  of	  knowledge	  about	  oil	  production	  as	  well	  as	  full	  participation	  of	  the	  indigenous	  labour	  force	  will	  be	  slower	  and	  maximum	  benefits	  of	  the	  national	  content	  reduced.	  	  
4.4	  	   Further	  marginalisation	  or	  integration?	  We	  can	  only	  make	  analysis	  based	  on	  what	  we	  know	  and	  make	  assumptions	  based	  on	   experiences.	   The	   oil	   production	   and	   the	   LAPSSET	  Corridor	   are	   only	   in	   their	   initial	  stages	  and	   it	   is	   therefore	  difficult	   to	   say	   if	   the	  objectives	  of	   equitable,	   socio-­‐economic,	  people	   centred	   development	   with	   opportunities	   for	   everyone	   will	   materialise	   or	   not	  from	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  at	  this	  stage.	  However,	  as	  Mwakali	  et	  al.	  (2011:	  6)	  notes	  “[i]t	  is	   a	   known	   fact	   that	   oil	   companies	   depend	   on	   massive	   outsourcing	   from	   the	   non-­‐oil	  sector	  (predominantly	  international	  corporations).	  This	  means,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  latter	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  controls	  the	  former’s	  national	  content	  component.”	  	  	   Also	  with	   regards	   to	   governance	  mechanisms	   and	   local	   communities’	   concerns	  over	  environmental	  implications	  of	  the	  oil	  explorations	  and	  production	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  the	  community	  outside	  of	   the	   central	   core	   is	  voiceless.	  According	   to	  a	  Beach	  Management	  Unit	   (BMU)	  representative	   from	  Ssebagoro,	  whenever	  community	  members	  raise	  such	  concerns	   district	   officials	   reply	   that	   “oil	   is	   a	   national	   issue,	   and	   lower	   levels	   of	  government	   cannot	   influence	   what	   happens	   at	   the	   top”	   (de	   Kock	   2012b:	   37).	   This	  demonstrates	  the	  inefficiency	  and	  faulty	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  devolution	  and	  decentralisation	  policies	  in	  Uganda.	  	   Current	  perceptions	  and	  discourses	  in	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  show	  concern	  about	  the	   future	   of	   their	   livelihoods,	   and	   fear	   about	   the	   disruption	   of	   communities	   as	   a	  consequence	   of	   the	   oil	   and	   infrastructure	   projects.	   Such	   perceptions	   and	   discourses	  offer	   important	   insights	   about	   the	   real	   processes	   on	   the	   ground.	   Therefore,	   the	   next	  section	  addresses	  discourses	  of	  marginalisation	  and	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  corridor.	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4.4.1	  	   (Discourses	  of)	  marginalisation	  and	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  	   The	  oil	  discoveries	  in	  the	  region	  in	  examination	  in	  this	  study	  concern	  on-­‐shore	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  discoveries.	  As	   the	   illustration	  above	  shows,	   they	  are	  also	   located	   in	  a	  historically	   unstable	   region;	   therefore	   it	   gives	   some	   association	  with	   the	   Niger	   Delta.	  	  The	  people	  living	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  the	  corridor	  are	  basically	  dependent	  on	  subsistence	  farming,	   cattle	   herding	   and	   fishing	   as	   livelihoods.	   The	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   and	   the	   oil	  exploration	   and	   production	   are	   bound	   to	   have	   transformative	   effects	   on	   the	   broader	  eastern	  African	  region,	  and	  in	  particular	  on	  the	  regional	  space	  surrounding	  the	  corridor.	  This	  section	  highlights	  the	  way	  in	  which	  major	  extractive	  industry	  activities	  can	  impact	  on	  the	  political	  psychology	  of	  the	  residents	  affected	  by	  such	  operations.	  	   Before	  the	  colonisation	  of	  Uganda,	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Bunyoro	  was	  the	  largest	  and	  strongest	  kingdom	  in	  the	  country.	  However,	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  British,	  the	  Buganda	  kingdom	  on	  the	  northwest	  of	  Lake	  Victoria	  became	  the	  favourites	  of	  the	  colonial	  power	  and	  was	  strengthened	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  Bunyoro.	  Obote’s	  abolishment	  of	  Uganda’s	  four	  kingdoms11	   in	   the	   1960s	   was	   repealed	   only	   years	   after	   Museveni’s	   rise	   to	   power	   in	  198612	   (see	   Uganda	   Constitutional	   Commission	   1995:	   Chapter	   16).	   In	   the	   1995	  Constitution	   the	   kingdoms	   are	   reduced	   to	   cultural	   organisations	   and	   not	   allowed	   to	  involve	   themselves	   in	   politics.	   However,	   historical	   conflicts	   between	   the	   government	  and	  the	  kingdoms	  have	  seen	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Kings	  and	  Cultural	  Leaders	  Forum	  of	   Uganda	  which	   tries	   to	   lobby	   the	   government.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Bunyoro	   region	   in	  Uganda,	  where	  the	  biggest	  oil	  discoveries	  have	  been	  made	  so	  far,	  oil	  discoveries	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region	   “have	   added	   a	   new	   level	   of	   frustration	   to	   already	   existent	   perceptions	   of	  political	  marginalisation”	  (de	  Kock	  2012b:	  26).	  A	  spokesperson	  for	  the	  Bunyoro	  people	  has	  said	  that	  the	  people	  has	  never	  been	  consulted	  about	  the	  oil	  developments	  in	  the	  area	  and	  that	  “[t]hey	  [the	  government]	  do	  not	  listen	  to	  us”	  (cited	  in	  de	  Kock	  2012b:	  26-­‐27).	  It	  is	  therefore	  not	  surprising	  that	  many	  of	  the	  people	  in	  the	  area	  fear	  they	  will	  not	  have	  any	  stake	   in	   the	   oil	   development.	   Expressing	   frustration	   about	   the	   perception	   of	   the	   oil	  development	  and	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Bunyoro	  people,	  the	  spokesperson	  said:	  “We	  will	  only	  be	   left	  with	  holes,	  and	  pollution	   left	  behind	  after	   the	  oil	   is	  depleted”	   (cited	   in	  de	  Kock	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  These	  are	  the	  Kingdoms	  of	  Buganda,	  Ankole,	  Bunyoro	  and	  Toro.	  12	  The	  Ugandan	  kingdoms	  subject	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Uganda	  were	  restored	  by	  Amendment	  [No.	  8]	  Act	  –	  Statute	  No.	  8,	  Article	  118	  (1)	  of	  1993	  by	  the	  Parliament	  of	  Uganda	  and	  further	  recognized	  and	  protected	  under	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Uganda	  by	  Chapter	  IV	  –	  Article	  37;	  Chapter	  XVI	  –	  Article	  246	  (1)	  and	  (6)	  of	  1995	  and	  by	  Amendment	  [No.	  2]	  Act,	  Schedule	  V	  –	  Article	  178.8	  of	  2005	  and	  by	  the	  Act’s	  Supplement	  [No.	  4]	  Act	  6	  of	  2011.	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2012b:	  27).	  Complaints	   from	  a	  community	  representative	   from	  Ssebagoro	   landing	  site	  west	  of	  Hoima	   that	   the	  people	  of	  Bunyoro	  had	  not	  heard	  anything	  about	   region	  being	  compensated	   or	   receiving	   a	   share	   from	   the	   oil	   production,	   reinforces	   further	   the	  perception	   that	   the	   people	   are	   being	   sidelined	   in	   the	   oil	   development.	   As	   de	   Kock	  (2012b:	  27)	  note:	  “What	  emerges	  is	  a	  discourse	  of	  political	  marginalisation,	  frustration	  at	  the	  lack	  of	  consultation,	  and	  a	  perception	  that	  the	  […]	  people	  will	  not	  benefit	  from	  the	  lucrative	  oil	  resources	  that	  has	  been	  discovered”	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
4.5	  	   Conclusion	  	   This	   Chapter	   has	   assessed	   the	   origins,	   dynamics	   and	   impacts	   of	   micro-­‐regionalism	  in	  a	  very	  special	  part	  of	  East	  Africa.	  The	  emphasis	  of	  the	  analysis	  has	  looked	  beyond	  formal	  institutional	  structures	  and	  policy	  strategies	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  to	  include	  the	  underlying	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  fabric	  in	  a	  broad	  sense.	  It	  has	  shown	   the	   importance	   of	   infrastructure	   in	   development	   and	   how	   it	   is	   linked	   to	   GDP,	  wealth	  creation	  and	  market	  penetration,	  but	  also	  how	  it	  may	  influence	  and	  change	  the	  geopolitics	  of	  East	  Africa.	  By	  investigating	  the	  local	  level,	  the	  chapter	  has	  illustrated	  that	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  and	  the	  oil	  production	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  existing	  regions,	   legacies	  of	   conflict	  and	   informal	   regional	   trade	  patterns.	  The	  chapter	  has	  also	  addressed	  contradictory	  motives	  for	  regionalisation	  and	  highlighted	  the	  significant	  and	  far	  reaching	  influence	  of	  the	  carbon	  industry,	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  influence	  politicians	  and	  political	  decision-­‐making,	   to	  the	  benefit	  of	   the	  oil	  companies	  and	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  state,	   but	  more	   so	   of	   the	   people.	   It	   has	   addressed	   structural	  weaknesses	   in	   resources	  revenue	  management	  on	  both	  national	  and	  global	  levels	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  existing	  mechanisms	  are	  insufficient	  to	  ensure	  transparency	  and	  accountability.	  	   The	  chapter	  has	  also	  assessed	  the	  development	  potential	  or	  other	  consequences	  for	  the	  people	  living	  in	  the	  area.	  It	  has	  identified	  objectives,	  which	  makes	  promises	  and	  allusions	   about	   sustainable	   development	   through	   employment	   and	   improved	  livelihoods,	   and	   contradictions	   to	   these	   objectives	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   marginalised	  people	  residing	  in	  the	  corridor.	  The	  funding	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  various	  components	  in	  the	   LAPSSET	   has	   been	   scrutinised	   and	   has	   revealed	   an	   incompatibility	   between	   the	  motivations	   of	   the	   private	   sector	   and	   the	   state.	   It	   has	   thereon	   concluded	   that	   elite	  interests	  in	  the	  state	  and	  the	  oil	  companies	  are	  driving	  the	  profit-­‐maximising	  rationale	  of	  the	  LAPSSET.	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Chapter	  5	  	  
5	  	   Conclusion	  	   This	   study	   has	   focused	   upon	   regionalism	   theoretically	   and	   practically	   with	   a	  perspective	  on	   the	  regional	  oil	  and	   infrastructure	  project,	  LAPSSET	   in	  East	  Africa.	  The	  intention	  of	  the	  study	  has	  therefore	  been,	  first,	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  theoretical	  discourse	  of	   critical	   reflectivist	   theorisation	   of	   regions	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   dominant	  mainstream	  rationalist	  body	  of	   studies	  on	   the	  subject.	  Secondly,	   the	  study	  has	  made	  a	  comprehensive	   case	   study	   assessment	   of	   an	   ongoing	   regional	   project	   in	   order	   to	  demonstrate	  the	  inherent	  complexities	  and	  contradictions	  within	  regions	  and	  processes	  of	   regionalisation.	   It	   has	   subsequently	   shown	   from	   a	   historicist	   point	   of	   view	   the	  continuously	   social	   construction,	   deconstruction	   and	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   regional	  space	   under	   scrutiny,	   identified	   the	   variety	   of	   regional	   actors	   and	   the	   main	   drivers	  involved	  in	  these	  regional	  processes.	  	   The	  mainstream	  rational	  theories	  on	  regionalism	  have	  been	  dominating	  the	  area	  of	  research	  on	  regions	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  which	  makes	  the	  case	  for	  testing	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  regionalism.	  The	  rationalist	  theories	  are	  all	  to	  various	  degrees	  based	  on	  common	  assumptions	  of	  market	  orientation,	  state-­‐	  and	  Euro-­‐centrism	  and	  a	  reductionist	  presumption	  with	  a	  status	  quo-­‐bias.	  Therefore,	  as	  has	  been	  argued	  in	  this	   study,	   they	   fail	   to	   take	   into	   account	   dynamics	   and	   forces	  within	   the	   state-­‐society	  complex	  and	  are	  subsequently	  neglecting	  essential	  regional	  activity	  within	  the	  regional	  space.	   The	   activities	   and	   strategies	   in	   the	   regional	   space	   assessed	   in	   this	   study	   are	  indeed	  highly	  complex	  and	  multileveled	  and	  as	  shown	  very	  often	  in	  contradiction	  with	  each	   other.	   In	   addition,	   they	   are	   intimately	   connected	   to	   the	   historical,	   political	   and	  socially	  constructed	  patterns	  of	  society	  on	  global,	  regional	  and	  local	  dimensions.	  	  	   From	  a	  historical	  point	  of	  view	  the	  study	  has	  assessed	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  state	  society	   relations.	   From	   global	   political	   structural	   adjustment	   programmes	   (SAPs)	   to	  regional	  and	  national	  contestations	  the	  historical	  overview	  in	  this	  study	  has	  shown	  the	  connections	  between	  centre-­‐periphery	  from	  a	  global,	  regional	  and	  national	  perspective,	  and	  how	  political	  elites	  have	  manipulated	  such	  programmes	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  personal	  and	  political	   interests	   and	  power,	   also	   through	  military	   coercion.	   From	   this	   basis	   it	   is	  acknowledged	   that	   the	   political	   elites	   involved	   in	   the	   current	   regional	   projects	   are	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promoting	  regionalism	  as	  a	  means	  to	  inclusionary	  and	  participatory	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  democratic	   development.	   However,	   the	   study	   is	   sceptical	   about	   praising	   regionalism	  supported	  by	  regimes	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  and	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  nature.	  	   The	   case	   study	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	   as	   a	   case	   of	   micro-­‐regionalism	  transcends	   the	   formal	   structures	   and	  policy	   strategies	   and	   includes	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	  underlying	  socio-­‐cultural	  and	  socio-­‐economic	   fabric	  of	   the	  regional	  space.	   It	  highlights	  the	   importance	   of	   infrastructure	   in	   development,	   creation	   of	   wealth	   and	   market	  integration	  but	  it	  also	  demonstrates	  potential	  implications	  for	  the	  regional	  geo-­‐political	  situation.	   By	   including	   an	   assessment	   on	   oil	   production	   and	   the	   LAPSSET	   project	   in	  relation	   to	   the	   lower	   levels	   of	   regionalism	   it	   has	   revealed	   potential	   implications	   for	  existing	  legacies	  of	  contestation	  and	  informal	  cross	  border	  trade	  (ICBT)	  patterns.	  	   Importantly,	   the	   study	   has	   uncovered	   inconsistent	   agendas	   for	   regionalisation	  illustrated,	   not	   least,	   by	   the	   tug	   of	  war	   between	   the	  Ugandan	   government	   and	   the	   oil	  companies,	   and	   how	   the	   carbon	   industry	   has	   been	   able	   to	   influence	   the	   political	  decision-­‐making	  in	  Uganda	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  oil	  companies.	  The	  study	  has	  also	  revealed	  structural	  weaknesses	  on	  both	  global	  and	  national	  levels	  and	  its	  insufficiencies	  to	  ensure	  transparency	   and	   accountability.	   Finally	   the	   study	   has	   identified	   inconsistencies	  between	   the	   innuendoes	   of	   the	   participatory	   and	   developmental	   objectives	   and	   the	  profit-­‐maximising	  rational	  of	  the	  LAPSSET	  project.	  In	  this	  regard	  it	  makes	  for	  a	  gloomy	  perception	  at	  least	  in	  the	  core	  oil	  industry.	  This	  insight	  is	  resonated	  by	  the	  experiences	  and	  discourses	  of	  marginalisation	  and	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  area.	  	   Several	  findings	  have	  been	  made	  in	  this	  study	  of	  which	  three	  major	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn.	  First,	  the	  study	  of	  regionalism	  requires	  a	  holistic	  approach	  and	  a	  critical	  theoretical	   assessment	   that	   can	   provide	   for	   the	   historical	   origin	   of	   the	   regions	   and	  identify	  by	  whom,	   for	  whom	  and	   for	  what	  purpose	   regionalism	   is	  being	  pursued.	   It	   is	  also	   important	  to	   include	  a	  balanced	  focus	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  structures	  and	  agencies	  and	  the	  possibilities	  for	  change	  in	  this	  regard.	  This	  has	  been	  emphasised	  in	  the	  theoretical	   framework	   applied	   in	   this	   study	   in	   which	   insights	   from	   the	  World	   Order	  Approach,	  the	  New	  Regionalism	  Approach	  and	  the	  New	  Regionalisms	  Approach/weave	  world	   have	   been	   combined.	   This	   combination	   has	   been	   essential	   to	   understand	   the	  social	   and	   historical	   structures	   in	   which	   various	   regionalisms	   are	   operating	   and	  different	   regional	   actors	   are	   shaping	   the	   region	   through	   their	   actions	   and	   motives.	  Secondly,	  the	  actors	  identified	  in	  this	  study	  are	  state	  elites,	  from	  both	  within	  and	  outside	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the	  region;	  enemies	  of	  the	  state,	  such	  as	  the	  ADF	  and	  al-­‐Shabaab;	  Western	  development	  organisations,	  like	  Oil	  for	  Development;	  CSOs	  such	  as	  PWYP,	  WWF,	  Platform,	  WDM	  and	  Global	  Witness;	   oil	   companies;	   the	   local	   population	  of	   the	   area,	   reacting	   against	   these	  processes,	   creating	   communal	   land	   owners’	   associations;	   and	   the	   informal	   sector	   in	  trade	  and	  labour.	  Finally,	  this	  study	  has	  identified	  a	  mixed	  actor	  coalition	  consisting	  of	  political	   elites	   and	   external	   oil	   companies	   as	   the	   main	   drivers	   for	   regionalisation	  through	  the	  LAPSSET	  Corridor	  with	  oil	  production	  and	  exportation	  as	  the	  key	  incentive	  for	  enhanced	  regionalism.	  However,	  the	  findings	  in	  the	  study	  have	  revealed	  that	  the	  oil	  production	   has	   been	   highly	   influential	   in	   driving	   this	   regionalisation.	   The	   oil	   industry	  has	   had	   several	   functions	   in	   the	   current	   regionalisation	   in	   East	   Africa	   and	   has	   been	  elemental	   in	   the	   attraction	   of	   investors	   to	   the	   LAPSSET	   project.	   Most	   of	   the	   other	  regional	   actors	   have	   not	   been	   against	   the	   oil	   regionalisation	  per	   se,	   but	   their	   regional	  agendas	  have	  been	  defeated	  by	  the	  significant	  influence	  of	  carbon	  industry	  on	  political	  decision-­‐making.	   In	   fact,	   as	   has	   been	   thoroughly	   emphasised	   the	   LAPSSET	   is	   rather	  exclusionary	   in	   nature,	   and	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	   future	   of	   the	   project	   will	   continue	   to	  create	  conflict	  of	  interests.	  Despite	  the	  pessimistic	  predictions	  for	  the	  oil	  driven	  regional	  project,	  the	  current	  regionalisation	   in	   this	   particular	   region	   has	   revealed	   and	   made	   recognisable	   the	  perceived	  and	  real	  tensions	  and	  contradictory	  regionalisms	  in	  the	  area.	  The	  ongoing	  oil	  driven	  regionalisation	  must	  therefore	  also	  be	  understood	  as	  strengthening	  the	  agency	  of	  misrepresented	   and	   historically	  marginalised	   regional	   actors.	   CSOs	   like	   Save	   Lamu	   is	  creating	   awareness	   about	   the	   negative	   consequences	   of	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   port	  facilities	  for	  the	  people	  dependent	  on	  subsistence	  fishing.	  WWF	  attracts	  global	  attention	  to	  the	  environmental	  hazards	  of	  oil	  production,	  and	  are	  reacting	  against	  the	  secrecy	  and	  opaqueness	  of	  oil	  developments	  which	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  government	  to	  avoid	  further	  scandals.	  	   This	   study	   is	   necessarily	   incomplete	   due	   to	   the	   immaturity	   of	   the	   LAPSSET	  Corridor	  and	  the	  oil	  production	   in	   the	  region.	   It	  has	  been	  difficult	   to	   find	  relevant	  and	  reliable	   literature	  on	   the	  current	  oil	  development	  and	   the	  LAPSSET.	  Scholars	   from	  the	  school	  of	  NRA	  or	  other	  reflectivist	  branches	  have	  not	  yet	  published	  research	  on	  the	  new	  developments	  in	  the	  region.	  Most	  of	  the	  arguments	  are	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  historical	  understanding	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  region	  and	  on	  empirically	  informed	   theories	   and	   emerging	   trends.	   The	   conclusion	   is	   quite	   pessimistic,	   but	   as	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Thorbjørn	  Gaustadsæther	   (2014)	   argues	   “’structural	   changes’	   need	   time	   to	   settle’	   and	  referred	  to	  the	  oil	  county	  of	  Rogaland	  in	  western	  Norway	  as	  a	  comparison.	  If	  managed	  in	  the	   right	   and	   inclusive	   way	   the	   majority	   will	   benefit.	   As	   Cox	   (1995:	   33)	   eloquently	  argues,	   “Structures	   are	   formed	   by	   collective	   human	   activity	   over	   time.	   Structures,	   in	  turn,	  mould	  the	  thoughts	  and	  actions	  of	  individuals.	  Historical	  change	  is	  to	  be	  thought	  of	  as	   the	   reciprocal	   relationship	  of	   structures	  and	  actors.”	   It	  will	   therefore	  be	  exciting	   to	  see	  how	  the	  developments	  will	  be	  investigated	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	   This	  focus	  on	  the	  region	  in	  this	  study	  had	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  certain	  areas	  along	  the	  LAPSSET	  and	  included	  a	  historical	  overview	  of	  only	  two	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  the	  region.	  This	  was	  a	  choice	  made	  because	  of	   limited	  space	  and	  it	   is	  with	  regret	  that	   it	  could	  not	  provide	  a	  more	  broad	  based	  analysis	   for	   the	  region	  and	   include	  Ethiopia,	  South	  Sudan	  and	   Tanzania	   as	  well.	   A	   recommendation	   to	   further	   study	   is	   therefore	   to	   include	   the	  countries	  not	  analysed	  in	  this	  study.	  An	  interesting	  development	  as	  briefly	  addressed	  in	  Chapter	   4	   is	   the	   ongoing	   Tanzanian	   counterpart	   to	   the	   LAPSSET,	   the	  Mwambani	   Port	  and	   Railway	   Corridor	   (MWAPORT).	   It	   would	   have	   been	   very	   useful	   to	   make	   a	  comparison	  between	  these	  two	  corridors.	  	   A	   second	   limitation	   to	   the	   study	   is	   the	   insufficient	   attention	   devoted	   to	   civil	  society	   involvement	   in	   the	   regionalisation.	   Although	  much	   of	   the	   research	   was	  made	  possible	   because	   of	   the	   engagement	   of	   the	   civil	   society	   and	   through	   interviews,	   this	  important	   regional	   actor	   is	   underrepresented	   in	   the	   study	   and	   an	   important	  contribution	   for	   further	   research	   should	   try	   to	  demonstrate	  how	   civil	   society	   fits	   into	  the	  oil	  and	  infrastructure	  development	  and	  the	  region	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  is	  definitively	  an	  interesting	  topic	  and	  through	  the	  preparation	  for	  this	  study	  the	  plurality	  and	  ambiguity	  of	   the	  regional	  civil	  society	  was	  mentioned	  on	  several	  accounts.	  For	   instance,	  Florence	  Kyalimpa	  (2014)	  told	  me	  that	  there	  has	  developed	  a	  regional	  civil	  society	  cooperation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  oil	  discoveries	  in	  the	  region.	  	   A	   third	   recommendation	   for	   further	   study,	  which	   is	   currently	   very	   relevant	   for	  the	   region	   is	   the	   question	   about	   the	   licenses	   allocations.	   The	   license	   allocations	   are	  currently	  being	  negotiated	  and	  they	  will	  also	  be	  very	  relevant	  for	  the	  approach	  used	  in	  this	  study.	  This	  deserves	  to	  be	  put	  in	  the	  spotlight	  of	  future	  study.	  
	  
	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  88	  
Bibliography	  	  
Books,	  articles	  and	  reports	  	  ABIR,	   M.	   (1968),	   ‘Caravan	   Trade	   and	   History	   in	   the	   Northern	   Parts	   of	   Wast	   Africa,’	  
Paideuma,	  Bd.	  14:	  103-­‐120.	  	  ALVESSON,	  Mats	  &	  Kaj	  Sköldberg	  (1992),	   ‘Tolkning	  och	  Reflektion	  –	  Vetenskapsfilosofi	  och	  kvalitativ	  metod,’	  Lund:	  Studentlitteratur.	  	  ALY,	  Ahmad	  A.	  H.	  M.	   (1994),	   ‘Economic	  Cooperation	   in	  Africa:	   In	   Search	  of	  Direction’,	  Boulder:	  Lynne	  Rienned	  Publishers.	  	  AXLINE,	   Andrew	   W.	   (1977),	   ‘Underdevelopment,	   Dependence	   and	   integration:	   The	  Politics	  of	  Regionalism	  in	  the	  Third	  World’	  in	  International	  Organization,	  31(1):	  83-­‐105.	  	  AXLINE,	   Andrew	   W.	   (1996),	   ‘The	   Political	   Economy	   of	   Regional	   Cooperation:	  Comparative	  Case	  Studies’,	  London:	  Pinter	  Publishers.	  	  BACWAYO,	  Kukunda	  Elizabeth	  (2010),	   ‘Privatisation	  of	  Service	  Delivery	  and	  its	  Impact	  on	  Uganda’s	  Attainment	  of	  the	  7th	  MDG’,	  in	  The	  African	  Symposium	  10(2):	  39-­‐45.	  	  BAKEWELL,	   Oliver	   &	   Hein	   De	   Haas	   (2007),	   “African	   Migrations:	   Continuities,	  Discontinuities	   and	   Recent	   Transformations,”	   in	   Patrick	   Chabal,	   Ulf	   Engel	   and	   Leo	   de	  Haan	  (eds.),	  African	  Alternatives,	  Leiden:	  Brill.	  	  BALDWIN,	   Richard,	   Daniel	   Cohen,	   Andre	   Sapir	   &	   Anthony	   Venables	   (eds.)	   (1999),	  ‘Market	   integration,	   Regionalism	   and	   the	   Global	   Economy’,	   Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  BALDWIN,	  Richard	  &	  Charles	  Wyplosz	  (2012),	  ‘The	  Economics	  of	  European	  Integration’,	  Fourth	  Edition,	  London:	  McGraw-­‐Hill	  Higher	  Education.	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  89	  
BARKAN,	   Joel	   (2004),	   ‘Kenya	   After	   Moi:	   An	   Insecure	   Partner’,	   in	   Foreign	   Affairs	  (January/February	  Issue).	  -­‐ &	  Michael	  Chege	  (1989),	  ‘Decentralising	  the	  State:	  District	  Focus	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	   Reallocation	   in	  Kenya’,	   in	  The	   Journal	   of	  Modern	  African	   Studies,	   27(3):	   431-­‐453.	  	  BELASSA,	  Béla	  A.	  (1961),	  ‘The	  Theory	  of	  Economic	  Integration’,	  Homewood:	  R.	  D.	  Irwin.	  -­‐ (1967),	   ‘Trade	  Creation	  and	  Trade	  Diversion	   in	  the	  European	  Common	  Market’,	  in	  Economic	  Journal,	  77(305):	  1-­‐21.	  -­‐ (1975),	   ‘European	  Economic	  Integration’,	  Amsterdam:	  North-­‐Holland	  Publishing	  Company.	  	  BLAIKIE,	   Norman	   (2004),	   ‘Hypothetico-­‐Deductive	   Method’,	   in	   Michael	   S.	   Lewis-­‐Beck,	  Alan	  Bryman	  &	  Tim	  Futing	  Liao	  (eds.),	  The	  SAGE	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Social	  Science	  Research	  
Methods,	  London:	  Sage	  Publications,	  Inc.	  	  BØÅS,	  Morten,	  Marianne	  H.	  Marchand	  &	  Timothy	  M.	   Shaw	   (1999),	   ‘The	  Weave-­‐world:	  Regionalisms	   in	   the	   South	   in	   the	   New	   Millennium’,	   Special	   issue	   of	   Third	   World	  
Quarterly,	  20(5):	  1061-­‐70.	  -­‐ (2003),	   ‘The	  Weave-­‐World:	  The	  Regional	   Interweaving	  of	  Economies,	   Ideas	  and	  Identities’,	   in	   Fredik	   Söderbaum	   &	   Timothy	   M.	   Shaw	   (eds.),	   Theories	   of	   New	  
Regionalism:	  A	  Palgrave	  Reader,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  -­‐ (2005),	   ‘The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Regions	  and	  Regionalisms:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  our	   Critical,	   Revisionist	   Inquiries’	   in	   Morten	   Bøås,	   Marianne	   H.	   Marchand	   &	  Timothy	   M.	   Shaw	   (eds.),	   The	   Political	   Economy	   of	   Regions	   and	   Regionalism,	  Basingstoke:	  Pagrave	  Macmillan.	  	  BIELER,	  Andreas	  &	  Adam	  David	  Morton	  (2001),	  ‘The	  Gordian	  Knot	  of	  Agency-­‐Structure	  in	   International	   Relations:	   A	   Neo-­‐Gramscian	   Perspective’,	   in	   European	   Journal	   of	  
International	  Relations,	  7(5):	  5-­‐35.	  	  BRANCH,	   Daniel	   &	   Nic	   Cheeseman	   (2008),	   ‘Democratization,	   Sequencing,	   and	   State	  Failure	  in	  Africa:	  Lessons	  from	  Kenay’,	  in	  African	  Affaifs,	  108(430):	  1-­‐26.	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  90	  
	  BRANCH,	   Daniel,	   Nic	   Cheeseman	   &	   Leigh	   Gardner	   (eds.)	   (2010),	   ‘Our	   Time	   to	   Eat:	  Politics	  in	  Kenya	  since	  1950’,	  Berlin:	  LIT	  Verlag.	  	  BRESLIN,	   Shaun,	   Richard	   Higgott	   &	   Ben	   Rosamond	   (2002),	   ‘Regions	   in	   Comparative	  Perspective’,	  CSGR	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  107/02,	  Warwick:	  1-­‐31.	  	  BURGESS,	  Michael	  (2009),	  ‘Federalism’,	  in	  Antje	  Wiener	  &	  Thomas	  Diez	  (eds.),	  European	  
Integration	  Theory,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  BURLEY,	  A.-­‐M.	  &	  Walter	  Mattli	   (1993),	   ‘Europe	  Before	   the	  Court:	  A	  Political	  Theory	  of	  Legal	  Integration’,	  in	  International	  Organization,	  47(1):	  41-­‐76.	  	  BUZAN,	   Barry	   (1991),	   ‘People,	   States	   and	   Fear:	   An	   Agenda	   for	   International	   Security	  Studies	   in	   the	   Post-­‐Cold	   War	   Era,	   Second	   Edition,	   Hemel	   Hempstead:	   Harvester	  Wheatsheaf.	  	  CABLE,	  Vincent	  &	  David	  Henderson	  (eds.)	  (1994),	  ‘Trade	  Blocs?	  The	  Future	  of	  Regional	  Integration’,	  London:	  Royal	  Institute	  of	  International	  Affairs.	  	  COLEMAN,	  William	  D.	  &	  Geoffrey	  R.	  D.	  Underhill	  (eds.)	  (1998),	   ‘Regionalism	  and	  global	  Economic	  Integration:	  Europe,	  Asia	  and	  the	  Americas’,	  London:	  Routledge.	  	  COOPER,	   Andrew,	   Chris	   Hughes	   and	   Philippe	   de	   Lombaerde	   (eds.)	   (2008),	  ‘Regionalization	  and	  the	  Taming	  of	  Globalization’,	  London:	  Routledge.	  	  CORNETT,	  Linda	  &	  James	  A.	  Caporaso	  (1992),	   ‘”And	  still	   it	  moves!”	  State	  Interests	  and	  Social	  Forces	  in	  the	  European	  Community’,	  in	  James	  N.	  Rosenau	  &	  Ernest-­‐Otto	  Czempiel	  (eds.),	  Governance	  Without	  Government:	  Order	  and	  Change	  in	  World	  Politics,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  COX,	   Robert	   W.	   (1979),	   ‘Ideologies	   and	   the	   New	   International	   Economic	   Order:	  Reflections	  on	  Some	  Recent	  Literature’,	  in	  International	  Organization,	  33(2):	  257-­‐302.	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  91	  
-­‐ (1981),	  ‘Social	  Forces,	  States,	  and	  World	  Orders:	  Beyond	  International	  Relations	  Theory’,	  in	  Millennium	  Journal	  of	  International	  Studies,	  10(2):	  126-­‐155.	  -­‐ (1983),	  ‘Gramsci,	  Hegemony	  and	  International	  Relations:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Method’,	  in	  
Millennium:	  Journal	  of	  International	  Studies,	  12(2):	  162-­‐175.	  -­‐ (1987),	   ‘Production,	   Power,	   and	   World	   Order:	   Social	   Forces	   in	   the	   Making	   of	  History’,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  -­‐ (1993),	   ‘Structural	   Issues	   of	   Global	   Governance:	   Implications	   for	   Europe’,	   in	  Stephen	   Gill	   (ed.),	   Gramsci,	   Hegemony	   and	   International	   Relations,	   Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  -­‐ (1995),	   ‘Critical	  Political	  Economy’,	   in	  Björn	  Hettne	   (ed.),	   International	  Political	  
Economy:	  Understanding	  Global	  Disorder,	  Halifax:	  Fernwood	  Publishing.	  -­‐ (1996),	   ‘Global	  Perestroika’,	   in	  Robert	  W	  Cox	   (ed.),	  Approaches	   to	  World	  Order,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  -­‐ (1999),	  ‘Civil	  Society	  at	  the	  Turn	  of	  the	  Millenium:	  Prospects	  for	  and	  Alternative	  World	  Order’,	  in	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	  25(1):	  3-­‐28.	  -­‐ (2004),	  ‘Beyond	  Empire	  and	  Terror:	  Critical	  reflections	  on	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  World	  Order’	  in	  New	  Political	  Economy,	  9(3):	  307-­‐323.	  	  CROOK,	   Richard	   (2002),	   ‘Decentralisation	   and	   Good	   Governance’	   published	   by	   the	  
Forum	  of	  Federations,	  available	  online:	  http://www.forumfed.org/en/libdocs/IntConfFed02/StG-­‐Crook.pdf	  	  DE	  KOCK,	  Petrus	  (2012a),	   ‘Historical	  Background:	  Warriors	   in	  Politics	  and	  Prophets	   in	  the	   Bush’,	   in	   Petrus	   de	   Kock	   &	   Kathryn	   Sturman	   (eds.),	   The	   Power	   of	   Oil:	   Charting	  
Uganda’s	  Transition	  to	  a	  Petro-­State,	  SAIIA	  Research	  Report	  10,	  Governance	  of	  Africa’s	  Research	  Programme	  (March).	  -­‐ (2012b),	   ‘Discourses	   of	   Marginalisation	   and	   Uncertainty	   in	   the	   Lake	   Albert	  Region:	  A	  Report	  from	  the	  Field’,	  in	  Petrus	  de	  Kock	  &	  Kathryn	  Sturman	  (eds.),	  The	  
Power	  of	  Oil:	  Charting	  Uganda’s	  Transition	  to	  a	  Petro-­State,	  SAIIA	  Research	  Report	  10,	  Governance	  of	  Africa’s	  Research	  Programme	  (March).	  -­‐ (2012c),	  ‘Fuelling	  or	  Dousing	  Regional	  Fires?	  Uganda’s	  Rising	  Power	  in	  Africa’	  in	  Petrus	   de	  Kock	  &	  Kathryn	   Sturman	   (eds.),	  The	   Power	   of	   Oil:	   Charting	  Uganda’s	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  92	  
Transition	   to	   a	   Petro-­State,	   SAIIA	   Research	   Report	   10,	   Governance	   of	   Africa’s	  Research	  Programme	  (March).	  	  DELL,	   Sidney	   S.	   (1966),	   ‘A	   Latin	   American	   Common	   Marcet?’,	   New	   York:	   Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  DE	  MELO,	   Jamie	  &	  Arvind	   Panagariya	   (1992),	   ‘The	  New	  Regionalism	   in	   Trade	   Policy’,	  Washington	  D.C.:	  World	  Bank.	  	  DICKOVICK,	  J.	  Tyler	  (2013),	  ‘Africa	  2013’,	  Lanham:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield.	  	  ERDMANN,	  Gero	  	  &	  Ulf	  Engel	  (2006),	  ‘Neopatrimonialism	  Revisited	  –	  Beyond	  a	  Catch-­‐All	  Concept’,	  Working	   Paper	   to	   the	   GIGA	  Research	   Program:	   Legitimacy	   and	   Efficiency	   of	  Political	  Systems.	  	  ETZIONI,	   Amitai	   (1965),	   ‘Political	   Unification:	   A	   Comparative	   Study	   of	   Leaders	   and	  Forces’,	  New	  York:	  Holt,	  Rinehart	  and	  Winston.	  	  FARRELL,	   Mary,	   Björn	   Hettne	   and	   Luk	   van	   Langenhove	   (eds.)	   (2005),	   ‘The	   Global	  Politics	  of	  Regionalism:	  Theory	  and	  Practice’,	  London:	  Pluto	  Press.	  	  FAWCETT,	  Louise	  (2005),	  ‘Regionalism	  from	  an	  Historical	  Perspective’,	  in	  Mary	  Farrell,	  Björn	  Hettne	  and	  Luk	  Van	  Langenhove	  (eds.),	  Global	  Politics	  of	  Regionalism:	  Theory	  and	  
Practice,	  London:	  Pluto	  Press.	  	  FEAVER,	  Peter	  D.	  (1999),	  ‘Civil-­‐Military	  Relations’,	  in	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Political	  Science,	  2(1):	  211-­‐241.	  	  GAMBLE,	   Andrew	   &	   Anthony	   Payne	   (1996),	   ‘Conclusion:	   The	   New	   Regionalism’	   in	  Andrew	   Gamble	   &	   Anthony	   Payne	   (eds.),	   Regionalism	   &	   World	   Order,	   Basingstoke:	  Macmillan	  Press	  Ltd.	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  93	  
-­‐ (2003),	   ‘The	  World	  Order	  Approach’	   in	  Fredrik	  Söderbaum	  &	  Timothy	  M.	  Shaw	  (eds.),	   Theories	   of	   New	   Regionalism:	   A	   Palgrave	   Reader,	   Basingstoke:	   Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  	  GATHII,	   James	   Thuo	   (2009),	   ‘African	   Regional	   trade	   Agreements	   as	   Flexible	   Legal	  Regimes’,	  Albany	  Law	  School,	  Working	  Papers	  Series	  No.	  20	  of	  2009.	  	  GERTZ,	  Geoffrey	  (2009),	  ‘Kenya’s	  Trade	  Liberalization	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s:	  Policies,	  Impacts,	  and	  Implications’,	  Background	  paper	  for	  the	  report	  The	  Doha	  Round	  on	  Kenya,	  Wolfensohn	  Center	  for	  Development,	  Brookings	  Institution.	  	  GHAI,	   Yash	   (2008),	   ‘Devolution:	   Restructering	   the	  Kenyan	   State’,	   in	   Journal	   of	   Eastern	  
African	  Studies,	  2(2):	  211-­‐226.	  	  GIBB,	  Richard	  (2009),	  ‘Regional	  Integration	  and	  Africa’s	  Development	  Trajectory:	  meta-­‐theories,	  expectations	  and	  reality’,	  in	  Third	  World	  Quarterly,	  30(4):	  701-­‐721.	  	  GILL,	   Stephen	   (1995),	   ‘Theorizing	   the	   Interregnum:	  The	  Double	  Movement	  and	  Global	  Politics	   in	   the	   1990s’,	   in	   Björn	   Hettne	   (ed.),	   International	   Political	   economy:	  
Understanding	  Global	  Disorder,	  Halifax:	  Fernwood	  Publishing.	  	  GILPIN,	   Robert	   (1987),	   ‘The	   Political	   Economy	   of	   International	   Relations’,	   Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  	  GRANT,	  J.	  Andrew	  &	  Fredrik	  Söderbaum	  (2003),	  ‘Introduction:	  The	  New	  Regionalism	  in	  Africa’,	  in	  J.	  Andrew	  Grant	  &	  Fredrik	  Söderbaum	  (eds.),	  ‘The	  New	  Regionalism	  in	  Africa’,	  Aldershot:	  Ashgate.	  	  GREEN,	   Elliott	   (2008),	   ‘District	   Creation	   and	  Decentralisation	   in	  Uganda’,	   Crisis	   States	  Working	   Paper	   No.	   24,	   Development	   as	   State-­Making,	   London	   School	   of	   Economics,	  available	  online:	  http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP242.pdf	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  94	  
	  GRIECO,	  Joseph	  M.	  (1995),	  ‘The	  Mastricht	  Treaty,	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  and	  the	  Neo-­‐Realist	  Research	  Programme’,	  in	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	  21(1):	  21-­‐40.	  -­‐ (1997),	  ‘Systemic	  Sources	  of	  variation	  in	  Regional	  Institutionalization	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  Asia	  and	  the	  Americas’	   in	  Edward	  L	  Mansfield	  &	  Helen	  V.	  Milner	  (eds.),	  
The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Regionalism,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  	  HAARLOV,	   Jens	   (1997),	   ‘Regional	   Cooperation	   and	   Integration	   within	   Industry	   and	  Trade	   in	   Southern	   Africa:	   general	   approaches,	   SADECC	   and	   the	   World	   Bank.	   –	   (The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Africa)’,	  Aldershot:	  Avebury.	  	  HAAS,	   Ernst	   B.	   (1961),	   ‘International	   Integration:	   The	   European	   and	   the	   Universal	  Process’,	  in	  international	  Organization,	  24(4):	  606-­‐646.	  -­‐ (1964),	  ‘Beyond	  the	  Nation-­‐State’,	  Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  -­‐ (1967),	   ‘The	   Uniting	   of	   Europe	   and	   the	   Uniting	   of	   Latin	   America’,	   in	   Journal	   of	  
Common	  Market	  Studies,	  5(4):	  315-­‐343.	  	  HANSEN,	  Roger	  D.	  (1969),	  ‘Regional	  Integration:	  Reflections	  on	  a	  Decade	  of	  Theoretical	  Efforts’,	  in	  World	  Politics,	  21(2):	  242-­‐271.	  	  HANSEN,	   Thomas	   (2009),	   ‘Governing	   the	   Extractive	   Industries:	   The	   Extractive	  Industries	   Transparency	   Initiative	   (EITI)	   and	   Voluntary	   Principles	   on	   Security	   and	  Human	  Rights	  as	  Transnational	  Regimes’,	  paper	  presented	  at	  the	  annual	  meeting	  of	  the	  ISA’s	  50th	  Annual	  Convention	  (15	  February),	  Exploring	  the	  Past,	  Anticipating	  the	  Future,	  New	  York	  Marriott	  Marquis,	  New	  York,	  available	  online:	  http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/2/2/8/p312282_index.html	  	  HENN,	   Matt,	   Mark	   Weinstein	   &	   Nick	   Foard	   (eds.)	   (2009),	   ‘A	   Critical	   Introduction	   to	  Social	  Research’,	  London:	  Sage	  Publications.	  	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  95	  
HETTNE,	   Björn	   (1993),	   ‘Neo-­‐Mercantilism:	   The	   Pursuit	   of	   Regionness’	   in	   Cooperation	  
and	  Conflict,	  28(3):	  211-­‐232.	  -­‐ (1994),	  ‘The	  New	  Regionalism:	  Implications	  for	  Development	  and	  Peace’,	  in	  Björn	  Hettne	   and	   Andreas	   Inotai,	   The	   New	   Regionalism:	   Implications	   for	   Global	  
Development	  and	  International	  Security,	  Helsinki:	  UNU/WIDER.	  -­‐ (1997),	   ‘Development,	   Security	   and	   World	   Order:	   A	   Regionalist	   Approach’,	   in	  
European	  Journal	  of	  Development	  Research,	  9(1):	  83-­‐109.	  -­‐ (1999a),	   ‘The	   New	   Regionalism:	   A	   Prologue’,	   in	   Björn	   Hettne,	   András	   Inotai	   &	  Osvaldo	   Sunkel,	   Globalism	   and	   the	   New	   Regionalism,	   Basingstoke:	   Macmillan	  Press	  Ltd.	  -­‐ (1999b),	   ‘Globalization	   and	   the	   New	   Regionalism:	   The	   Second	   Great	  Transformation’	   in	   Björn	   Hettne,	   András	   Inotai	   &	   Osvaldo	   Sunkel	   (eds.),	  
Globalism	  and	  the	  New	  Regionalism,	  Basingstoke:	  Macmillan	  Press	  Ltd.	  -­‐ (2003),	   ‘The	   New	   Regionalism	   Revisited’,	   in	   Fredrik	   Söderbaum	  &	   Timothy	  M.	  Shaw	   (eds.),	   Theories	   of	   New	   Regionalism:	   A	   Palgrave	   Reader,	   Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  -­‐ (2004),	  ‘Foreword	  by	  Björn	  Hettne,’	  in	  Fredrik	  Söderbaum,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  
of	  Regionalism:	  The	  Case	  of	  Southern	  Africa,	  Houndmills,	  Basingstoke,	  Hampshire	  and	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  -­‐ (2005),	   ‘Beyond	   the	   ‘New’	   Regionalism’,	   in	  New	   Political	   Economy,	   10(4):	   543-­‐571.	  -­‐ &	   András	   Inotai	   (1994),	   ‘The	   New	   Regionalism:	   Implications	   for	   Global	  Development	  and	  International	  Security’,	  Helsinki:	  UNU/WIDER.	  -­‐ András	   Inotai	   &	   Osvaldo	   Sunkel	   (eds.)	   (1999),	   ‘Globalism	   and	   the	   New	  Regionalism’,	  Basingstoke:	  Macmillan	  Press	  Ltd.	  -­‐ (2001),	   ‘Editors’	   Introduction’,	   in	  Björn	  Hettne,	  András	   Inotai	  &	  Osvaldo	  Sunkel	  (eds.),	  Comparing	  Regionalisms:	  Implications	  for	  Global	  Development,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  -­‐ &	  Fredrik	  Söderbaum	  (1998),	  ‘The	  New	  Regionalism	  Approach’,	  in	  Politeia,	  17(3):	  6-­‐21.	  -­‐ (2000),	  ‘Theorising	  the	  Rise	  of	  Regionness’,	  in	  New	  Political	  Economy,	  5(3):	  457-­‐472.	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  96	  
-­‐ (2008),	   ‘The	   Future	   of	   Regionalism:	   Old	   Divides,	   New	   Frontiers’,	   in	   Andrew	   F.	  Cooper,	  Christopher	  W.	  Hughes	  &	  Philippe	  De	  Lombaerde	  (eds.),	  Regionalisation	  
and	  Global	  Governance:	  The	  Taming	  of	  Globalisation?,	  London:	  Routledge.	  	  HOFFMANN,	   Stanley	   (1964),	   ‘The	   European	   Process	   at	   Atlantic	   Crosspurposes’	   in	  
Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies,	  3(3):	  85-­‐101.	  -­‐ (1966),	   ‘”Obstinate	   or	   Obsolete?”	   The	   Fate	   of	   the	   Nation	   State	   and	   the	   Case	   of	  Western	  Europe’	  in	  Daedalus,	  95(3):	  862-­‐915.	  	  HORNSBY,	  Charles	  (2012),	  ‘Kenya:	  A	  History	  Since	  Independence’,	  London:	  I.	  B.	  Tauris	  &	  Co	  Ltd.	  	  HOUT,	  Wil	   (1999),	   ‘Theories	   of	   International	   Relations	   and	   the	   New	   Regionalism’,	   in	  Jean	   Grugel	   &	   Wil	   Hout	   (eds.),	   Regionalism	   Across	   the	   North/South	   Divide:	   State	  
Strategies	  and	  Globalization,	  London:	  Routledge.	  	  IHONVBERE,	   Julius	   Omozuanvbo	   (1996),	   ‘Economic	   Crisis,	   Civil	   Society,	   and	  Democratization:	  The	  Case	  of	  Zambia’,	  Asmara:	  Africa	  World	  Press,	  Inc.	  	  IKOME,	   Francis	   Nguendi	   (2004),	   ‘From	   the	   Lagos	   Plan	   of	   Action	   (LPA)	   to	   the	   New	  Partnership	   for	   Africa’s	   Development	   (NEPAD):	   The	   Political	   Economy	   of	   African	  Regional	  Initiatives’,	  PhD	  thesis	  in	  International	  relations,	  University	  of	  Witwatersrand.	  	  JEROME,	   Afeikhena	   (2004),	   ‘Infrastructure	   Privatization	   and	   Liberalization	   in	   Africa:	  The	   Quest	   for	   the	   Holy	   Grail	   or	   Coup	   de	   grace?’,	   article	   submitted	   for	   the	   4th	  
Mediterranean	  Seminar	  on	   International	  Development	   (September)	   at	   the	  University	  of	  Balearic	  Islands,	  Palma	  de	  Mallorca.	  	  JOURDAN,	   Paul	   (1998),	   ‘Spatial	   Development	   Initiatives	   (SDIs)	   –	   the	   Official	   View’,	   in	  
Development	  Southern	  Africa,	  15(5):	  717-­‐25.	  	  KALANDE,	   William	   (2008),	   ‘Kenya	   Land	   Disputes	   in	   the	   Context	   of	   Social	   Conflict	  Theories’,	   paper	   prepared	   for	   the	   FIG	   Commission	   7th	   Annual	   Meeting	   and	   Open	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  97	  
Symposium	   on	   Environment	   and	   Land	   Administration:	   ‘Big	   Works	   for	   Defence	   of	   the	  Territory’	  (11-­‐15	  September),	  Verona.	  	  KANYINGA,	   Karuti	   (2011),	   ‘Contradictions	   in	   Neoliberalism:	   Donors,	   Human	   Rights	  NGOs,	   and	   Governance	   in	   Kenya’,	   in	   Makau	   Mutua	   (ed.),	  Human	   Rights	   NGOs	   in	   East	  
Africa:	  Political	  and	  Normative	  Tensions,	  Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press.	  	  KATHMAN,	   Jacob	   &	   Megan	   Shannon	   (2011),	   ‘Oil	   Extraction	   and	   the	   Potential	   for	  Domestic	  Instability	  in	  Uganda’,	  in	  African	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  12(3):	  23-­‐45.	  	  KATUMANGA,	   Musambayi	   (2005),	   ‘A	   City	   Under	   Siege:	   Banditry	   &	   Modes	   of	  Accumulation	   in	  Nairobi,	   1991-­‐2004’,	   in	  Review	  of	  African	  Political	   Economy,	   32(106):	  505-­‐520.	  	  KEOHANE,	   Robert	   O.	   (1989),	   ‘Neoliberal	   Institutionalism:	   A	   Perspective	   on	   World	  Politics’	   in	   Robert	   O.	   Keohane,	   International	   Institutions	   and	   State	   Power:	   Essays	   in	  
International	  Relations	  Theory’,	  Boulder:	  Westview	  Press.	  -­‐ &	  Joseph	  Nye	  (1977),	  ‘Power	  and	  Interdependence:	  World	  Politics	  in	  Transition’,	  Boston:	  Little	  Brown.	  	  KHISA,	   Caleb	   M.	   &	   Peter	   Oesterdiekhoff	   (2012),	   ‘Regional	   Disparities	   and	  Marginalisation	  in	  Kenya’,	  a	  publication	  for	  the	  Friedrich	  Ebert	  Stiftung,	  available	  online:	  http://www.fes-­‐kenya.org/media/publications/2013/Regional%20Disparities%20Book.pdf	  	  KLOPP,	   Jacqueline	   M.	   (2000),	   ‘Pilfering	   the	   Public:	   The	   Problem	   of	   Land	   Grabbing	   in	  Contemporary	  Kenya’,	  in	  Africa	  Today,	  47(1):	  7-­‐26.	  	  KORIR,	   Julius	   &	   Urbanus	   Kioko	   (2009),	   ‘Evidence	   of	   the	   Impact	   of	   IMF	   Fiscal	   and	  Monetary	   Policies	   on	   the	   Capacity	   to	   Address	   HIV/AIDS	   and	   TB	   Crises	   in	   Kenya’	   a	  CEGAA	  and	  REF	  report,	  available	  online:	  http://www.results.org/uploads/files/Kenya_IMF_Report.pdf	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  98	  
LEE,	   Margaret	   C.	   (2002),	   ‘Regionalism	   in	   Africa:	   A	   Part	   of	   the	   Problem	   or	   Part	   of	  Solution”,	  in	  Polis/R.C.S.P./C.P.S.R,	  Vol.	  9,	  Numéro	  Spécial.	  -­‐ (2003),	   ‘The	   Political	   Economy	   of	   Regionalism	   in	   Southern	  Africa’,	   Cape	   Town:	  University	  of	  Cape	  Town	  Press.	  	  LEYSENS,	   Anthony	   (2000),	   ‘Critical	   Theory	   and	   the	   Southern	   African	   Region:	   A	  Framework	  for	  Discovery?’,	  in	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  African	  Studies,	  18(2):	  265-­‐276.	  -­‐ (2008),	   ‘The	   Critical	   Theory	   of	   Robert	  W.	   Cox:	   Fugitive	   or	   Guru?’,	   Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  	  LINDBERG,	   Leon	   N.	   &	   Stuart	   A.	   Scheingold	   (1970),	   ‘Regional	   Integration:	   Theory	   and	  Research’,	  Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  	  MANJI,	   Ambreena	   (2012),’	   The	   Grabbed	   State:	   Lawyers,	   Politics	   and	   Public	   Land	   in	  Kenya’,	  in	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  African	  Studies	  59(3):	  467-­‐492.	  	  MANSFIELD,	   Edward	   D.	   &	   Helen	   V.	   Milner	   (eds.)	   (1997),	   ‘The	   Political	   Economy	   of	  Regionalism’,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  	  MARCHAND,	  Marianne,	  Morten	  Bøås	  &	  Timothy	  M.	  Shaw	  (1999),	  ‘The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Regionalisms’,	  in	  Third	  World	  Quarterly,	  20(5):	  897-­‐910.	  	  MASON,	   Jennifer	   (2004),	   ‘Semistructured	   Interview’,	   in	   Michael	   S.	   Lewis-­‐Beck,	   Alan	  Bryman	   &	   Tim	   Futing	   Liao	   (eds.),	   The	   SAGE	   Encyclopedia	   of	   Social	   Science	   Research	  
Methods,	  London:	  SAGE	  Publications,	  Inc.	  	  MATTLI,	  W.	  (1999),	  ‘The	  Logic	  of	  Regional	  Integration:	  Europe	  and	  Beyond,’	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  MELO,	   Jaime	   &	   Arvind	   Panagariya	   (eds.)	   (1993),	   ‘New	   Dimensions	   in	   Regional	  Integration’,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  99	  
MISTRY,	   Percy	   S.	   (2003),	   ‘New	   Regionalism	   and	   Economic	   Development’	   in	   Fredrik	  Söderbaum	  &	  Timothy	  M.	  Shaw	  (eds.),	  Theories	  of	  New	  Regionalism:	  A	  Palgrave	  Reader,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  	  MITCHINSON,	   Robin	   (2003),	   ‘Devolution	   in	   Uganda:	   an	   Experiment	   in	   Local	   Service	  Delivery’,	  in	  Public	  Administration	  and	  Development,	  23(3):	  241-­‐248.	  	  MITRANY,	  David	  (1966	  [1946]),	  ‘A	  Working	  Peace	  System’,	  Chicago:	  Quadrangle	  Books.	  	  MITTELMAN,	   James	   H.	   (1996),	   ‘Rethinking	   the	   “New	   Regionalism”	   in	   the	   Context	   of	  Globalization’,	  in	  Global	  Governance,	  2(2):	  189-­‐213.	  -­‐ (2000),	  ‘The	  Globalization	  Syndrome:	  Transformation	  and	  Resistance’,	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  	  MOOLAKKATTU,	   John	   S.	   (2009),	   ‘Robert	  W.	   Cox	   and	   Critical	   Theory	   on	   International	  Relations’	  in	  International	  Studies,	  46(4):	  439-­‐456.	  	  MORAVCSIK,	   Andrew	   (1991),	   ‘Negotiating	   the	   Single	   European	  Act:	  National	   Interests	  and	  Conventional	  Statecraft	  in	  The	  European	  Community’	  in	  International	  Organization,	  45(1):	  19-­‐56.	  -­‐ (1998),	   ‘The	  Choice	   for	  Europe:	  Social	  Purpose	  &	  State	  Power	   from	  Messinal	   to	  Maastricht’,	  New	  York:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  	  MUELLER,	   Susanne	   D.	   (2008),	   ‘The	   Political	   Economy	   of	   Kenya’s	   Crisis’,	   in	   Journal	   of	  
Eastern	  African	  Studies,	  2(2):	  185-­‐210.	  	  MUNDELL,	  Robert	  A.	   (1961),	   ‘A	  Theory	  of	  Optimum	  Currency	  Areas’,	   in	  The	  American	  
Economic	  Review,	  51(4):	  657-­‐665.	  	  MURIISA,	  Roberts	  Kabeba	  (2008),	   ‘Decentralisation	  in	  Uganda:	  Prospects	  for	  Improved	  Service	  Delivery’,	  in	  African	  Development,	  Vol.	  XXXIII,	  No.	  4:	  83-­‐95.	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  100	  
MWENDA,	  Andrew	  M.	  &	  Roger	  Tangri	   (2005),	   ‘Patronage	  Politics,	  Donor	  Reforms	  and	  Regime	  Consolidation	  in	  Uganda’,	  in	  African	  Affairs,	  104(416:	  449-­‐469.	  	  MWENZWA,	  Ezekiel	  Mbitha	  &	  Joseph	  Akuma	  Misati	  (2014),	  ‘Kenya’s	  Social	  Development	  Proposals	  and	  Challenges:	  Review	  of	  Kenya	  Vision	  2030	  First	  Medium-­‐Term	  Plan,	  2008-­‐2012”	  in	  American	  International	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  Research,	  4(1):	  246-­‐253.	  	  N’DIAYE,	  Boubacar	   (2002),	   ‘How	  Not	   to	   Institutionalize	  Civilian	  Control:	  Kenya’s	  Coup	  Prevention	  Strategies,	  1964-­‐1997’,	  in	  Armed	  Forces	  &	  Society,	  28(4):	  619-­‐640.	  	  NEUMANN,	   Iver	   B.	   (2003),	   ‘A	   Region-­‐Building	   Approach’	   in	   Fredrik	   Söderbaum	   &	  Timothy	  M.	  Shaw	  (eds.),	  Theories	  of	  New	  Regionalism:	  A	  Palgrave	  Reader,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  	  NIEMANN,	  Arne	  &	  Philippe	  C.	   Schmitter	   (2009),	   ‘Neofunctionalism’	   in	  Antje	  Wiener	  &	  Thomas	  Diez	   (eds.),	  Theories	  of	  European	   Integration,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2nd	  Edition.	  (A	  preliminary	  version	  of	  the	  chapter):	  1-­‐29.	  	  NUNOW,	  Abdirrizak	  Arale	   (2012),	   ‘The	  Displacement	   and	  Dispossession	   of	   the	  Aweer	  (Boni)	  Community:	   the	  Kenya	  Government	  Dilemma	  on	   the	  New	  Port	  of	   Lamu’,	   paper	  presented	  at	  the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Global	  Land	  Grabbing	  II	  (17-­‐19	  October),	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University.	  	  NYE,	   Joseph	  (1968),	   ‘Comparative	  Regional	   Integration:	  Concept	  and	  Measurement’,	   in	  
International	  Organization,	  22(4):	  855-­‐880.	  -­‐ (1970),	   ‘Comparing	   Common	   Markets:	   A	   Revised	   Neo-­‐Functionalist	   Model’,	   in	  
International	  Organization,	  24(4).	  796-­‐835.	  -­‐ (1971),	   ‘Peace	   in	   Parts:	   Integration	   and	   Conflict	   in	   Regional	   Organization’,	  Boston:	  Little,	  Brown	  and	  Company.	  	  OBALA,	  Luke	  M.	  (2012),	  “South	  Sudan	  and	  Kenya:	  The	  Relationships,”	  Al	  Jazeera	  Centre	  for	  Studies.	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  101	  
OJAMBO,	   Henry	   (2012),	   ‘Decentralisation	   in	   Africa:	   A	   Critical	   Review	   of	   Uganda’s	  Experience’,	   in	   Potchefstroomse	   Electronise	   Regsblad	   (PER)/Potcheftsroom	   Elecrtonic	  
Law	  Journal	  (PELJ),	  15(2):	  70-­‐88.	  	  OKIDI,	   John	  A.	  &	  Madina	  Guloba	  (2006),	   ‘Decentralization	  and	  Development:	  Emerging	  Issues	   from	  Uganda’s	  Experience’,	   Economic	  Policy	  Research	  Centre,	  Occasional	  Paper	  No.	  31.	  	  OLIVIER,	   Gerrit	   (2010),	   ‘Regionalism	   in	   Africa:	   Cooperation	   Without	   Integration?’,	  Research	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Mercury	  Project.	  	  OMARA-­‐OTUNNU,	   Amii	   (1987),	   ‘Politics	   and	   the	   Military	   in	   Uganda,	   1890-­‐1985’,	  Basingstoke:	  MacMillan.	  	  ØSTERGAARD,	  Tom	  (1993),	  ‘Classic	  Models	  of	  Regional	  Integration	  –	  what	  Relevance	  for	  Southern	   Africa?’	   pp.	   27-­‐47	   in	   Bertil	   Oden	   (ed.),	   Southern	   Africa	   After	   Apartheid:	  
Regional	   Integration	   and	  External	  Resources’,	   Seminar	  Proceedings	  No	  28,	  Upsala:	   The	  Scandinavian	  Institute	  of	  African	  Studies.	  	  PAGE,	  John	  (2012),	  ‘Why	  Intra-­‐African	  Trade	  Matters:	  Working	  Locally	  to	  Go	  Global’,	  in	  Mwangi	   S.	   Kimenyi,	   Zenia	   A.	   Lewis	   &	   Brandon	   Routman	   (eds.),	   Accelerating	   Growth	  
through	  Improved	  Intra-­African	  Trade,	  report	  by	  Brookings	  Africa	  Growth	  Initiative.	  	  PAYNE,	   Anthony	   &	   Andrew	   Gamble	   (1996),	   ‘Introduction:	   The	   Political	   Economy	   of	  Regionalism	  and	  World	  Order’,	  in	  Andrew	  Gamble	  &	  Anthony	  Payne	  (eds.),	  Regionalism	  
&	  World	  Order’,	  New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press.	  	  PILEGAARD,	  Jess	  &	  Michael	  Kluth	  (nd.),	  ‘To	  Be	  or	  Not	  to	  Be:	  A	  Neorealist	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  EU’s	  External	  Action	  Service’,	  Foreign	  Ministry	  of	  Denmark	  &	  Roskilde	  University.	  	  POLANYI,	  Karl	  (1957	  [1944]),	  ‘The	  Great	  Transformation’,	  Boston:	  Beacon	  Press.	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  102	  
RADON,	  Jenik	  (2007),	  ‘How	  to	  Negotiate	  Your	  Oil	  Agreement?	  In	  Macartan	  Humphreys,	  Jeffrey	   D.	   Sachs	   &	   Joseph	   E.	   Stiglitz	   (eds.),	   Escaping	   the	   Resource	   Curse,	   New	   York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  	  RAVENHILL,	  John	  (1990),	  ‘Overcoming	  Constraints	  to	  Regional	  Cooperation	  in	  Southern	  Africa:	  Coordination	  Rather	  Than	   Integration?’,	   in	  The	  Long-­Term	  Perspectives	  Study	  of	  
Sub-­Saharan	  Africa,	  Volume	  4,	  Proceedings	  of	  a	  Workshop	  on	  Regional	  Integration	  and	  Cooperation,	  Washington:	  World	  Bank.	  	  REMPEL,	  Ruth	   (1998),	   ‘Trade	   and	  Transformation:	  Participation	   in	   the	   Ivory	  Trade	   in	  Late	   19th	   Century	   East	   and	   central	   Africa’,	   in	   Canadian	   Journal	   of	   Development	  
Studies/Revue	  canadienne	  d’études	  du	  développement,	  19(3):	  529-­‐554.	  	  ROBSON,	  Peter	  (2011	  [1968]),	  ‘Economic	  Integration	  in	  Africa’,	  Oxon:	  Routledge	  -­‐ (1998),	   ‘The	  Economics	   of	   International	   Integration’,	   Fourth	  Edition,	   London	  &	  New	  York:	  Routledge.	  	  ROSAMOND,	   Ben	   (2000),	   ‘Theories	   of	   European	   Integration’,	   New	   York:	   St.	   Martin’s	  Press.	  -­‐ (2005),	   ‘The	  Uniting	  of	  Europe	   ad	   the	  Foundation	  of	  EU	  Studies:	  Revisiting	   the	  neofunctionalism	   of	   Ernst	   B.	   Haas’,	   in	   Journal	   of	   European	   Public	   Policy,	   12(2):	  237-­‐254.	  	  RUESCHEMEYER,	   Dietrich,	   Evelyn	   Huber	   Stephens	   &	   John	   D.	   Stephens,	   (1992),	  ‘Capitalist	  Development	  and	  Democracy’,	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  	  SAASA,	  Oliver	  S.	  (1991),	  ‘Background	  to	  Regional	  Integration	  in	  Africa’,	  in	  Oliver	  S.	  Saasa	  (ed.),	  Joining	  the	  Future:	  Economic	  Integration	  and	  Co-­operation	  in	  Africa	  	  SANDER,	  Harald	  (1996),	  ‘Multilateralism,	  Regionalism	  and	  Globalisation:	  The	  Challenges	  to	  the	  World	  Trading	  System’,	  in	  Harald	  Sander	  &	  András	  Inotai	  (eds.),	  World	  Trade	  after	  
the	   Uruguay	   Round:	   Prospects	   and	   Policy	   options	   for	   the	   twenty-­first	   century,	   London:	  Routledge.	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  103	  
	  SANDHOLTZ,	   Wayne	   &	   Alec	   Stone	   Sweet	   (1998),	   ‘European	   Integration	   and	  Supranational	  Governance’,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  university	  Press.	  	  SANDHOLTZ,	  Wayne	  &	  John	  Zysman	  (1989),	  ‘1992:	  Recasting	  the	  European	  Bargain’,	  in	  
World	  Politics,	  42(1):	  95-­‐128.	  	  SCHMITTER,	   Phillippe	   C.	   (1970),	   ‘A	   Revised	   Theory	   of	   Regional	   Integration’,	   in	  
International	  Organization,	  24(4):	  836-­‐868.	  	  SCHULZ,	   Michael,	   Fredrik	   Söderbaum	   &	   Joakim	   Öjendal	   (2001),	   ‘Introduction:	   A	  Framework	  for	  Understanding	  Regionalization’	  in	  Micahel	  Schulz,	  Fredrik	  Söderbaum	  &	  Joakim	  Öjendal	  (eds.),	  Regionalization	  in	  a	  Globalizing	  World:	  A	  Comparative	  Perspective	  
in	  Forms,	  Actors	  and	  Processes,	  London:	  Zed	  Books.	  	  SCHWELLER,	  Randall	   (1996),	   ‘Neorealism’s	  Status	  Quo	  Bias:	  What	  Security	  Dilemma?’,	  Security	  Studies,	  5(3):	  90-­‐121.	  	  SHAW,	   Timothy	   M.	   (1998),	   ‘African	   Renaissance/African	   Alliance:	   towards	   New	  Regionalisms	   and	   New	   Realism	   in	   the	   Great	   Lakes	   at	   the	   Start	   of	   the	   Twenty-­‐first	  Century’,	  Politeia,	  17(3):	  60-­‐74.	  -­‐ (2000),	   ‘New	   Regionalisms	   in	   Africa	   in	   the	   New	   Millennium:	   Comparative	  Perspectives	   on	   Renaissance,	   Realisms,	   and/or	   Regressions’,	   in	   New	   Political	  
Economy,	  5(3):	  399-­‐414.	  -­‐ (2002),	   ‘The	   New	   Regionalism	   in	   Africa	   in	   the	   New	   Millennium:	   Comparative	  Perspectives	   on	   Renaissance,	   Realism	   and/or	   Regressions”	   in	   S.	   Breslin,	   C.	   W.	  Hughes,	   N.	   Philipps	   &	   Ben	   Rosamond	   (eds.),	   New	   Regionaisms	   in	   the	   Global	  
Political	  Economy,	  London:	  Routledge.	  	  SHAXSON,	   Nicholas	   (2007),	   ‘Oil,	   Corruption	   and	   the	   Resource	   Curse’,	   in	   International	  
Affairs,	  83(6):	  1123-­‐1140.	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  104	  
SHIVJI,	  Issa	  G.	  (2006),	  ‘The	  Silence	  in	  the	  NGO	  Discourse:	  The	  Role	  and	  Future	  of	  NGOs	  in	  Africa’,	  in	  Africa	  Development,	  Vol	  XXI,	  No.	  4:	  22-­‐51.	  	  SMITH,	  Steve	  (2001),	  ‘New	  Approaches	  to	  International	  Theory,’	  In	  Baylis,	  John	  &	  Steve	  Smith	   (eds.),	   The	   Globalization	   of	   World	   Politics:	   an	   Introduction	   to	   International	  
Relations,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  (2nd	  edn).	  -­‐ (2002),	   ‘The	   United	   States	   and	   the	   Discipline	   of	   International	   Relations:	  “Hegemonic	   Country,	   Hegemonic	   Discipline”’	   in	   International	   Studies	   Review,	  4(2):	  67-­‐85.	  -­‐ (2007),	   ‘Introduction:	   Diversity	   and	   Disciplinarity	   in	   International	   Relations	  Theory’,	   in	  Tim	  Dunne,	  Milja	  Kurki	  &	  Steve	  Smith	  (eds.),	   International	  Relations	  
Theories:	  Discipline	  and	  Diversity,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  -­‐ &	   Patricia	   Owens	   (2008),	   ‘Alternative	   Approaches	   to	   International	   Theory’,	   in	  John	   Baylis,	   Steve	   Smith	   &	   Patricia	   Ownes	   (eds.),	   The	   Globalization	   of	   World	  
Politics,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  SÖDERBAUM,	   Fredrik	   (2003a),	   ‘Introduction:	   Theories	   of	   New	   Regionalism,’	   in	  Söderbaum,	   Fredrik	   and	   Timothy	   M.	   Shaw	   (eds.),	   ‘Theories	   of	   New	   Regionalism.	   A	  Palgrave	  Reader,’	  Houndmills,	  Basingstoke,	  Hampshire	  &	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  -­‐ (2003b),	  ‘Modes	  of	  Regional	  Governance	  in	  Africa:	  by	  Whom,	  for	  Whome	  and	  for	  What	  Purpose?’,	  in	  Hans	  van	  Ginkel,	  Julisu	  Court	  and	  Luk	  Van	  Langenhove	  (eds.),	  
Integrating	   Africa:	   Perspectives	   on	   Regional	   Integration	   and	   Development,	   UNU	  and	  UNU/CRIS:	  UNU	  Press.	  -­‐ (2004),	   ‘The	   Political	   Economy	   of	   Regionalism:	   The	   Case	   of	   Southern	   Africa,’	  Houndmills,	  Basingstoke,	  Hampshire	  &	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  -­‐ (2007),	   ‘Regionalisation	   and	  Civil	   Society:	   The	  Case	   of	   Southern	  Africa’,	   in	  New	  
Political	  Economy,	  12(3):	  319-­‐337.	  -­‐ (2008),	   ‘Consolodating	  Comparative	  Regionalism:	  From	  Euro-­‐centrism	  to	  Global	  Comparison,’	   Paper	   for	   the	   GARNET	   2008	   Annual	   Conference,	   Science	   Po	  Bordeaux	  (17-­‐19	  September):	  1-­‐26.	  -­‐ &	  (2009),	  ‘Comparative	  Regional	  Integration	  and	  Regionalism’	  in	  Todd	  Landman	  &	   Neil	   Robinson	   (eds.),	   The	   SAGE	   Handbook	   of	   Comparative	   Politics,	   London:	  SAGE	  Publications	  Ltd.	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  105	  
-­‐ 	  (2011),	  ‘Formal	  and	  Informal	  Regionalism’,	  in	  Timothy	  M.	  Shaw,	  J.	  Andrew	  Grant	  &	   Scarlett	   Cornelissen	   (eds.),	  The	  Ashgate	  Research	  Companion	   to	  Regionalisms,	  Farnham:	  Ashgate	  Publishing.	  -­‐ &	   Ian	  Taylor	   (2001),	   ‘Transmission	  Belt	   for	  Transnational	  Capital	  or	  Facilitator	  for	   Development?	   Problematising	   the	   Role	   of	   the	   State	   in	   the	   Maputo	  Development	  Corridor’	  in	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  African	  Studies,	  39(4):	  675-­‐695.	  -­‐ &	  Timothy	  M.	  Shaw	  (2003),	   ‘Conclusion:	  What	  Futures	  for	  New	  Regionalism’,	   in	  Fredrik	   Söderbaum	  &	   Timothy	  M.	   Shaw	   (eds.),	  Theories	   of	   New	   Regionalism:	   A	  
Palgrave	  Reader,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  -­‐ Ian	   Taylor	   (eds.)	   (2008),	   ‘Afro-­‐Regions.	   The	   Dynamics	   of	   Cross-­‐Border	   Micro-­‐Regionalism	  in	  Africa’,	  Nordiska	  Afrikainstitutet,	  Stockholm:	  Elanders	  Sverige	  AB.	  -­‐ &	   Ian	   Taylor	   (2010),	   ‘State,	   Religion	   &	   Space	   in	   Africa’,	   in	   Ulf	   Lundel	   &	   Paul	  Nugent	  (eds.),	  Respacing	  Africa,	  Leiden:	  Brill.	  	  SOUTHALL,	   Roger	   (2005),	   ‘The	   Ndungu	   Report:	   Land	   &	   Graft	   in	   Kenya’,	   in	  Review	   of	  
African	  Political	  Economy,	  32(103):	  142-­‐151.	  	  STEDMAN,	   Stephen	   John	   (1996),	   ‘Conflict	   and	   Conciliation	   in	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa’,	   in	  Michael	  E.	  Brown	  (ed.),	  The	  International	  Dimension	  of	  International	  Conflict,	  Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University.	  	  STERLING-­‐FOLKER,	   Jennifer	   (2013),	   ‘Neoliberalism’,	   in	   Tim	  Dunne,	  Milja	   Kurki	   	   Steve	  Smith	   (eds.),	   International	   Relations	   Theories:	   Discipline	   and	   Diversity,	   Third	   Edition,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  SUNDET,	  Geir,	  Eli	  Moen	  &	  Tiberius	  Barasa	  (2009),	  ‘Political	  economy	  Analysis	  of	  Kenya’,	  prepared	  for	  the	  Norwegian	  Agency	  for	  Development	  Cooperation	  (Norad).	  	  SWEET,	   Alec	   Stone	   (1994),	   ‘What	   is	   a	   Supranational	   Constitution?	   An	   Essay	   in	  International	  Relations	  Theory’,	  in	  review	  of	  Politics,	  56(3):	  441-­‐474.	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  106	  
TAYLOR,	  Ian	  (2003),	  ‘Globalization	  and	  Regionalization	  in	  Africa:	  Reactions	  to	  Attempts	  at	   Neo-­‐Liberal	   Regionalism’,	   in	  Review	   of	   International	   Political	   Economy,	   10(2):	   310-­‐330.	  -­‐ (2005),	  ‘Nepad:	  Towards	  Africa’s	  Development	  or	  Another	  False	  Start?’,	  Boulder:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  Inc.	  -­‐ &	  Paul	  Williams	  (2001),	  ‘South	  African	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Crisis:	  African	  Renaissance	  Meets	  Vagabondage	  Politique?,	   in	  African	  Affairs,	  100(399):	  265-­‐286.	  	  TELÒ,	  Mario	  (2007),	   ‘Introduction:	  Globalization,	  New	  Regionalism	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  European	   Union’,	   in	  Marion	   Telò	   (ed.),	  European	   Union	   and	   New	   Regionalism,	   Second	  Edition,	  Aldershot:	  Ashgate	  Publishing	  Limited.	  	  TUSSIE,	  Diana	  (2003),	  ‘Regionalism:	  Providing	  a	  Substance	  to	  Multilateralism?’	  in	  Fredrik	  Söderbaum	   &	   Timothy	   M.	   Shaw,	   Theories	   of	   New	   Regionalism:	   A	   Palgrave	   Reader,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  	  VASQUEZ,	   Patricia	   I.	   (2013),	   ‘Kenya	   at	   a	   Crossroads:	  Hopes	   and	  Fears	   Concerning	   the	  Development	   of	   Oil	   and	   Gas	   Reserves’,	   in	   International	   Development	   Policy/Revue	  
internationale	  de	  politique	  de	  développement,	  4(3):	  1-­‐29.	  	  VEIT,	   Peter	   G.,	   Carole	   Excell	   &	   Alisa	   Zomer	   (2011),	   ‘Avoiding	   the	   Resource	   Curse:	  Spotlight	  on	  Uganda’,	  Working	  Paper	  (January),	  World	  Resources	  Institute.	  	  WALTZ,	   Kenneth	   N.	   (1979),	   ‘Theory	   of	   International	   Politics’,	   New	   York:	   Addison	  Wesley.	  -­‐ (1996),	  ‘The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐Paradigm	  Debate’,	  in	  Security	  Studies,	  6(1):	  52-­‐55.	  	  WÆVER,	  Ole	  (1998),	   ‘The	  Sociology	  of	  a	  Not	  So	  International	  Discipline:	  American	  and	  European	  Developments	  in	  International	  Relations,	  in	  International	  Organization,	  52(4):	  687-­‐727.	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  107	  
WEBER,	   Max	   (1978	   [1968]),	   ‘Economy	   and	   Society:	   An	   Outline	   of	   Interpretative	  Sociology’,	  edited	  by	  Guenther	  Roth	  &	  Claus	  Wittich,	  New	  York:	  Bedminster	  Press.	  	  WEBB,	  Carol	  (1983),	  ‘Theoretical	  Perspectives	  and	  Problems’	  in	  Helen	  Wallace,	  William	  Wallace	  &	  Carol	  Webb	   (eds.),	  Policy-­Making	   in	   the	  European	  Communities,	   2nd	   Edition,	  Chichester:	  Wiley.	  	  WEISS,	  Tanya	  (2004),	   ‘Guns	   in	   the	  Borderland:	  Redusing	   the	  Demand	   for	  Small	  Arms’,	  Pretoria:	  Institute	  for	  Security	  Studies.	  	  WOODS,	  Ngaire	   (2011),	   ‘International	  Political	  Economy	   in	  an	  Age	  of	  Globalization’,	   in	  John	  Baylis,	  Steve	  Smith	  &	  Patricia	  Owens	  (eds.),	  The	  Globalization	  of	  World	  Politics:	  An	  
Introduction	  to	  International	  Relations,	  Fifth	  Edition,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  WRONG,	  Michaela	  (2010),	  ‘It’s	  Our	  Turn	  to	  Eat:	  The	  Story	  of	  a	  Kenyan	  Whistle-­‐Blower’,	  London:	  Harper	  Perennial	  Publishers.	  	  YIN,	  R.	  (2013),	  ‘Case	  Study	  Research:	  Design	  and	  Methods’,	  Sage	  	  YOUNG,	   Crawford	   (1994),	   ‘In	   Search	   of	   Civil	   Society’	   in	   John	   W.	   Harbeson,	   Donald	  Rothchild	  &	  Naomi	   Chazan	   (eds.),	  Civil	   Society	   and	   the	   State	   in	   Africa,	   Boulder:	   Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers.	  	  
Documents	  and	  institutional	  publications	  
	  Abdulrahman,	   Saad	  &	  Associates	   (2010),	   ‘Petition	   in	   the	  Matter	  of	  Articles	  22,	  70	  and	  258	   of	   the	   Constitution	   of	   Kenya	   2010,	   in	   the	   matter	   of	   the	   contravention	   of	  fundamental	   rights	   and	   freedoms	  under	  Articles	  19,	  20,	  22,	  27,	  35,	  42,	  42,	  44,	  70	  and	  257	  of	  the	  Constritution	  of	  Kenya	  2010,	  and	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  contravention	  of	  Articles	  2(5)	  &	  (6),	  10,	  69	  and	  73	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Kenya	  2010’,	  available	  online:	  http://www.savelamu.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2011/08/LAMU-­‐Petition.pdf	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  108	  
AfDB	  (2000),	  ‘Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Regional	  Integration	  Policy’,	  (February	  2000),	  available	  online:	  http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-­‐Documents/10000021-­‐EN-­‐ECONOMIC-­‐COOPERATION-­‐AND-­‐REGIONAL-­‐INTEGRATION-­‐POLICY-­‐PAPER.PDF	  	  AfDB	   (2013),	   ‘State	   of	   Infrastructure	   in	   East	   Africa’,	   Statistics	   Department	   Africa	  Infrastructure	  Knowledge	  Program,	  (April).	  
	  Africa	  Research	  Bulletin	  (2012),	  ‘Policy	  and	  Practice’,	  available	  online:	  http://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1111/j.1467-­‐6346.2012.04850.x	  	  Afrika,	   Jean-­‐Guy	   K.	   &	   Gerald	   Ajumbo	   (2012),	   ‘Informal	   Cross	   Border	   Trade	   in	   Africa:	  Implications	   and	   Policy	   Recommendations’,	   in	   Africa	   Economic	   Brief,	   3(10),	   AfDB,	  available	  online:	  http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Economic%20Brief%20-­‐%20Informal%20Cross%20Border%20Trade%20in%20Africa%20Implications%20and%20Policy%20Recommendations%20-­‐%20Volume%203.pdf	  
	  AMIS,	  Philip,	  Danielle	  Kanyinga,	  Karuti	  Kanyinga	  &	  Heather	  P.	  Marguette	  (2008),	  ‘Power	  and	   Change	   Analysis:	   Kenya’,	   a	   consultant	   report	   by	   ECORYS	   Nederland	   BV	   and	  Overseas	  Development	  Institute,	  Rotterdam.	  
	  BANFIELD,	   Jessica	   (2009),	   ‘Harnessing	   Oil	   for	   Peace	   and	   Development	   in	   Uganda’,	  
Investigating	  in	  Peace	  Brief	  Paper	  Series,	  2	  (September),	  Kampala:	  International	  Allert.	  
	  Centre	   for	   Legal	   Research	   &	   Policy	   Development	   (CLR&PD),	   ‘A	   Review	   of	   the	   Public	  Private	  Partnerships	  Act	  No.	  15	  of	  2013’,	  a	  review	  made	  by	  CLR&PD	  for	  Strategic	  Legal	  Solutions	  Group	  Limited	  (5	  September),	  available	  online:	  http://stralexgroup.blogspot.no/2013/09/a-­‐review-­‐of-­‐public-­‐private-­‐partnerships.html	  
	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  109	  
Credit	  Suisse	  (2009),	  ‘Heritage	  Oil’	  analysis	  report,	  available	  online:	  http://www.scribd.com/doc/15566382/Credit-­‐Suisse-­‐Heritage	  
	  East	  African	  Community	  (EAC)	  2006),	   ‘Treaty	  for	  the	  Establishment	  of	  the	  East	  African	  Community’.	  
	  Economic	   Commission	   for	   Africa	   &	   African	   Union	   (2006),	   ‘Assessing	   Regional	  Integration	   in	   Africa	   II:	   Rationalizing	   Regional	   Economic	   Communities,	   Addis	   Ababa:	  Economic	  Commission	  for	  Africa.	  
	  Ernst	  &	  Young	  (2009),	   ‘Review	  of	  Oil	  Explorations	  of	  Activities	  in	  Block	  3A	  Licensed	  to	  Heritage	   Oil	   &	   Gas	   (u)	   Limited”,	   prepared	   for	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Energy	   and	   Mineral	  Development:	   Petroleum	   Exploration	   &	   Production	   Department	   (3	   April	   2009),	  available	  online:	  http://platformlondon.org/carbonweb/documents/uganda/090407_Heritage_Oil_Audit_MEMD_Ernst&Young.pdf	  
	  Global	  Witness,	  Oil	  Watch	  Network	  Uganda,	   Publish	  What	  You	  Pay	   (PWYP)	  Uganda	  &	  Water	  Governance	  Institution	  (2012),	  ‘Campaigners	  Call	  for	  Urgent	  Changes	  as	  Ugandan	  MPs	   Prepare	   to	   Debate	   Crucial	   New	   Oil	   Laws’,	   a	   press	   release	   by	   Global	  Witness,	   Oil	  Watch	  Uganda,	  PWYP	  Uganda	  &	  Water	  Governance	  Institute	  (10	  September),	  available	  online:	  http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/Uganda%20NRC%20PR_2.pdf	  
	  Global	   Witness	   (2012),	   ‘Uganda’s	   Petroleum	   Legislation:	   Safeguarding	   the	   Sector’,	  available	  online:	  http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/Ugandas%20petroleum%20legislation%20-­‐%20Safeguarding%20the%20sector_0.pdf	  
	  GLOPPEN,	   S;	   C.	   Atoo;	   E.	   Kasimbazi;	   A.	   Kibandama;	   J.	   Kiiza;	   S.	   Makara;	   G.	   Okiror;	   L.	  Rakner;	   S.	   Rwengabo;	   L.	   Svåsand;	   R.	   Tabaro	   &	   A	   Tostensen	   (2006),	   ‘Uganda’s	   2006	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  110	  
Presidential	  and	  Parliamentary	  Elections’,	  a	   report	  by	  Christian	  Michelsen	   Institute,	  10,	  Bergen:	  CMI,	  available	  online:	  http://bora.cmi.no/dspace/bitstream/10202/91/1/Report%20R%202006-­‐10.pdf	  
	  IDMC	   (2010),	   ‘Uganda:	   Difficulties	   Continue	   for	   Returnees	   and	   Remaining	   IDPs	   as	  Development	  Phase	  Begins.	  A	  Profile	  of	  the	  Internal	  Displacement	  Situation”,	  report	  by	  Internal	  Displacement	  Monitoring	  Centre	  (IDMC)	  and	  Norwegian	  Refugee	  Council	  (NRC)	  (28	  December	  2010),	  available	  online:	  http://www.internal-­‐displacement.org/assets/library/Africa/Uganda/pdf/Uganda-­‐December-­‐2010.pdf	  
	  Institute	  for	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Business	  (IHRB)	  (2012),	   ‘Avoiding	  the	  Resource	  Curse:	  Advancing	  Human	  Rights	  Within	  the	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Sector	  in	  Kenya’,	  report	  by	  the	  Institute	  for	  Human	  Rights	   and	  Business,	   in	   collaboration	  with	  Kenya	  National	   Commission	   on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  UN	  Office	  for	  Human	  Rights	  (6	  November),	  available	  online:	  http://business-­‐humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/ihrb_knchr_ohchr_meeting_report_-­‐_6_nov_-­‐_final.pdf	  
	  Joint	  Venture	  Partners	  (2014),	  ‘Planning	  for	  the	  Future	  and	  Promoting	  National	  Content:	  A	  Survey	  to	  Foster	  Opportunities	  for	  Ugandans	  in	  the	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Sector’,	  an	  Industrial	  Baseline	  Survey	  by	  the	  Joint	  Venture	  Partners	  (CNOOC,	  Total	  and	  Tullow	  Oil),	  available	  online:	  http://www.ucmp.ug/details?imgt=content&cid=lI32f06a4DaA&name=Industrial%20Baseline%20Survey&typ=pdf	  
	  JPC	  &	  BAC/GKA	  JV	  (2011),	  ‘LAPSSET	  Corridor	  and	  New	  Lamu	  Port	  Feasibility	  Study	  and	  Master	  Plans	  Report’,	  available	  online:	  http://www.lapsset.go.ke/pages/newsletters	  
	  KABAGAMBE-­‐KALIISA,	   Kaliisa	   (2004),	   ‘Loose	   Minute:	   Production	   Sharing	   Agreement	  Between	   Government	   and	   Heritage	   Oil	   &	   Gas	   LTD/Energy	   Africa	   Uganda	   LTD	   for	  Exploration	  Area	  3A’,	  available	  online:	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  111	  
http://www.carbonweb.org/showitem.asp?article=376&parent=39	  
	  KAMP,	   Mathias	   (2010),	   ‘Political	   Actors	   and	   Academicians	   Discuss	   the	   State	   of	  Multiparty	  Democracy	  in	  Uganda’	  an	  event	  publication	  by	  the	  Konrad-­‐Adenauer-­‐Stiftung	  (27	  October),	  Kampala,	  available	  online:	  http://www.kas.de/uganda/en/publications/20968/	  	  KASUKU,	  Silvester	  (2013),	   ‘LAPSSET	  Corridor	  Project:	  Building	  Africa’s	  Transformative	  and	   Game	   Changer	   Infrastructure	   to	   Deliver	   a	   Just	   and	   Prosperous	   Kenya’,	   a	  presentation	   by	   the	   Presidency	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Kenya	   and	   the	   LAPSSET	   Corridor	  Development	  Authority.	  
	  KOWALCZYK-­‐HOYER,	  Barbara	  (2011),	  ‘Promoting	  Revenue	  Transparency	  in	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Companies’	  a	  report	  by	  Transparency	  International	  &	  Revenue	  Watch	  Institute.	  
	  KIBATI,	   Mugo	   (2012),	   ‘Kenya	   Vision	   2030	   Flagship	   Projects’,	   presentation	   by	   Mugo	  Kibati,	   Director	   General	   of	   Kenya	   Vision	   2030	   Delivery	   Secretariat	   (31	   July	   2012),	  available	  online:	  http://www.cbcglobal.org/images/uploads/library/KIS2012_Vision_2030_Flagship_Projects_Mugo_Kibati.pdf	  	  LAROK,	   Arthur	   (2008),	   ‘Deepening	   Decentralisation	   or	   Regime	   Consolidation:	   What	  explains	   the	   Unprecedented	   Creation	   of	   New	   Districts	   in	   Uganda?’,	   a	   National	   NGO	  Forum	  Issue	  Paper	  No.	  1.	  	  LAY,	  Taimour	  &	  Mika	  Minio-­‐Paluello	  (2010),	  ‘Contracts	  Curse:	  Uganda’s	  Oil	  Agreements	  Place	   Profit	   Before	   People’,	   a	   report	   by	   the	   Civil	   Society	   Coalition	   on	   Oil	   in	   Uganda,	  available	  online:	  http://platformlondon.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2012/01/Contracts-­‐Curse-­‐Uganda-­‐Platform-­‐CSCO.pdf	  	  MUTTITT,	   Greg	   (2005),	   ‘Crude	   Designs:	   The	   Rip-­‐Off	   of	   Iraq’s	   Oil	   Wealth’,	   a	   research	  report	  by	  Platform,	  available	  online:	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  112	  
http://www.carbonweb.org/documents/crude_designs_large.pdf	  	  MWAKALI,	   Jackson	   A.,	   Per	   Heum	   &	   Ole	   Fredrik	   Ekern	   (2011),	   ‘Enhancing	   National	  Participation	  in	  the	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Industry	  in	  Uganda’,	  a	  report	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  Mineral	  Development	  (September),	  available	  online:	  http://www.google.no/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.snf.no%2FAdmin%2FPublic%2FDownload.aspx%3Ffile%3DFiles%252FFiler%252FPublications%252FSNF-­‐R13_11.pdf&ei=R1NUVMqlA8nBOaX5gYgE&usg=AFQjCNEqMl-­‐Z6nsXLsznn9kCzRJTiEchUw&sig2=Rkijj8GEGDwCrQkP5p_IIw&bvm=bv.78677474,d.ZWU	  	  NJIRU,	  Cyrus	  (2011),	   ‘2nd	  Transport	  and	  Economic	  Corridor	  –	  LAPSSET’,	  a	  presentation	  for	  the	  Kenyan	  Ministry	  of	  Transport,	  available	  online:	  http://www.google.no/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CCgQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.coastpropertieskenya.com%2Fcomponent%2Fdocman%2Fdoc_download%2F2-­‐ministry-­‐of-­‐transport-­‐2nd-­‐transport-­‐and-­‐economic-­‐corridor-­‐lapsset%3FItemid%3D&ei=7DtUVPevH4nDOfjsgJAG&usg=AFQjCNFfl_HPe1sKdFCoqyamAkB9KSHfig&sig2=1A8QLKz9BIGxXyEvfEHhZQ&bvm=bv.78677474,d.ZWU	  	  OLUM,	  Yasin	  (2010),	   ‘The	  Political	  System	  and	  Environment	  in	  Uganda:	  Are	  the	  Checks	  and	   Balances	   to	   Power	   and	   the	   Political	   Playing	   Field	   Sufficient	   to	   Consolidate	  Multiparty	   Democracy?’,	   in	   Yusuf	   Kiranda	   &	   Mathias	   Kamp	   (eds.),	   Reality	   Check:	   The	  
State	  of	  Multiparty	  Democracy	  in	  Uganda,	  Konrad-­‐Adenauer-­‐Stiftung:	  Kampala.	  
	  Publish	   What	   You	   Pay	   (PWYP)	   Uganda	   (2011),	   ‘Towards	   a	   Time	   Bound	   Legislative	  Agenda	  for	  Effective	  Oil	  Governance	  and	  Avoiding	  the	  Oil	  Curse”	  Communiqué	  issued	  at	  the	  closing	  of	  the	  High	  Level	  Policy	  Dialogue	  on	  Oil	  Governance	  in	  Uganda	  (1	  December):	  Jinja.	  
	  Republic	   of	   Kenya	   (RoK)	   (2007),	   ‘Kenya	   Vision	   2030’,	   Nairobi:	   Ministry	   of	   Planning,	  National	  Development	  and	  Vision	  2030,	  available	  online:	  http://theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/vision_2030_brochure__july_2007.pdf	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  113	  
	  Republic	   of	  Kenya	   (ROK)	   (2008),	   ‘Kenya	  Vision	  2030’,	   First	  Medium	  Term	  Plan	  2008-­‐2012:	   a	   Globally	   Competitive	   and	   Prosperous	   Kenya,	   Nairobi:	   Office	   of	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   and	   Ministry	   of	   Planning,	   National	   Development	   and	   Vision	   2030,	   available	  online:	  http://www.sida.se/contentassets/855677b831b74ea0b226ce2db4eb93a3/kenya_medium_term_plan_2008-­‐2012.pdf	  
	  Republic	  of	  Kenya	  (RoK)	  (2011),	  ‘Vision	  2030	  Development	  Strategy	  for	  Northern	  Kenya	  and	  other	  Arid	  Lands’,	  available	  online:	  http://www.disasterriskreduction.net/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/Vision2030%20development%20strategy%20for%20northern%20kenya%20and%20other%20dry%20areas%202011%20.pdf	  
	  Republic	   of	   Uganda	   (RoU)	   (2007),	   ‘Production	   Sharing	   Agreement	   for	   Petroleum	  Exploration,	  Development	   and	   Production	   in	   the	  Republic	   of	  Uganda	  By	   and	  Between	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Uganda	  and	  Heritage	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Limited’,	  available	  online:	  http://www.carbonweb.org/showitem.asp?article=375&parent=39	  
	  Republic	   of	   Uganda	   (RoU)	   (2012),	   ‘Production	   Sharing	   Agreement	   for	   Petroleum	  Exploration	  Development	  and	  Production	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Uganda	  By	  and	  Between	  the	  Government	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Uganda	   and	   Tullow	   Oil’	   (February	   2012),	   available	  online:	  http://www.globalwitness.org/ugandaoilcontracts/files/PSA_Kanywataba.pdf	  
	  Rift	   Valley	   Instituute	   (RVI)	   (2013),	   ‘LAPSSET:	   Transformative	   Project	   or	   Pipe	  Dream?	  Debating	   the	   Opportunities	   and	   Dangers	   of	   a	   Transnational	   Megaproject’,	   a	   meeting	  report	  by	  RVI	  and	  Nairobi	  Forum	  (4	  October),	  available	  online:	  http://www.google.no/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.riftvalley.net%2Fdownload%2Ffile%2Ffid%2F3092&ei=eMdTVJXII9bvaPrsgRg&usg=AFQjCNEoKCPMZ8RzMwBcoSt_V5g3V_C4Xw&sig2=EJ1chAyu-­‐CvOTlpAap5lOg&bvm=bv.78677474,d.d2s	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  114	  
	  SAVAGE,	  Emily	  (2014),	   ‘Build	  Your	  Way	  to	   ‘Middle-­‐Income’	  status?:	  Lamu	  Port	  and	  the	  Lamu-­‐South	   Sudan-­‐Ethiopia	   Transport	   Corridor	   (LAPSSET)’,	   in	   the/le	   Panel	   (3	  September	  2014),	  available	  online:	  http://www.thepanelonline.com/blog/build-­‐your-­‐way-­‐to-­‐middle-­‐income-­‐status-­‐lamu-­‐port-­‐and-­‐the-­‐lamu-­‐south-­‐sudan-­‐ethiopia-­‐transport-­‐corridor-­‐lapsset	  
	  SID	   (nd.),	   ‘The	   Transport	   Corridors	   of	   the	   GHEA’,	   a	  GHEA	   Outlook,	   No.	   19,	   Society	   for	  
International	  Development,	  Rockefeller	  Foundation,	  available	  online:	  http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/transport-­‐corridors-­‐ghea	  
	  Tullow	  Oil	   (2007),	   ‘Drilling	   and	  Development	  Activities’	   a	   report	   on	   a	  Uganda	  Analyst	  Visit	  (October),	  available	  online:	  http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/uganda/drilling.pdf	  
	  TUMUSHABE,	   Godber,	   Elijah	   Dickens	   Mushemeza,	   Lillian	   Muyomba	   Tamale,	   Daniel	  Lukwago	  &	   Eugene	   Ssemakula	   (2010),	   ‘Monitoring	   and	   Assessing	   the	   Performance	   of	  Local	  Government	  Concils	  in	  Uganda:	  Background,	  Methodology	  and	  Score	  Card’,	  Policy	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  31,	  Kampala:	  ACODE,	  available	  online:	  http://www.acode-­‐u.org/documents/PRS_31.pdf	  	  Uganda	   Constitutional	   Commission	   (1995),	   ‘The	   1995	   Constitution	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	  Uganda,	  1995’	  Entebbe:	  Uganda	  Government	  Printers	  and	  Publishers.	  
	  US	   International	   Trade	   Commission	   (USITC)	   (2012),	   ‘Trade	   Facilitation	   in	   the	   East	  African	   Community:	   Recent	   Developments	   and	   Potential	   Benefits’,	   Investigation	   No.	  332-­‐530,	  Publication	  No.	  4335	  (July),	  available	  online:	  http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4335.pdf	  
	  WDM	   (2013),	   ‘Web	   of	   Power:	   The	   UK	   Government	   and	   the	   Energy-­‐Finance	   Complex	  Fuelling	  Climate	  Change’,	   a	  media	  briefing	  by	  World	  Development	  Movement,	   available	  online:	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  115	  
http://www.wdm.org.uk/sites/default/files/Carbon%20Capital%20Media%20Briefing5.pdf	  
	  WIIG,	  Arne	  &	  Madalena	  Ramalho	  (2005),	  ‘Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility	  in	  the	  Angolan	  Oil	   Industry’,	  a	  Working	  Paper	  by	  Cristian	  Michelsen	  Institute,	  8,	  Bergen:	  CMI,	  available	  online:	  http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?1990=corporate-­‐social-­‐responsibility-­‐in-­‐the-­‐angolan-­‐oil	  
	  World	   Bank	   (2001),	   ‘Moving	   Beyond	   Borders.	   The	   Bank’s	   Role	   in	   African	   Regional	  Integration’,	  Bord	  Presentation,	  8	  February,	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  World	  Bank.	  
	  
Newspaper	  articles	  and	  media	  sources	  	  ABM,	   ‘Pipeline	  Deal	  Rescues	  LAPSSET’,	   in	  African	  Business	  Magazine	   (20	  March	  2012),	  No.	  385:	  56-­‐57,	  available	  online:	  http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sector-­‐reports/oil-­‐and-­‐gas/kenya-­‐pipeline-­‐deal-­‐rescues-­‐lapsset/	  	  BEJA,	  Patric,	  ‘Award	  of	  LAPSSET	  Scholarship	  Faulted’,	  in	  Standard	  Media	  (19	  December),	  available	  online:	  http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/m/?articleID=2000100380&story_title=Award-­‐of-­‐Lapsset-­‐scholarships-­‐faulted	  	  COLOMA,	   Tristan,	   ‘White	   Elephant	   or	   Port	   in	   the	  Making?’,	   in	   Le	  Monde	   diplomatique	  (April	  2013),	  available	  online:	  http://mondediplo.com/2013/04/11kenya	  	  FLATTAU,	  Jeremy,	  ‘A	  Megaproject	  Transforms	  Kenya	  –	  But	  Not	  Everyone	  is	  Thrilled’,	  in	  
Foreign	  Policy	  (28	  May	  2012),	  available	  online:	  http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/25/a_megaproject_transforms_kenya_but_not_everyone_is_thrilled	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  116	  
IMAKA,	  Isaac,	  ‘Government	  to	  Approve	  All	  foreign	  Oil	  Workers’,	  in	  Saturday	  Monitor	  (17	  October	  2012),	  available	  online:	  http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Government-­‐to-­‐approve-­‐all-­‐foreign-­‐oil-­‐workers/-­‐/688334/1535060/-­‐/4jwdy/-­‐/index.html	  	  IMAKA,	   Isaac	   &	   Abdulaziime	   Tumusiime,	   ‘More	   than	   100,000	   Jobs	   to	   be	   Created	   in	  Uganda’s	  Oil	  Sector’,	  in	  Saturday	  Monitor	  (1	  May	  2014),	  available	  online:	  http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/More-­‐than-­‐100-­‐000-­‐jobs-­‐to-­‐be-­‐created-­‐in-­‐Uganda-­‐s-­‐oil/-­‐/688334/2299512/-­‐/cb5tku/-­‐/index.html	  	  KANTAI,	  Parselelo,	   ‘The	  Lamu	  Project:	  Kenya’s	  Gateway	  to	  Africa’,	   in	  The	  Africa	  Report	  (18	  June	  2012),	  available	  online:	  http://www.theafricareport.com/News-­‐Analysis/the-­‐lamu-­‐project-­‐kenyas-­‐gateway-­‐to-­‐africa.html	  	  KIGGUNDU,	  Edris,	  ‘Secret	  Oil	  Deals	  Leak’,	  in	  The	  Observer	  (7	  February),	  available	  online:	  http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7140	  	  MBABAZI,	   Peninnah,	   ‘EAC	   Common	   Market	   Protocol	   is	   Key	   to	   Achieve	   Regional	  Integration’	  in	  New	  Vision	  (29	  January	  2014),	  available	  online:	  http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/651929-­‐eac-­‐common-­‐market-­‐protocol-­‐is-­‐key-­‐to-­‐achieve-­‐regional-­‐integration.html	  	  MBANGA,	   Jeff,	   ‘Uganad’s	   Crude	   Oil	   to	   be	   Exported’,	   in	   The	   Observer	   (26	   July	   2012),	  available	  online:	  http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20047:-­‐ugandas-­‐crude-­‐oil-­‐to-­‐be-­‐exported	  	  MURPHY,	   Richard	   &	   Nicholas	   Shaxson,	   ‘African	   Graft	   is	   a	   Global	   Responsibility’,	   in	  
Financial	  Times	  (1	  June	  2007),	  available	  online:	  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/edd9b506-­‐0c74-­‐11dc-­‐a4dc-­‐000b5df10621.html#axzz3H515oMhg	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  117	  
MUSINGUZI,	  Bamaturaki	  (2010),	  ‘Leaked	  Secret	  Oil	  Contracts	  Show	  Uganda	  did	  not	  get	  a	  ‘Great	  Deal’,	  in	  The	  East	  African	  (1	  March),	  available	  online:	  http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-­‐/2558/870304/-­‐/pumsyvz/-­‐/index.html	  	  NARESH,	   Amrit,	   ‘Uganda	   Seeks	   a	   Refined	   Place	   in	   the	   Oil	   World’,	   in	   Open	   Oil	   (10	  December	  2012),	  available	  online:	  http://openoil.net/2012/12/10/uganda-­‐seeks-­‐a-­‐refined-­‐place-­‐in-­‐the-­‐oil-­‐world/	  	  NGANDA,	  Ssemujju	  Ibrahim,	  ‘The	  Forces	  Behind	  Museveni’s	  Power’,	  in	  The	  Observer	  (11	  May	  2011),	  available	  online:	  http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13387:the-­‐forces-­‐behind-­‐musevenis-­‐power	  	  NG’WANIKILALA,	   Fumbuka,	   ‘Tanzania	   Complains	   of	   Being	   Sidelined	   in	   East	   African	  Bloc’,	  in	  Reuters	  (5	  November	  2013),	  available	  online:	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/05/us-­‐tanzania-­‐eastafrica-­‐idUSBRE9A40SY20131105	  	  ODHIAMBO,	  Allan,	  ‘Kibaki	  Sets	  up	  Agecy	  to	  Run	  Lamu	  Port	  Project’,	  in	  Business	  Daily	  (31	  March),	  available	  online:	  http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Kibaki-­‐sets-­‐up-­‐agency-­‐to-­‐run-­‐Lamu-­‐port-­‐project/-­‐/539546/1735498/-­‐/3ht8pwz/-­‐/index.html	  	  SALESA,	  Hussein,	  ‘Lapsset	  ‘Not	  good	  for	  All’,	  in	  The	  Star	  (16	  September	  2013),	  available	  online:	  http://www.the-­‐star.co.ke/news/article-­‐135899/lapsset-­‐not-­‐good-­‐all	  	  SSEKIKA,	   Edward,	   ‘Bunyoro	   Kingdom	   Faces	   Split’,	   in	   The	   Observer	   (13	   June	   2013),	  available	  online:	  http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&id=25867:oil-­‐bunyoro-­‐kingdom-­‐faces-­‐split&catid=34:news&Itemid=114	  -­‐ ‘Why	  Ugandans	  Could	  Miss	  Out	  on	  Oil	  Jobs’,	  in	  The	  Observer	  (2	  September	  2014),	  available	  online:	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  118	  
http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33642:-­‐why-­‐ugandans-­‐could-­‐miss-­‐out-­‐on-­‐oil-­‐jobs&catid=79:businesstopstories	  	  OLUPOT,	  Milton,	   ‘Fighter	   Jets	   to	  Protect	  Oil	   –	  Government’,	   in	  The	  New	  Vision	   (9	  April	  2011),	  available	  online:	  http://allafrica.com/stories/201104110308.html	  	  SLATER,	   Emma,	   ‘Political	   Party	   Funding:	   Michael	   Gove’s	   constituency	   receives	   over	  £60,000’	  in	  The	  Bureau	  of	  Investigative	  Journalism	  (21	  October	  2011),	  available	  online:	  http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/10/21/michael-­‐goves-­‐constituency-­‐receives-­‐over-­‐60000/	  	  The	  Economist	  (sn.)	  (2013),	  ‘Pipeline	  Poker’,	  in	  The	  Economist	  (25	  May	  2013),	  available	  online:	  http://www.economist.com/news/middle-­‐east-­‐and-­‐africa/21578402-­‐east-­‐africa-­‐danger-­‐throwing-­‐away-­‐part-­‐its-­‐new-­‐found-­‐oil	  	  WACHIRA,	   George,	   ‘Aligning	   Kenya	   to	   Benefit	   from	   New	   Foreign	   Investment	  Opportunities’,	  TRALAC,	  ‘News’	  (14	  August	  2014),	  available	  online:	  http://www.tralac.org/news/article/6049-­‐aligning-­‐kenya-­‐to-­‐benefit-­‐from-­‐new-­‐foreign-­‐investment-­‐opportunities.html	  	  
Webpages	  	  www.carbonweb.org	  	  Kenya	   Vision	   2030,	   ‘Flagship	   Projects:	   Lamu	   Port	   and	   New	   Transport	   Corridor	  Development	   to	   Southern	   Sudan	   and	   Ethiopia	   (LAPSSET)’,	   Available	   from:	  http://www.vision2030.go.ke/index.php/projects/details/Macro_enablers/181	   	   [15	  June	  2014].	  	  LAPSSET,	  http://www.lapsset.go.ke/newscast/pages/4	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	  119	  
LAPSSET	   Tracker,	   ‘Move	   Over	   LAPSSET	   Here	   Comes	   MWAPORC’,	   (25	   April	   2013),	  available	  online:	  http://lapssettracker.blogspot.no/2013/04/move-­‐over-­‐lapsset-­‐here-­‐comes-­‐mwaporc.html	  	  National	  Planning	  Authority	  (NPA),	  http://npa.ug/uganda-­‐vision-­‐2040/	  	  Save	  Lamu,	  http://www.savelamu.org/	  	  UNICEF	  Kenya	  (2012),	  http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/kenya_statistics.html	  	  UNICEF	  Uganda	  (2012),	  http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/uganda_statistics.html	  	  
	  
List	  of	  interviews	  	  Interviewee	   (sn.),	   central	  member	   of	  Ugandan	   civil	   society	   related	   to	   oil	   and	   gas,	   July	  2014,	  Kampala.	  	  GAUSTADSÆTHER,	   Thorbjørn,	   Ambassador,	   Royal	   Norwegian	   Embassy	   to	   Uganda,	   24	  October	  2014,	  Oslo.	  	  KYALIMPA,	  Florence,	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Officer,	  WWF	  Uganda,	  12	  July	  2014,	  Kampala.	  	  SØREIDE,	  Tina,	  Senior	  researcher,	  Chr.	  Michelsen	  Institut	  and	  University	  of	  Bergen,	  23	  October	  2014,	  Oslo.	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
